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We are pleased to present the latest volume in the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna’s 
publication series. The series, published in cooperation with our highly committed 
partner Sternberg Press, is devoted to central themes of contemporary thought 
about art practices and theories. The volumes comprise contributions on subjects 
that form the focus of discourse in art theory, cultural studies, art history, and 
research at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna and represent the quintessence of 
international study and discussion taking place in the respective fields. Each 
volume is published in the form of an anthology, edited by staff members of the 
academy. Authors of high international repute are invited to make contributions 
that deal with the respective areas of emphasis. Research activities such as  
international conferences, lecture series, institute-specific research focuses, or 
research projects serve as points of departure for the individual volumes.
All books in the series undergo a single blind peer review. International reviewers, 
whose identities are not disclosed to the editors of the volumes, give an in-depth 
analysis and evaluation for each essay. The editors then rework the texts, taking 
into consideration the suggestions and feedback of the reviewers who, in a second 
step, make further comments on the revised essays. The editors—and authors—
thus receive what is so rare in academia and also in art universities: committed, 
informed, and hopefully impartial critical feedback that can be used for finishing 
the work.
We thank the editors, Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and Leonhard Grond, 
for proposing this volume. We would also like to thank the authors for their  
contributions, and, as always, we are grateful to all the partners contributing to 
the book, especially Sternberg Press.
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When I came in I was confused, when I came out I was full of ideas. 
—Eilean Hooper Greenhill
Slipping into dizzying freefall, sliding into uncertainty, becoming stuck, losing 
one’s way, and giving up are as much actions as they are occurrences, both 
active and passive. Dizziness, marked by an increasing feeling of loss of control 
and vulnerability, is a midway state at the point where everything and nothing 
seems possible, where certainty and uncertainty are in superposition. What 
potential lies in being out of kilter? How does a thought, an expression, the 
emergence of an idea, or an experiment evolve under such a condition? How 
can this phenomenon of Taumel, which translates as “dizziness,” become a resource? 
In this book, dizziness is used as a metonym for cognitive, emotional, and 
physiological processes involving, unbalance, confusion, and disorientation. 
Moreover, Taumel is pertinent to a physical, mental, and metaphorical frame  
of references, and is therefore relevant to cross- and transdisciplinary commu-
nication. However, the appropriateness of the terms Taumel and dizziness 
were challenged throughout the trajectory of the artistic research project 
“Dizziness—A Resource” funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-PEEK,  
AR 224, 2014–17), that lay the foundation for this publication, evaluating their 
implications and exploring functionality and appositeness. Through this  
multidisciplinary confrontation, the project was able to establish dizziness  
as an operational term for related artistic and scientific research. 
Starting with the attempt to call the phenomenon of dizziness by its proper 
name, this book brings together diverse voices considering the potential of this 
in-between state from multiple perspectives and in view of different disci-
plines. With specific attention to moving-image art and post-structural philos-
ophy, reflecting the expertise of the editors, this book assembles essays,  
interviews, and poetic texts by sixteen artists, artistic researchers, philosophers, 
scientists, and practitioners from Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Israel, and Poland. Contrasting their respective approaches, Dizziness— 
A Resource aims to reveal the richness of a future field of cross-disciplinary 
dizziness studies that seeks to understand dizziness from the viewpoints of 
different disciplines: from sensory input to philosophical and metaphorical 
dizziness, to artistic and creative processes, to personal, or sociopolitical change 
processes. The contributing authors share a background of interdisciplinary 
research that broadens their methodological approaches as well as their 
practice. Referring to this common background, the use of conversations in 
this book represents a methodological approach of the underlying artistic re-
search project. This volume can be perceived as the first attempt to outline 
the emerging field of dizziness studies. Further and ongoing research is to be 
found on the online repository: http://www.on-dizziness.org.
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ilinx and spatial theories of the early Futurists in regard to aviation, art history, 
and expanded cinema. Caillois’s game theory is subsequently addressed  
by architectural theorist Davide Deriu and philosopher Sarah Kolb. Their con-
tributions differ in style, but are both concerned with how dizziness offers ways  
to position oneself outside the societal norm; be it the illegal art of high-wire 
walking between the urban abyss of the Twin Towers of the former World Trade 
Center, or challenging scientific boundaries by translating the experience of 
existential dizziness into philosophical writing as the case of Caillois. Rebekka 
Ladewig’s essay on Jan Evangelista Purkyně’s self-experiments in the nineteenth 
century ties in with her book Schwindel: Eine Epistemologie der Orientierung 
(2017), which considers the significance of vertigo within an epistemology 
of orientation. Ladewig is also a cofounder of the Berlin-based cultural sciences 
journal ilinx, which proposes and analyzes new and experimental forms of  
research in cultural studies. The first edition of the journal was an essential 
catalyst for the artistic research “Dizziness—A Resource.” The title, ilinx, refers 
to Caillois’s groundbreaking study Les jeux et les hommes: Le masque et le 
vertige (1958).
 
The third section, “Modes of Creativity,” begins with a conversation between 
Anderwald, Grond, and creativity researcher Mathias Benedek, who became another 
important contributor to “Dizziness—A Resource.” Not only would Benedek and 
his colleague Emanuel Jauk’s psychological creativity research be challenged 
by the artist duo approaching them with questions about their own creativity, but 
their cooperation also created new research in the form of a scientific survey 
that was incorporated into an art competition Living in a Dizzying World. The  
artwork that won first prize, Fractal Crisis (2016) by Viktor Landström and Sebastian 
Wahlforss, was included in the exhibitions on dizziness. Besides elucidating on 
the relation of dizziness and creativity, the conversation also testifies to essential 
questions of arts-based research and research-based art. Indeed, the problem 
of mutual translation, translatability, and understanding is a visceral one for any 
cross-disciplinary research and has its specific moulding within the realm of 
artistic research. In the essay “The Many Facets of Creative,” researcher and head 
of innovation and strategy at a company that provides medical and therapeutic 
solutions Maya M. Shmailov links the personality of creative boundary-crossers 
with their ability to risk failure, and to place themselves in states of imbalance 
to come out with new ideas. What Shmailov researches in the sciences, consul-
tant and philosopher Maria Spindler presents as a practice-based example 
within management. Like Botar, Deriu, Shmailov, and Alice Pechriggl, Spindler 
also speaks about the necessary training of specific capabilities in the context 
of business consulting.
Opening the last section, “Navigating Dizziness,” with the interview “Navigating 
the Unknown,” philosopher and psychoanalyst Pechriggl refers to her existential 
experience of dizziness when speaking about writing her book on acting out 
The book’s four sections “Naming Dizziness,” “Transversal Nature of Dizziness,” 
“Modes of Creativity,” and “Navigating Dizziness” question how and under 
which conditions dizziness can be regarded a resource. The prelude addresses 
the reader as a possible “agent of confusion” and confronts her or him with 
the personification of dizziness. Together, the editors of this book, created the 
poetic monologue Dizziness Is My Name in a collective effort to combine art, 
philosophy, and artistic research with musical improvisation by trumpet player 
Anders Nyquist from the Vienna-based orchestra klangforum Wien. Midway  
between manifesto and sound installation, Dizziness Is My Name was employed 
to lead the visitor through the exhibitions on dizziness at Kunsthaus Graz and 
U-jazdowski Castle Centre for Contemporary Art in Warsaw. 
Drawing on the prelude the first section, “Naming Dizziness,” presents different 
ways to give dizziness a proper name. Ruth Anderwald and Leonhard Grond’s 
essay gives account on the research-creation process of “Dizziness—A Resource” 
and its starting points, carefully positing dizziness as a resource within “artistic 
facts,” artistic-cinematic practices, philosophical thought, and scientific research. 
Following this is a conversation with philosopher François Jullien, which laid 
the foundation of Anderwald and Grond’s cooperation with Karoline Feyertag, 
who added the focus on French contemporary philosophy to the research-
creation process. Jullien presents a steady point of reference for the artist 
duo, well before their research on dizziness set off. Therefore, it deemed logical 
to explore with Jullien the connection of the dynamics of his thoughts on  
dizziness as a concept in motion. The conversation revealed some indispensable 
preliminaries to the reflection of dizziness; namely, linking dizziness to the 
philosophical terms “ambiguity,” “paradox,” and “compossibility.” The contribu-
tion by Jarosław Lubiak, artistic director of U-jazdowski Castle Centre for 
Contemporary Art Warsaw, is explicitly concerned with naming dizziness and 
highlights the fact that the phenomenon called dizziness functions as a 
“proper name,” eluding the necessity for narrowly defining the object of study 
but rather introducing dizziness into Lacan’s concept of a “symbolic system.” 
A prospect on this symbolic dimension of dizziness is provided by philosopher 
Marcus Steinweg in his experimental philosophical essay “Dizzy Thinking” through 
the mastery of thinking and writing: beginning with Peter Handke, passing  
by Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Jacques Lacan, Jean-François Lyotard, Franz 
Kafka, Edgar Allan Poe’s maelstrom, Simone Weil’s pain, Robert Walser’s Schnori, 
and closing with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s questions on certainty, Steinweg  
encompasses the proper risk of dizziness when the individual exposes oneself 
to the act of philosophizing: “No thinking without risk.” 
The second section, “Transversal Nature of Dizziness,” focuses on the cultural, 
art-historical, architectural, and performative accounts of dizziness. Com-
mencing this section, art historian Oliver A. I. Botar emphasizes the corporeal 
and artistic pleasures of dizziness from the perspective of Roger Caillois’s  
Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and Leonhard Grond
14
and taking action. Her accident led to the inclusion of a specific phase into 
her theory of action that refers to mise en abîme, which is the human experience 
of groundlessness, disorientation, and fear of the abyss. To navigate dizziness 
as a quandary or predicament equals the necessity to confront fears connected 
with these personal experiences and to train ourselves “to master vertigo”  
as Caillois proposed. The conversation that follows between Kunsthaus Graz 
chief curator Katrin Bucher Trantow and artist and activist Oliver Ressler 
strengthens the political aspects of dizziness and dissent their potential, but 
also pushes for radical change, self-empowerment, and solidarity. Finally,  
Feyertag’s essay “Dizziness: From Aporia to Method?” tries to summarize the 
different and divergent ways in, through, and out of dizziness, asking if dizziness 
and the artistic research project “Dizziness—A Resource” created a method 
or rather a poros—the way that always has to be traced anew. As there are a lot 
of individual and collective ways into dizziness, it seems there are as many 
leading out of or away from dizziness. 
In conclusion, the resource of dizziness, like all resources, needs to be activated, 
explored, and exploited in order to become fertile. The plurality of perspectives 
on dizziness assembled in this volume is offered as a resource: a resource to 
profit from and to inspire further artistic and scientific investigation on the 
topic. In this way, this book does not present an exhaustive systematization of 
dizziness but introduces dizziness in light of the disciplines that make up the 
core of the artistic research project. 
We are very thankful for the cooperation and the ongoing exchange with  
scientific, practice-based, and artistic contributors and institutions that have 
contributed to the development of the project. By questioning different  
disciplines and modes of expression, we aim to draw an accurate picture of 
the visceral experience of dizziness, its reflection and observation, and  
to give an overview of the diverse methods and disciplines engaged in this 
endeavor. Thus, this book opens a glimpse into what cross-disciplinary  
dizziness studies could be, and how artistic research contributes knowledge, 
understanding, and insight on today’s dizzying conditio humana. 
Mode d’emploi
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It’s hopeless to find the initials.
Constantly, I digress …
I’m old and also very young. I’m always already here. 
I do not have roots: my root is rootlessness. 
I do not have ground: my ground is groundlessness.
Dizziness is my name and I am a pendulum without rope or gravity. 
My gravity is movement. 
I’m your out-of-body experience. I’m your fall. I’m your hallucination. 
I’m your somnambulistic awareness.    
I am your voice of reason.     
Sometimes.
I am here and I am there, I stagger, I stumble, I stammer, and I twist. 





Catch me if you can.
I am here.
I’m not your inspiration, thank you very much.
I am awake only in what I love & desire to the point of terror—everything else 
is just shrouded furniture, quotidian anaesthesia, shit-for-brains, sub-reptilian 
ennui of totalitarian regimes, banal censorships, and useless pain.  
But—I digress … 
Here you are, the artist as the enemy of general sensibilities, the philosopher as 
the enemy of common sense, the economist as the enemy of balance. We have 
had our conflicts, our failures, and losses. But let’s put that behind us now: a 
devaluation is direly needed, a trans-valuation, a reevaluation of our relation to 
the world and to ourselves in order to understand the world anew.
To be sure, we are staggering and will be staggering for some time. But we do 
not intend to fall, and in this decade we shall set the pace and spiral forward.
Chaos comes before all principles of order and entropy, it’s neither a god nor 
a maggot, its idiotic desires encompass and define every possible choreography, 
all meaningless aethers & phlogistons: its masks are crystallizations of its own 
facelessness, like clouds.
Confront your anxiety of the formless, of the faceless and embrace it.
Is it this anxiety that finally will make you fall? 
Don’t you see, out of your neediness for categories you create bloodless ghosts 
from ambiguity. Ambiguity and Dizziness: we clear the path to this vast openness, this 
in-between state of mind, of confusion and combination, of the not-yet, of the 
“as well,” of the compossible—where contradictions and opposites fuse together.
Let us mount our horses of imagination and off with us—in search for 
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To understand the resourceful potential of dizziness, 
we had to let Dizziness speak to us, listen to Dizziness.  
The process of personalization led to this monologue, 
that was combined with improvisations by Swedish 
trumpet player Anders Nyquist for the eponymous 
sound installation and film.
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There is no being safe, because being safe in itself is unsafe. 
Don’t take control; take the next step.
In fact, the idea of control is meaningless on its own. 
In a world of rampant inequality and injustice, we can only seize control at the 
expense of someone else.
Bon courage, ma vieille pirate! 
Stagger rhymes with dagger—and you my agents!   
You need to move out of yourself to start!
Turn, let lose, let go, embrace your helplessness, and eye to eye with it make 
way for new possibilities and new impossibilities.
Our big chance is that we acknowledge a part of the still Unknown as  
unknown (without assimilating the Unknown into the yet Known), and that we 
become open for what we do not yet know or are not yet able to think   
and that we free our minds and move, move, move.
Dizziness is my name and I am a pendulum without rope or gravity.  
My gravity is movement.
Together, we will reach this intermediate space, where every answer becomes 
a question and every question becomes an answer; arrive at the crossroads 
where all journeys merge.
This is a place where roads not only join, but new axes multiply and new 
directions sprout.
This stage is faraway and very close by, created by ephemeral moments that 
simultaneously mark a departure and the arrival of the next step. Every 
arriving is a new departing toward this stage, where everything is compossible 
and it’s only a step made, for other steps to come.
There is no meaning unless this meaning  
creates a multiplicity of other meanings.
Here is what I, Dizziness, have to offer you: 
confusion guided by a clear sense of purpose.
Leave shattered what was lost.   
Hold on to our purpose and hold on to hope! 
I am here, I’m not there. 
I am not. 
I become. And I digress.
I’ve heard surviving pilots tell that free fall triggers a feeling of confusion 
between the self and the aircraft. While falling, people may sense themselves 
as being things, while things may sense that they are people. Traditional 
modes of seeing and feeling are shattered. Any sense of balance is disrupted. 
Perspectives are twisted and multiplied. Doesn’t that sound familiar? 
We’ll let Aporia guide us. Aporia who seizes us, paralyses us, and drowns us. 
Aporia, you can bring us to the threshold of compossibility.
Remember, without me you will never be able to fully understand the value of 
loss and failure, the value of vitality, nor will you be able to find alternatives to 
success and failure.
Dizziness is my name and I am a pendulum without rope or gravity. 
My gravity is movement.




I, Dizziness, am not only stumbling and turning—I’m also exploding,  
spreading all over, and recalling the ephemeral to mind:
I’m in the north and in the south, in the east and in the west, I’m up and down, 
going up and going down, dragging you with me onto this roller-coaster trip, 
following you on your vertiginous heights. My breathtaking pace creates new 
wills as it dispels old, new ignorance, new problems, new dangers. The opening 
vistas of dizziness promise confusion, hardship, as well as high reward. 
Creativity and responsibility have to go hand in hand. Say what you have to 
say properly and then take responsibility for it.
Artists and philosophers, scientists and inventors, poets, gifted teachers, doctors, 
economists, talented politicians, and gardeners. My agents of confusion! This 
is your call of duty! 
Watch the things that are not here.   
Or not yet.       
Go, transform! Confuse! Dream.
It seems you thrive on movement not yet made, on space undefined, unexplained, 
on things unthought and uncombined. You know that to combine means to 
confuse—at first. As agents of confusion you precede the agents of change.
Your promise is to grow on disaster as much as on construction, on the 
useless as much as on the necessary, on the absurd, the arbitrary, and the 
alien. 
You have experienced yourself different situations of dizziness, like being in 
flow, intoxication, inebriation, or spinning around—complementary and  
contradictory as they come—but remember: as you enter my cocoon, a certain 
numbness befalls you; your perception of time changes, as your perception  
of proportion; think of the sensation of increasing loss of control; of the  
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There is a dimension, which seems fertile in this moment of dizziness 
when things become confused because they lose their equilibrium and 
because they find themselves suspended from the clearness, which  
allowed thinking them. 
—François Jullien
Any art hopes […] to speak with some cogency of our condition as human 
beings; […] Art can accomplish such ends only through accuracy, 
through exact definition, what Confucius referred to as “calling things 
by their right names.” 
—Hollis Frampton
The book Dizziness—A Resource is the culmination of a four-year-long, extensive 
transnational, cross-disciplinary process that encompasses artistic, academic, 
and practice-based research. It has spawned a blog, two major exhibitions, a 
series of HASENHERZ film screenings,1 discussions, workshops, conferences, a 
survey tied to an art competition, and artistic and academic publications. All 
this was done in an attempt to more fully define the multidimensional phenomenon 
of dizziness, and calling it by its “right name.” Despite a proclivity toward eclec-
ticism, the project’s emphasis was on casting dizziness in a new light, identifying 
that it has its own field of artistic and interdisciplinary research, and showcasing 
the creative potential it holds. In the process of metaphorization and prosopopoeia,2 
Dizziness—A Resource takes advantage of art’s potential to integrate not only 
the contributions of multiple disciplines but to also include the unknown and 
paradoxical. The latter is essential in this case, because—in the words of Polish 
curator and scholar Jarosław Lubiak: “Dizziness is the name of what disrupts 
communication, understanding, comprehension. It suspends beyond all certainty.”3 
Definition
For this endeavor, the German word Taumel is translated as “dizziness,” but the 
meanings of both terms are not strictly identical. Taumel describes the positive, 
negative, and ambiguous feelings of being dizzy, as well as the staggering 
Dizziness— 
A Resource?
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1 “HASENHERZ or the Pleasures of the Moving 
Image and Word” is a screening- and dis-
cussion format that simultaneously constitutes 
a work of art and an instrument of in-depth 
art examination based on an open exchange 
between the artist and the audience. By 
screening the work repeatedly with inter-
mittent discussions including the artist 
and the audience, it furthers a deeper under-
standing of film and video art. Its method 
is appropriated from Arnold Schönberg’s 
practice to perform and communicate new 
developments in contemporary music.
 2 Prosopopoeia is a figure of speech 
representing an abstract quality or idea as 
a person or creature speaking and acting.
 3 Jarosław Lubiak “Semantics of Dizziness” 
(lecture, “Balancing Togetherness,” 
Warsaw, December 1, 2017). See also in 




we took his proposition further to expand our understanding of dizziness as a 
resource within the concept of the compossible space.11 By creating a com-
possible space, the unpredictable movement of Taumel discomposes the given 
and habitual—such as its wants, preconceptions, patterns, disciplines, mean-
ings, or systems—creating space and dynamics in-between established cate-
gorization and perceived oppositions, and thus making space for a change of 
perspective and renewal. As a dynamic motion, Taumel arises situationally, locally, 
and temporarily, and combines disparate elements: commotion and continuity, 
dissolution and formation, habitude and evolution, disorientation and momen-
tum. It can clear or obfuscate, cause a great stir—move heaven and earth.12  
According to Plato, dizziness signifies the constitution of all philosophical thought 
by destabilizing the basis of knowledge to a state of uncertainty: as an onto-
logical state, it indicates a temporal opening toward possible transformation 
and innovation.13
Departing from the conception of dizziness as an underlying and uncontrollable 
dynamic that dissolves perspectives, meanings, boundaries, disciplines,  
oppositions, categories, and systems, our research identified dizziness as an 
agent of confusion. It was defined, named, and characterized, and through 
prosopopoeia, the voice of an expressive fictional character was created. Fur-
thermore, as well as sharing Hannah Arendt’s appreciation of metaphors  
connecting abstract thinking with the realms of the sensory,14 and Hollis Frampton’s 
confidence in images being able to cross psycholinguistic and disciplinary 
movement of a body that is about to fall down. Moreover, it is often used 
metaphorically, for example, in the German expression im Taumel der Gefühle, 
which implies doing something inconsiderate when being overwhelmed by 
an emotion, such as rage, sadness, or love. In the context of this project, the 
word “dizziness” is used in a positive, negative, and ambiguous way and is an 
expansion of the original English meaning of the term. Its ambivalence and 
disconcerting polysemy, on the one hand, and simple efficiency, on the other, 
defy the strict categorization attributed to a concept. It emphasizes the 
ephemeral and unpredictable character of the phenomenon of dizziness, which 
is understood as the unforeseeable movement or the feeling of such move-
ment that causes a shift from the expected and familiar to the uncertain and 
unknown.4 Being subjected to experiences of dizziness can evoke a fearful  
response, as individuals find themselves lost in turmoil, confounded and unable 
to trust their senses and reason ing. The experience of dizziness causes feel-
ings equivalent to philosopher Timothy Morton’s description of being inside 
a hurricane: “To be inside a hurricane is to inhabit a ‘present’ […]. This is  
because a hurricane has its own temporality, not ours. We endure it, undergo it, 
in a nowness that is more like a slightly nauseating feeling of relative motion.”5
Nevertheless, many people purposefully and joyfully search for states of  
dizziness, relishing moments of blissful disorientation, self-abandonment, and 
catharsis.6 This chapter explores the subject of dizziness concerning the  
individual in relation to artistic and philosophical sources, and in the wider 
context of the cultural and natural sciences, underlining the assumption that 
it can become a source of transformation and creativity. In particular, Dizziness—
A Resource investigates whether the emergence of dizziness, such as the 
states it creates and its effects, can be regarded as a resource, and if so, under 
what conditions. Drawing attention to the creative and generative potential of 
this in-between state, we propose to reconsider dizziness as a way of thinking 
about artistic practice and other fields of creative thinking, and as a primary 
indicator of the possibility for transformation.7 The research-creation process 
on Dizziness—A Resource started from the hypothesis that states of dizziness  
in the form of disorientation, unbalance, uncertainty, or confusion are not only 
a part of the physiology and ontology of being human, but also of artistic 
and philosophical or even any creative processes.8 By becoming dizzy, the in-
dividual experiences emotional turbulences including shifting and overlapping 
feelings of insecurity, exhilaration, lightheadedness, perturbation, disarray, 
and anxiety. Exposure to dizziness increasingly reduces predictability and 
thus affects our ability to exercise control and hindsight.9
In the interview with philosopher Karoline Feyertag in 2015, French philosopher 
François Jullien, whose book The Silent Transformations (2009) was a valuable 
reference from the very beginning of this project, called our attention to the 
connectivity of ambiguity, compossibility, and dizziness.10 Together with Feyertag, 
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4 See François Jullien, The Silent Transfor­
mations, trans. Krysztof Fijalkowski and 
Michael Richardson (London: Seagull 
Books, 2011).
 5 Timothy Morton, “Apologies for the Delay: 
Time Junction,” wall text for “After the End 
of the World,” an exhibition about the 
present and the future of the climate 
crisis that took place at Centre de Cultura 
Contemporània de Barcelona, October 25, 
2017–May 1, 2018.
 6 Petra, Löffler, Verteilte Aufmerksamkeit, 
Eine Mediengeschichte der Zerstreuung 
(Zurich: diaphanes, 2013).
 7 See Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation 
(London: Hutchinson & Co, 1964).
 8 Rebecca Solnit, A Field Guide to Getting 
Lost (London: Penguin Books, 2005). See 
also Mathias Benedek, Emanuel Jauk, and 
Kevin Kerschenbauer, “Creating Art: An 
Experience Sampling Study in the Domain 
of Moving Image Art,” Psychology of Aesthe­
tics, Creativity, and the Arts (2017): 325–34.
9 Isabell Lorey, State of Insecurity: Govern­
ment of the Precarious (London: Verso, 2016), 
18.
10 See Karoline Feyertag and François Jullien, 
“On the Philosophical Potential of 
Dizziness and Compossible Space,” in this 
volume, 54–64.
 11 Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and 
Leonhard Grond, “The Concepts of 
Dizziness and the Compossible Space in 
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different brain areas),20 we saw the connection to Jullien’s definition of com-
possibility, as the realm of the foundational non-separation, non-distinction, 
non-exclusivity where the one (thing, thought, fact, idea) as well as the other 
are simultaneously existent without excluding each other or making each 
other impossible. To shape a compossible space, an actual space-time for 
compossibility and dizziness, we attempted to recreate such a network for 
our project through the diverse sources and disciplines we involved. In this 
cross-disciplinary cooperative process, it proved germane to keep the dia-
logue carefully on topic, and to not focus on disciplinary specifics or taxonomies 
but rather to keep an open mind for what may still be on the outside of the 
current focus. 
In this way we surrounded the research hypothesis with abundant, diverse, 
and sometimes contradicting information, enduring the resultant zones of 
confusion and ambiguity that emerged. To make dizziness resourceful a high 
tolerance for ambiguity and disarray is needed—what the English poet John 
Keats termed negative capability21—as well as the confidence that even disparate 
parts will “come together because of a propensity inherent in the material” 
or in the initial question.22 In this way, dizziness used as a method involves in-
creasing complexity, and that in itself can be confusing and perplexing. How-
boundaries,15 we relate our artistic research practice to Polish curator and art 
theorist Jerzy Ludwiński (1930–2000) and his concept of post-artistic practice. 
To this effect, it was not ultimately plausible to impose a clear-cut separation 
between topic and method and applied thinking and working processes. 
However, reflections along this line show that in the final analysis, the interde-
pendence between all factors can yield an intelligible artistic narrative and 
increase scientific and popular understanding of the topic, even if the main 
character, dizziness, remains unstable, unpredictable, vertiginous, and 
other worldly.
Artistic Facts, Compossible Space, and Dizziness as a Method
States of dizziness can lead to disorientation, confusion, perplexity, or even 
paralysis and aporia. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the search for an 
apposite methodology for our research-creation led us to the consideration 
of, and experimentation with, dizziness as a method.16 Thus, we focused on the 
potential of dizziness as a productive part of creative and artistic processes 
and on its potential of creating and dynamizing a compossible space. 
In his writings, Ludwiński referred to post-art as vulnerable art, ephemeral art, or 
impossible art to underline “the dialogue that art has with other spheres of civiliza-
tion while taking into consideration the specificity of that dialogue with our reality.”17 
This is not a recent phenomenon, but deeply rooted in the development of the 
visual arts of the twentieth century. Ludwiński considered the artists’ desideratum 
for a multi- or cross-disciplinary approach as first being caused by the blurring of 
the boundaries within the arts, and subsequently by the dissolution of boundaries 
between the arts, cultural sciences, technological developments, and entrepre-
neurship. Indeed, in this multi- or cross-disciplinary work process, he claims, the 
“work of art loses its former spatial and temporal structure and no longer con-
forms to any previously drawn limits. The work of art can appear everywhere and 
embrace anything and everything. It becomes concrete only in the viewer’s 
imagination. The recording of the creative process is confined either to its pro-
logue—the idea—or its epilogue—the docu men ta tion.”18 Therefore, neither the 
documentation of the process nor the initial idea is apt to transport the entirety of 
the artistic work, which is rather constituted of an artistic fact.19 Such an artistic 
fact is nevertheless limited in its potential to account for the social and transfor-
mational aspect of shared knowledge formation and imagination that fuel, co-
create, and progress the research-creation process.
How much of a resource dizziness actually is was put to the test when it was 
used as a methodological approach. By drawing on the psychological under-
standing of creativity as inciting and stimulating a complex network between 
a multitude of divergents, indeed, even with conflicting information (from 
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ever, dizziness also provides space-time in the form of the compossible space 
to use ambiguity and confusion dynamically and to keep thinking in motion, 
that is, “a mode of thinking infused by movement, not relying on fixed points 
but on moving relations and shifting anchor points.”23 
Furthermore, a number of different artists, curators, researchers, and practi-
tioners were involved in this endeavor of defining dizziness, and this social 
interaction, exchange, and critique proved to be invaluable. The participants’ 
open-mindedness made it possible to use the dynamics of dizziness, uncer-
tainty, and disorientation to drive the research process. Or, in the words of 
Ludwiński: “What matters are the tensions created by the collective effort  
of many individuals which contributes to the making of one system, pulsating 
with its own life.”24 The project blog (www.on-dizziness.org) can be perceived 
as an artistic fact in its own right and represents a collection of further artistic 
facts that draw on a broader picture of the process of artistic, scientific, 
practice-based, and curatorial investigation. 
Synthesizing all the disciplinary languages and ensuing tensions into a voice 
that portrays dizziness has become the final research-based artistic output. 
Through this metaphorization of dizziness into an archaic persona, the research-
creation’s “pulsating life” gradually transformed and gave life to the voice of 
dizziness. Dizziness’ monologue is presented in the prelude to this book and 
alongside the research-creation’s related interviews and academic writing.25 
Moreover, through the aforementioned “tensions created by the collective effort 
of many individuals” and through the many contributors who wrote texts for 
this book, the multifaceted potential and impact of dizziness have become 
manifest.
Experimentation and Artistic Process
In the following section, we will consider dizziness by experiencing and reflect-
ing on the staggering movements of our own dizzy bodies, taking into account 
that “the structure of the nervous system is such that it is hard to imagine 
purely sensory or motor or vegetative impulses. The most abstract thought has 
emotional-vegetative and sensory-motor components. Abstract thinking is 
possible only in conjunction with a special configuration or pattern or state of 
the body.”26
Every morning in the few weeks into this research-creation project, we started 
with an experiment: we took turns spinning ourselves until we fell. Contrary to 
nineteenth-century physiologist Jan Evangelista Purkyně’s self-experiments 
that were aimed at categorizing dizziness and vertigo, we were particularly 
interested in the photographic and philosophical qualities of dizziness.27  
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In particular, we focused on capturing the fleeting moment of a spinning person 
turning and falling simultaneously (see figs. 1–8). It is the turning point, the 
superposition of balancing upright and falling, in the precise temporal and 
spatial moment of the superposition of motion and standstill or, as François 
Jullien suggests, the compossibility of all possibilities and impossibilities of 
motion and standstill, of balance and fall.28 
As artists working with time-based media, we were intrigued to record com-
possibility and depict the spatiotemporal moment when falling and moving 
upright become equally and simultaneously possible. While observing the 
other person spinning, it soon became apparent when people are staggering 
and then falling, there are no outward signs to indicate the quality of their 
momentary experience of dizziness, nor could we predict when or if the stag-
gering person would eventually fall down. Encouraged by these observations, 
we began to work on data for 3D models (figs. 1–6). With the help of iconic,  
a leading photogrammetry studio in Istanbul, participants were surrounded 
by the studio’s cage consisting of one hundred cameras while they spun until 
they fell. After quite a few failed attempts, we were finally able to record 
snapshots from one hundred different perspectives of each person in this 
compossible moment, and thus we were able to print two photo-sculpture 
models from this data (see figs. 7–8). 
The female figurine cannot stand. Indeed, the velocity and rotational forces just 
barely stabilized the moving body into an upright position before she fell 
down. More generally, this exposes the dizzy person’s illusion of being in control 
over his or her body’s movements, when in fact the fall is already underway. 
It highlights that the limen of falling is transgressed before we are even able 
to recognize it with certainty, neither from the standpoint of the observer nor 
from the perspective of the dizzy person. The photographs for the male figure 
were taken an instant before he fell backward. But even in his stumbling, the 
figurine’s poise appears balanced and stable because the body movements 
before and after the snapshots cannot be anticipated from this momentary 
posture, pointing to the unpredictable, processual, conditional, and temporary 
nature of dizziness and its expression on the body. In essence, these artistic 
facts are consistent with the medical definition of dizziness as a symptom that 
has to be described from the experiencing person and cannot sufficiently be 
described or depicted from the outside alone. Therefore, dizziness requires the 
communication of the experience from the dizzy person and also the recording 
and analysis of the observation, the experiencing and its reflection. The fol-
lowing steps of the artistic process saw the adding of reflective layers in the 
form of poetic language and curatorial reflection. 
The Bend
Since it became apparent while working on the figurines that we wanted to 
address the experience of dizziness, as well as the reflection and remembrance 
of the experience simultaneously, in each case in a different artistic language, 
we started the search for a possible narrative description of the erratic and 
unpredictable nature of dizziness. Yet something else caught our attention: in 
our spinning experiments we experienced the impression of suspended or 
accelerated time, as Morton mentioned in his consideration of being inside a 
hurricane, but we felt that this also applied to other dizzying experiences 
such as losing one’s way, falling in love, or going on a roller-coaster ride. This 
different experience of time is not perceivable from an outside perspective, 
of course, but impacts interaction. As a way to accommodate these obser-
vations artistically, we put together text and images conveying different perspec-
tives on time for the booklet The Bend (figs. 9–10). The images themselves 
bend time insofar as these pictures were all taken in the same instant, but are 
laid out in time, treating the pages of the booklet as film frames. In a continuous 
loop, the poetic text “The Bend” oscillates between different narrative persons 
(from the first-person singular to third-person plural) and relates their experiences 
and expectations on a winding, unforeseeable path. On this course, they find 
themselves stunned and overwhelmed time and time again, eventually coming 
to terms with their experiences to find themselves paralyzed still by the next 
turn. When both the images and the text came together, it defined a decisive 
moment in our artistic process, widening our perception of the possible artistic 
output and heightening our intention of metaphorizing dizziness.
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Can this really be the right direction?
So different from what they assumed?
Proceeding seems easier now.
And finally, after the bend I will have certainty.
Here, the bend!
Intersilient—








Can this really be the right direction?
So different from what they assumed?
Proceeding seems easier now.
And finally, after the bend I will have certainty.
Here, the bend!
The Emotional and Corporeal Experience of Dizziness
In the previously described self-experiment, the anticipation of feeling unwell 
after spinning resulted in a very displeasing start to our daily chores. Due to 
this, and to the fact that it required too much time to recover from, we ended it. 
Danish artist Joachim Koester emphasizes how the reflecting of experiences 
of dizziness, and the memories and emotions we connect to them, shape our 
preconditions, form beliefs, and thus impact our actual experience.29 In a 
similar manner, we realized that the uncomfortable expectation of being unwell 
afterward increasingly influenced our experience. Nevertheless, dizziness is 
an experience that extracts from the habitual, also through said change in the 
dizzy person’s perception of time, and thus, whether pleasurable or unpleasant, 
may present a cathartic or transformative experience.
The resource rich, and even cathartic, character of dizziness is emphasized in 
filmmaker Henry Hills’s experience. Hills literally used dizziness as a resource 
to overcome a severe and prolonged crisis in his work. Spinning around, camera 
in hand, and becoming dizzy enabled him to pull through this difficult situa-
tion. Not only did it seem to him that the vertiginous perception of the world 
matched the uncertainties about going on with his work, but his becoming 
dizzy also stimulated new sensations, and brought back a dear childhood 
memory: spinning and falling into the grass while watching the world turning 
Figs. 9–10
Ruth Anderwald + Leonhard Grond, The Bend. Taumel Issue #3, 2015
29 Joachim Koester, in an unpublished 
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around him. This early and positive experience of dizziness and of creating 
moving images helped him to push through in this troubled period in his life, 
and he recovered by making a film about spinning. Hills used dizziness not 
only as his resource, both personally and artistically, but also as his method. 
His experimental film Failed States (2008) investigates dizziness as a reflec-
tive and visceral experience, taking into account that “every muscular con-
traction has an origin and a history, which is also this idea of memory situated 
in the body, or events leaving sediments in the body, sediments that can be 
explored or become compulsive as they ‘become’ in the mind. So, in the mind, 
memory sits as a kind of premise for this world.”30 Moreover, we need to think 
about the emotions that dizziness evokes “in terms of ideas and values, that 
is as judgments about things: To hate or to fear is to have a judgment about a 
thing as it approaches.” However, “thinking about what emotions do cannot 
be thought about without the sense of being in a body.”31
Throughout this artistic research, dizziness is considered a phenomenon of 
embodied knowledge that blurs the boundaries not only between experience, 
memory, and reflection, but also between perception and conception. Re-
flecting Giorgio Agamben’s thoughts, dizziness is “not properly a modality of 
being, but it is the being that is always already given in modality, that is its 
modalities.”32 Defining dizziness started not only by considering dizziness in 
relation to the linguistics of Taumel, or regarding the creative and artistic 
process, but also by the investigation of the dizzy body. Disequilibrium is the 
sensation of being off-balance, and is most often characterized by frequent 
falls in a specific direction (as described above in our artistic experimentation). 
One can induce dizziness and disequilibrium by engaging in disorientating 
activities such as spinning. As mentioned earlier, from a physiological perspective 
dizziness is considered a symptom, not a sign. As a medical symptom, dizziness 
is ambiguous and can lead to a multitude of deviating diagnoses. Moreover, it 
needs to be described by the subject who is experiencing it and cannot be 
measured objectively (i.e., like blood pressure). Medically speaking, dizziness 
concerns impairment in perception and stability. It can be used to mean a 
nonspecific feeling such as giddiness and lightheadedness, as well as presyn-
cope, disequilibrium, or vertigo, and is used to describe the sensation of spinning 
without moving or having one’s surroundings spin around them. 
The vestibular system (fig. 12) is the sensory system that affords our sense of 
balance, gravity, and movement. Together with the cochlea, it constitutes 
the labyrinth of the inner ear, which is situated in the vestibule of the ear. As 
our movements consist of rotations and translations, the vestibular system 
comprises two components: the semicircular canal system, which indicates 
rotational movements; and the otoliths, which indicate linear acceleration. The 
vestibular system sends signals primarily to the neural structures that control 
our eye and head movements, and to the brain and spinal cord, affecting the 
muscular structure that steers our poise. The projections to the former provide 
the anatomical basis of the vestibulo–ocular reflex, which is required for clear 
and stable vision; the projections to the brain and spinal cord control our 
body posture, instill our sense of direction and gravity, and allow for quick 
reflex reactions to both the limbs and trunk to regain balance. The reflexes 
could be construed as being the corporeal mode of compossibility. When we 
stagger, our body refers to the spinal cord that orchestrates the reflexes of our 
legs’ movements. In falling, another such reflex puts our hands in front of our 
head. Under these circumstances we are not consciously self-determined, but 
on account of our reflexes we stand a chance of regaining balance.
Recent physiological, psychological, and neuroscientific research shows train-
ing balance capability to ameliorate cognitive abilities, especially memory 
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and spatial cognition.33 Psychobiological research suggests a deeper connec-
tion between our ability to maintain emotional and corporeal equilibrium and 
flexibility, further indicating a remarkable comorbidity between anxiety disorders 
and a deficient sense of balance and orientation.34 Evidently, the dizzy indi-
vidual is exposed to an emotional maelstrom involving overlapping feelings of 
exhilaration, euphoria, anxiety, disorientation, and alienation. Being out-of-kilter 
can evoke feelings of separation and alienation toward the self and/or the 
world affecting our senses and ratio. At times, the dizzy person is seeing, feeling, 
and hearing dizziness unfolding without realizing, but is baffled, perplexed, 
and in denial, since acknowledging dizziness also means admitting to a certain 
loss of control to precariousness and vulnerability.35 Clearly, emotional con-
ditions and memories influence the experience and reflection of dizziness in 
its potential resourcefulness, which points to its situational, temporal, and 
conditional character. With its physical, mental, and metaphorical implications, 
dizziness is part of the conditio humana, raising questions pertaining to 
physiological and psychological research, as much as philosophical and artistic 
considerations.
The Cinematic Experience of Dizziness and Its 
Contemporary Artistic Relevance
From its very beginnings, the experience of dizziness was connected to the 
cinematic experience, which affects first, but not solely, the body, either as an 
effect consciously sought after or as an unwelcome side effect, such as ciné-
matophtalmie, a term coined by French ophthalmologist Thierry Lefebvre in 
1909 to communicate the harmful, dizzying effect of cinema to the healthy 
human being.36 In his seminal work Theory of Film (1960), Siegfried Kracauer 
confirms that the cinematic experience affects us first physiologically rather than 
intellectually, and in the early years of cinema the senso-motoric experience 
of film was brought into context with dizziness, drowsiness, disorientation, 
and confusion. Aside from its intellectual impact, the bodily effect of moving-im-
age art is regarded as equally important throughout film history. This concept 
is epitomized in Peter Kubelka’s Arnulf Rainer (1960) and Tony Conrad’s The 
Flicker (1966). Both films consist only of black-and-white images and are not 
only hallucinatory and dizzying, but can also be perceived when one’s eyes 
are shut. Not only do we find exceptional artists invested in dizziness, but these 
groundbreaking films can be read as comment on the nature of film itself, 
where the ambiguity, the in-between created out of the rush of alternating 
images, sets the frame for the cinematic experience. Besides, “flicks” and 
“flickers” were once generic nicknames for films. Consequently, Kubelka’s and 
Conrad’s films were said to provide opportunities for viewers to come to un-
derstand the nature of film. Koester’s My Frontier Is an Endless Wall of Points 
(After the Mescaline Drawings of Henri Michaux) (2007) or Rosalind Nashashibi 
and Lucy Skaer’s Flash in the Metropolitan (2006), artists that pertain to a 
younger generation, serve as contemporary examples of the employment of 
film’s corporeal and dizzying effects of flicker on human perception. 
Speaking of visual perception, dizziness can be produced by either abundant 
visual stimulation, such as the flickering of light used in the abovementioned 
flicker films, or dizziness can be produced by a deprivation of visual stimuli, 
as is seen in the phenomenon named “prisoner’s cinema,”37 which is reflected 
in visual artist Melvin Moti’s confrontation for his video work The Prisoner’s  
Cinema (2008). It can be evoked by rapid, rotating, or unstable camera move-
ments, as exemplified in Michael Snow’s 1969 film Back and Forth or in Hills’s 
earlier mentioned work Failed States. Dizziness, in its physiological experience, 
can thus be transmitted to film, and via film to the corporeal experience  
of the viewer, defining the starting point of our curatorial considerations. Indeed, 
abundant examples exist already in early cinema, and also presently, in feature 
and experimental films and video art.38
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Contemporary artists such as Hito Steyerl, Joachim Koester, Anna Jeromlaewa, 
Catherine Yass, or Oliver Ressler, on the other hand, contextualize dizziness 
within questions of loss of orientation, and collective and individual identity. 
Steyerl’s In Free Fall (2010) draws a picture of a society unknowingly in free 
fall, dangerously defying gravitation as traditional systems of orientation and 
navigation become obsolete.39 Koester’s artistic research fuses archival find-
ings with personal and fictive narratives and explores dizziness in experimen-
tation with drugs or poisons (e.g., Tarantism, 2007), in utopian experiments, 
such as sectarian or anarchic experiences (e.g., Of Spirits and Empty  
Spaces, 2012), and in the vanishing of explorers (Message from Andrée, 2005). 
Jeromlaewa’s body of multimedia work (e.g., Leninopad, 2016) mixes dizzying 
personal and political events, and focuses on our improvisational ways of 
coming to terms with the paradoxes and changes we face—a human capacity 
that requires flexibility and adaptability. This capacity is challenged in her 
work Trying to Survive (2000), where roly-poly puppets shake violently from side 
to side, coming back up only to eventually fall from the frame. In contrast, 
Catherine Yass addresses dizziness in her filmic and photographic work by 
focusing on built environments and their dizzying psychological and physio-
logical impact on human beings. Her work is often characterized by unstable 
and/or floating camera movement, and beyond that, by her curiosity for the 
condition of the in-between: “I became interested in the time between two 
exposures, this little gap of movement, of time passed. […] A kind of vacuum 
where nothing happened, as though the photographs missed a moment of 
time. To me that gap became really important. This is reflected in my moving 
image work.” Yass’s work, however, reflects this transition differently to the 
aforementioned flicker films: “When I make films there is always some kind of 
upside down or backwards going on, which differs from the way you normally 
treat film, to make you lose your foundation point.”40 
The camera movement of her films often mirrors the motion of the subject 
depicted in her films. In her four-screen video installation High Wire (2008), 
acclaimed tightrope artist Didier Pasquette walks on a rope suspended be-
tween two high-rise buildings of the oldest social-housing complex in North 
Glasgow (fig. 14). Slowly and steadily walking on air, a sudden gush of wind 
hits him. His surprising response to this precarious moment of unbalance is 
not to turn around. Instead his feet feel their way backward to his starting 
point, without ever looking back. We have come to understand that changing 
the level of stimulation is a possible way to come to terms with dizziness, to  
increase or reduce complexity or stimuli, or to abstract in order to find a way 
of navigating. The shutting out of one sense or rather of a possibility is re-
flected, on a different level, in Oliver Ressler’s body of work. He involves the 
inherent utopian and sociopolitical aspects of joint action in dizzying circum-
stances, regarding them as chance for processes of positive social and eco-
nomic change by investigating successful social movements, such as worker-led 
co-owned factories or the lasting occupation of a piece of land in northern 
France.41 Interestingly, Ressler shows struggle, obstacles, paradoxes, dead-
ends—but ultimately he never shows failure. In shutting this possibility out  
of his artistic communication, as much as Pasquette’s foregoing of his eyesight, 
he highlights that centering on purpose is germane to navigate through  
situations of dizziness. However, dizziness can also become the purpose, as 
in Hills’s filmmaking that is based on the positive memory of his childhood 
39 Hito Steyerl and Maria Lind, “Free Fall: A 
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The development of the spinning 3D figurines and the publishing of the booklet 
The Bend incited the process of metaphorization by transforming the abstract 
notion of dizziness into an archaic character. Dizziness’s insignia was cocreated 
with graphic designer Christian Hoffelner in the form of a heraldic flag and  
a font (see fig. 15). Reflection and artistic experimentation along this path led 
us to try and embody dizziness; to see through dizziness’s eyes, and speak 
with her and his voice. What would dizziness say? Ignited by this question, 
dizziness’s voice grew into a monologue informed by the ongoing research 
findings and collaging excerpts from relevant literature44 in order for her or his 
voice to create “a sphere around it, which includes all its hearers: an intimate 
sphere or area, limited both in time and space. […] Words are events, they do 
things, change things,” as Ursula Le Guin noted.45 Lastly, we asked the renowned 
Swedish trumpet player Anders Nyquist to perform an improvisation that 
constitues his understanding of dizziness, which then concluded the production 
of the sound installation Dizziness Is My Name (2016). Dizziness’s monologue 
makes use of “conceptual metaphorical speech,” as described by Hannah Arendt, 
and takes it beyond the realm of thinking and poetry.46 A means to pervade 
thought and action in everyday life, conceptual metaphorical speech acknowledges 
that the terms with which we think and act are already “fundamentally meta-
phorical in nature,”47 and that “thought and speech anticipate one another. 
They continually take each other’s place.”48 This meant combining deliberate 
and unconscious processes in our artistic experimentation, while following 
philosopher Alice Pechriggl’s claim: “The advantage in terms of understanding—
in this case doing, somewhere between enacting and taking action—resides in 
the possibility of making interface between subject and object, between inter-
nalization and externalization the point of departure for one’s deliberations and 
exploration of concepts.”49 In keeping with Ludwiński we understand curating an 
exhibition as the act of connecting displayed objects within an inclusive process 
that stages compelling creative minds—in order to involve the living energy 
of people: their ideas, research, processes, and significant activities. In fact, 
the first curatorial steps took on the form of art conferences where artworks 
like films, performances, and concerts interchanged with academic, practice-
experience of spinning and falling down dizzily. Evidently, the subject of dizziness 
can be found in a plethora of contemporary and historic works of art, and  
Oliver Botar’s contribution to this book will expound its influence on art history 
since the early twentieth century.42
Process of Metaphorization and Curatorial Approach
Dizziness, in its physiological and emotional sense, can be transmitted by an 
artwork to affect the body of the viewer. Paul Sharits’s experimental film instal-
lation Epileptic Seizure Comparison (1976), in which he intended to set up an 
“experiential field,” as he called it, so that the audience could move through 
on their own rather than passively following the development of the work shall 
be singled out for its impact on our curatorial objective. His film installation  
is “about an epileptic seizure in flicker style that causes dizziness and can trigger 
an epileptic fit itself, and in itself signifies an attempt to orchestrate sound 
and light rhythms in an intimate and proportional space, wherein non-epileptic 
persons may begin to experience, under ‘controlled conditions,’ the majestic 
potentials of conclusive seizure.”43 However, this idea of an experiential field 
denotes not only the basis of our curatorial considerations, but also of our  
artistic motivation to metaphorize: What would Dizziness say? How does Dizziness 
move (through) a space? What does an experiential space created by Dizziness 
look like?
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42 See Oliver A. I. Botar, “The Pleasures of 
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Garde,” in this volume, 92–121.
43 Paul Sharits, “Epileptic Seizure 
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.com/film/sharits_epileptic.html.
44 “Dizziness Is My Name,” pp. 16–20.
45 Ursula Le Guin, The Wave in the Mind: 
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and the Imagination (Boston: Shambala 
Publications, 2004), 199.
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based and performative lectures and conversations. These encounters included 
the established practice of HASENHERZ, of repeated screenings with discussions 
in-between. Conversations with artists and curators, but also with scientists 
and practitioners formed an important part of our curatorial methodology. These 
art conferences aim to transcend standard educational symposia or usual 
Q&A sessions after screenings to yield an experimental and creative realm whereby 
new and diverse materials, concepts, ideas, and projects are presented, tested, 
and reflected upon collectively. This experimentation can be understood as the 
putting into action of the compossible space, and sees the role of curating as 
a practice to formulate knowledge within an expanded ecology, integrated with 
academic, educational, artistic, and social practice.50 Moving forward, these 
considerations were given particular scrutiny in our prolonged discussion and 
cooperation with Katrin Bucher Trantow with whom we then developed the 
exhibitions on dizziness. Together we specifically took note of contemporary 
artworks that discussed or expressed dizziness, or dealt with possibilities of 
initiating, balancing, navigating and confronting states of dizziness. We then 
discussed dizziness with the artists in question, as well as exchanging with other 
curators, namely, Gareth Evans, Juha van ‘t Zelfde, Sergio Edelsztein,51 and 
Jarosław Lubiak. Our collective curatorial approach can be seen as a form of 
critical investigation into ways of communicating dizziness and treats the  
exhibition as an epistemological space. The curatorial gesture at Kunsthaus 
Graz, with an awareness of the hosting institution as an early artificial intelligence 
museum building, was to create a network from zones of becoming dizzy, of 
navigating dizziness and of leaving this state. For each of these zones we staged 
a theater of objects and contrasted them with the meandering sound installa-
tion that pervaded the entire exhibition space, complicating the staged objects 
with its erratic emergence and disappearance of sounds, shifting their distance 
and connections. 
In order to consider the exhibition as an object of knowledge, we established 
different possibilities of knowledge transfer. Creating the exhibition as expe-
riential field accentuates the role of experience and allows for the audience to 
intimately encounter with the phenomenon, its different emotions and states. 
Sara Ahmet underlines that “emotions don’t work simply in a located, bound 
subject. They move and they are not just social in the sense of mediated, but 
they actually show how the subject arrives into a world that already has affects 
and feelings circulating in very particular ways.”52 Artworks link the individual 
to the collective experience, specifically in the cinema and the exhibition space, 
and thus further exchange and understanding. Moreover, to take into account 
the audiences’ experience, a voluntary survey among the exhibition visitors was 
set up. It revealed that visitors had felt the impact of dizziness in their personal 
life and the resource it provided when they were allowed to be “out of control 
in a controlled life,” inebriated or completely “free from daily constraints.”  
For these visitors, this led to a change of perspective or empowered them to 
make a decision, but many also recognized they were coming out of the  
experience with an increased appreciation of their sanity and groundedness.
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Fig. 16 
“Dizziness. Navigating the Unknown,” 
exhibition view, 2017, Kunsthaus Graz
Fig. 17 
“Utrata równowagi,” exhibition view, 
2017, U-jazdowski Castle Centre for 
Contemporary Art, Warsaw
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The Source of the Resource
As the comments from the exhibition visitors indicate, the experience of  
dizziness can pull the proverbial rug out from under our feet and leave us with 
aporetic feelings of disorientation, anxiety, and groundlessness. Speaking 
about her work Descent (2002), Catherine Yass substantiated that her filmic 
examinations of falling do imply questions of dizziness relating to balance, 
ground, and the abyss, but that they also lead to questions of freedom as de-
scribed by Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard: “He whose eye happens  
to look down the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? 
It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked 
down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit 
wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, 
laying hold of finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness.”53 
In his seminal work The Concept of Anxiety (1844), Kierkegaard gives the 
definition of dizziness as the anxiety caused by the possibility of possibility, 
and confirms that dizziness can become a resource. Central to his premise  
is the conception of dizziness as a dual force that can be both destructive and 
generative. Kierkegaard further argues that our ability to orientate ourselves 
in states of anxiety and dizziness depends on how we approach these situations. 
Following Plato, dizziness’ movement engenders the possibility of all philo-
sophical thought by the destabilization of our very basis of thinking to a state 
of uncertainty. François Jullien characterizes this basis from which we think 
as the unthought. The unthought describes “the thing that I use as the source 
of my thinking, which I therefore cannot think at the same moment.”54 It de-
termines the underlying source of thinking, that is, knowledge, memories and 
preconditions on which we unconsciously base our thinking. Speaking about 
the resource of dizziness, he reflects: “It’s only through this act of vacillation 
that philosophy realizes that it has a basis or foundations. It’s these foundations 
which philosophy takes as evident; […] it’s the implicit choices philosophy 
makes, which constitute the unthought.”55 Indeed, dizziness can shake us to 
the core, thus discomposing the unthought. Instead of the philosophical term 
“unthought,” American essayist and activist Rebecca Solnit speaks of beliefs 
that inherently shape our worldviews and our actions, up to the point where 
they can become a matter of life and death.56 Even though their points of ref-
erence differ, Jullien and Solnit both draw attention to the underlying basis, 
the foundation or the ground of our thinking and acting, this tacit and implicit 
framing of our point of view. Furthermore, Jarosław Lubiak combines the vis-
ceral with the philosophical in his reflections on dizziness: “The physiology of 
balance opens up the possibility of a philosophy of orienting oneself in a situ-
ation when the ground slips from under one’s feet.”57 Dizziness confuses the 
source from which we think and act, dissolving and blurring our frames of ref-
erence, our perspectives, beliefs, and habits. It confuses, in the very literal 
sense of the word, spreading disorder and perplexity. Confusion, however, is 
rooted in the underlying Latin term confundere, meaning to fuse together.  
Dizziness con-fuses—it makes all that seemed clear and definite fuse, blend, 
become unfinished, unstable, and impermanent. Jullien emphasizes the  
connectivity of confusion and compossiblity. Further, he assures us that “the 
phase when it’s neither the one nor the other—this phase of confusion/dizziness, 
when both are possible, compossible, occurs when there is no separation  
between the two. This is […] a resource: To think in the mode of confusion 
and dizziness, and not in the mode of the distinct.”58 Dizziness, the resource, 
appears as the shaking of the ground, as the source that “maintains itself 
within the compossible, on this ground/foundation (foncier), which can’t be 
chopped into opposites and, therefore, is apt to expansion.” Here, the para-
doxal character of the phenomenon becomes obvious. Philosopher Margaret 
Cuonzo defines paradox in her book as a set of mutually inconsistent claims, 
each of which seems to be true, but she strengthens the creative possibilities 
when confronted with a paradox. In the famous words of Niels Bohr: “How 
wonderful that we have met with a paradox. Now we have some hope of making 
progress.”59
Compossible Movements 
Whether regarded as ontological concept, paradox or symptom, method or 
object, sensation or metaphor, dizziness, and its unsettling movement, reshapes 
coherent, unrelated, and/or mutually exclusive elements. Dizziness—A Resource 
therefore acknowledges the resource-rich potential that the destabilization of 
the learned and the troubling of the habitual by an agent of confusion can 
mean. This reasoning can identify dizziness as being initiated by polarities, but 
also holds the potential to dissolve and transform said polarities. Together 
with Karoline Feyertag, we have proceeded to define this capacity, the space-
time of fecund confusion that dizziness opens, and to name it the “compossible 
space,” describing it as “an actual and theoretical space/time, a situation and 
53 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of 
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Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that 
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condition” that allows for a productive confusing and transforming of what 
seemed clear and definite: the given and the lacuna, the possible and the im-
possible, ground and groundlessness.60
Bringing the notion of the compossible space back to its physicality, we pro-
pose to consider the peculiar movement of staggering. Staggering triggers 
reflexes that are located in the lower region of the spinal cord. When stagger-
ing, we instantly relax the unsteady leg and simultaneously tense the other 
leg in an effort to regain balance. This reflex opens a space-time of possibility, 
a compossible space of simultaneously falling and balancing, analogously to 
the earlier mentioned work process on the 3D figurines. Within this compossible 
space, all possibilities are present in their potential, foregoing their exclusive-
ness—they become compossible. Without the reflex of staggering, we must fall, 
just like when fainting we simply fall. But the compossibility of staggering  
affords us with additional, albeit uncertain, possibilities; for example, controlled 
falling to a certain side or being able to slow down the fall, staggering on,  
or regaining balance. Hence, through the compossible space, we multiply our 
possibilities. In that sense, the compossible space of staggering is a resource 
that every healthy human benefits from.
Dizziness is the predefined space of indeterminacy, where possibilities and 
impossibilities coexist. It is the source, the resource of the compossible, that 
nurtures the fecund ground of creativity, but at the same time it designates  
a dismantling of the presupposed, orderly, and classified. Every compossible 
space as a space-time of ambiguity includes elements of order and elements 
of disorder. Its diversity is ultimately more than just parallel existing elements, 
as it contains commingling elements, that possibly intertwine, overlap, block, 
complement, reinforce, exclude, and destroy each other.61 Advancing on  
Kierkegaard’s aforementioned notion of dizziness, existential psychologist Rollo 
May contemplates: “Now creating, actualizing one’s possibilities, always  
involves negative as well as positive aspects. It always involves destroying the 
status quo, destroying old patterns within oneself, progressively destroying 
what one has clung to from childhood on, and creating new and original forms 
and ways of living. […] But creating also means destroying the status quo  
of one’s environment, breaking the old forms; it means producing something 
new and original in human relations as well as in cultural forms (e.g., the  
creativity of the artist).”62 
In our research-creation, this breaking down, destroying, and decomposing 
necessary for the creative process brought up the notion of compost (in view 
of its Latin root com-ponere, meaning to construct, arrange together). Indeed, 
compost can be used as metaphor for the taking up space by and for the pro-
cedural fecundity of the compossible space. Compost is formed through the 
decomposition of organic matter. Corresponding to the nurturing of compost, 
a compossible space needs to be maintained, to make this dizzying process 
of decomposition and letting go fecund, thus engendering the generation of 
new ground.63 
60 Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and 
Leonhard Grond, “The Concepts of 
Dizziness and the Compossible Space in 
Research-Creation,” Emotion, Space, 
Society (2017): 3.
61 See Ulrich Bröckling et al., Das Andere der 
Ordnung: Theorien des Exzeptionellen 
(Weilerwist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2015).
62 Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015), 44.
63 See also Maria Spindler’s “Growing 
Transformation and Cocreation 
Capacities: Two Case Studies in Business 
Consulting,” in this volume, 202–16.
Fig. 18 
Ruth Anderwald + Leonhard Grond and Anna 
Kim, The Future Is Compost for the public art 
billboard series The Frame of the FutureTM, 
2013–14
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Compost Is
compost is
nature’s best mulches and soil
you can use it
all, compost is cheap




structure, texture, and aeration
are soil’s water-holding capacity
compost is
organic
where it takes up space
compost is
material that can be added
to soil to help plants grow
food scraps and yard waste
making compost keeps these materials
compost is and should be
it releases methane, a potent greenhouse gas
composting is nature’s process of recycling
anything that was once living will decompose
all compost is cheap
made out of material that can be added
and of the same process nature uses
by composting your organic waste
you are returning nutrients back
basically backyard composting is an acceleration
you can make it
in order for the cycle of life to continue




smells like a forest floor
structure, texture, and aeration
you added
compost is matter
at the simplest level
you need a heap of wetted organic matter
where it takes up space
methodical composting is a multistep,
closely monitored process
with measured inputs of water, air, and carbon
and nitrogen-rich materials
compost is and should be
without spending
it will have everything you need
and
compost is useful for erosion control,
land and stream reclamation, wetland construction, and as landfill cover
compost is fertile
and
refers not to the actual production of offspring
rather than to the physical capability to produce
all, compost is cheap




when the components which contribute to fertility are removed
and not replaced
and
conditions which support fertility are not maintained.
Conclusion
The multiplication of our potential possibilities through the compossible space 
references Kierkegaard’s conception of dizziness reflecting the possibility  
of possibility. Its unpredictable movement indicates the potential for renewal 
and transformation. Therefore, dizziness does not relate to theoretical,  
artistic, and philosophical concepts only, but remains a phenomenon in the 
realm of the physical, sensory, mental, and emotional. Its force shakes us to 
the core, and troubles the patterns, beliefs, actions, and habits that form our 
thinking and acting. Moreover, the emotional spectrum of dizziness must be 
considered in order to comprehend its potential as a resource. The experience 
of dizziness contains ambiguous, disruptive and unpredictable movements 
and emotions, and, as in the experience of a sudden stagger, it can include an  
element of surprise, shock, or perplexity. Due to the inherent instability and  
unpredictability of the process, dizziness cannot be seen as a means of “self-
design.”64 In its reflection, dizziness exposes related emotions as propelling the 
individual into a certain direction or perspective. For filmmaker Henry Hills, 
64 See Boris Groys, “The Obligation to Self-
Design,” e­flux journal (2008), 
 https://www.e-flux.com/journal/00/68457 
/the-obligation-to-self-design/.
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memories of being dizzy generated a positive reminiscence of childhood, 
which helped him to come to terms with an aporetic crisis in his artistic work. 
However, not all recollections of dizziness necessarily need to have a con-
structive effect, and this demands further research.
While Oliver Ressler suggests that dizziness can lead to positive social change, 
practices of inflicting states of dizziness on individuals and groups are not  
always necessarily positive. On the contrary, there is a dark side to the possi-
bilities dizziness provides. This can be observed, for instance, in the form of 
torture based on severe and potentially lethal shaking used in military or police 
interrogation.65 Israeli artist Meir Tati addresses this method of shaking (Tiltul) 
in his homonymous video work for the artistic-research project “Sharashka” 
where he himself performs torture and so-called enhanced interrogation tech-
niques. Tiltulim in particular is executed by the forceful shaking, back and forth, 
of the suspect’s upper torso repeatedly, in a manner that causes the neck and head 
to dangle and vacillate rapidly, for instance, by “holding the detainee by the collar 
of his shirt and violently shaking him.”66 This not only terrorizes, but also confuses, 
causing the captive to lose spatial and inner orientation. Another art-historical 
example of affecting a detainee with mental and physical torture through dizziness 
is Alphonse Laurencic’s design for prison cells during the Spanish Civil War 
(1936–39). Laurencic, an artist and anarchist, designed Bauhaus- and Surrealist-
inspired prison cells that tormented the prisoner through intricate coloring 
and inclined planes, affecting physical and mental instability and pain.67
In this artistic research, dizziness became the metaphorization of the unfore-
seeable dynamic that con-fuses the given and habitual, and establishes a 
condition of profound and abyssal uncertainty and confusion that can assist 
the emergence of new possibilities conveying that orientation is situated in 
the lived experience. It is a phenomenon that remains ambiguous even in its 
provision as a resource. Voluntary or unconscious recollections of past  
experiences shape our individual attitude and action toward the idea of dizzi-
ness and of being in a state of dizziness. Furthermore, dizziness can provoke 
surprise, shock or aporia in the affected, thus adding to the disorientation and 
confusion. Nevertheless, it can lead to a change of perspective as part of a 
creative, transformative process. But the aporetic element can be used as a 
manipulative and vicious tool, spreading confusion and installing chronic  
crisis to conceal, disorient, and devastate—rather than to clear and create, 
which is why we must take care to scrutinize and reflect further on dizziness, 
its affects and its (ab)uses. It is of critical importance to discuss, research, 
and educate on states of dizziness and its related processes, and weigh our 
options of balancing and navigating states of dizziness individually and as a 
society. Dizziness can become a resource, but the remaining questions are: 
Cui bono? Who uses it, to what end and what are the consequences for all of us?
65 Stephen D. Wrage, “Case 273—Tiltulim: 
Interrogation by Shaking in Israel” 
(Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 
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67 See César Alcalá, Las Checas del terror:  
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(Madrid: Libros Libres, 2007).
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Jerzy Ludwiński. Eindhoven: Van 
Abbemuseum, 2007.
55Karoline Feyertag and François Jullien
The following conversation with the French philosopher and sinologist François 
Jullien took place in June 2015 in Paris.1 Jullien claims to take the critical  
deconstruction of European continental philosophy a step further by juxtaposing 
the European thought and unthought to a geographical and ideological  
outside.2 In his case, this outside happens to be China or, more precisely, “Chinese 
language-thought.”3 Jullien’s philosophy orients to this Chinese way of think-
ing and therefore elaborates by couples of notions or “double concepts,” 
which means for example that one cannot speak of European hegemony with-
out thinking of the non- or extra-European. The same is true of philosophical 
concepts that are not based on a single notion but are ambiguous in that they 
waver between two notions in order to be productive as way of generating 
new sense and ideas. To say “intelligent” in Chinese, one says “hearing-seeing” 
(cong-ming), putting more weight on the first notion, hearing, but including 
the notion of sight as well.4
Further examples of Chinese “language-thought” operating by double concepts 
are found in Jullien’s De l’être au vivre: Lexique euro-chinois de la pensée 
(From being to living: Euro-Chinese lexicon of thought). This lexicon consists 
of a list of concepts that constitute the core of Jullien’s philosophy; in it there 
is a selection of these kinds of double concepts: inclination (vs. causality), 
potential of a situation (vs. initiative of a subject), availability (vs. liberty), 
obliquity (vs. frontality), silent transformation (vs. sonorous event), ambiguity 
(vs. equivocalness), in-between (vs. beyond), resource (vs. truth), and so forth. 
The gap, tension, or distance between each of these double concepts is called 
“écart” by Jullien, pointing out to the act of distancing and putting into tension 
a movement that is proper to philosophy itself. Jullien writes: “Philosopher, 
c’est s’écarter” (to philosophize is to distance oneself).5 This movement, both 
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1 The long version of the interview can be 
found online: http://on-dizziness.com 
/francois_jullien/. For an in-depth discussion 
of the interview, please refer to my essay 
with comments by Anderwald and Grond, 
“Inside/Outside and the Ground beneath 
Our Feet,” http://on-dizziness.com 
/insideoutside/. 
2 François Jullien, L’écart et l’entre: Leçon 
inaugurale de la Chaire sur l‘altérité (Paris: 
Éditions Galilée, 2012), 15. Jullien speaks 
about his project of a “deconstruction 
from the outside” of Western thought in 
our interview. Admitting such an “outside” 
implies a dichotomy between two terms 
and, finally, between two entities. Jullien 
has been criticized for speaking about 
“China” as an entity. I believe that this 
critique merits some attention. See also 
Fabian Heubel, “Immanente Transzendenz 
im Spannungsfeld von europäischer Sino-
logie, kritischer Theorie und zeitgenössi-
schem Konfuzianismus,” Polylog: Zeit schrift 
für interkulturelles Philosophieren, no. 26 
(2011): 91–114; and Jean-François Billeter, 
Contre François Jullien (Paris: Allia, 2006).
3 François Jullien, De l’ être au vivre: 
Lexique euro­chinois de la pensée (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2015), 7. Unless otherwise 
noted all translations are my own.
4 See Jean-Jacques Neuer, “Debate: When 
China Helps to Better Understand European 




5 Jullien, De l’être au vivre, 267.
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There is one thing I haven’t found in your research project that seems 
important to me. You have considered the moment of transition. But 
there is a dimension, which seems fertile in this moment of dizziness, 
when things become confused because they lose their equilibrium and 
find themselves suspended from clarity—this dimension is ambiguity.7
Within your artistic research project, the moment of dizziness (Taumel) 
puts into suspension all oppositions, which constitute reason, a suspen-
sion of the constitutive determinations of reason, and this very fact of 
dizziness allows going beyond the separation of opposites; it’s somehow 
metaphysical. It’s a stage where the opposites are not yet separated 
and it’s fertile because it’s a stage when thought can come up with new 
and different determinations.
So, there is a moment, a sas in French—a moment in transition when the 
already-constituted oppositions dissolve themselves because they come 
back to their fundamental ambiguity, that is, their non-separated state, 
and only afterward is there a realisation of different determinations. […] 
A sas is in between two; it’s a temporary place. For example, if you want 
to enter somewhere, there is a double door and in between the two doors, 
this is a “sas” (a sluice chamber). […] It’s a small and hermetic enclosure 
in between two different settings/environments. It’s something in between 
the two and it allows passing from the one to the other, but it is at a dis-
tance to the one and the other.
The interesting aspect of dizziness, when it’s not a definitive vertigo but 
a temporary one, is that the determinations, which were valuable before 
dizziness occurred, are brought back to a fundamental non-separation 
of opposites—or one is conducted by dizziness, or confusion, to go back 
to this non-separation (or: beyond separation)—and this makes an ambi-
guity reappear, which is underlying any opposition, whereby I mean the 
oppositions of thought. This underlying, fundamental ambiguity resets 
the field of oppositions, makes it fuse/melt and allows for other opposi-
tions, other determinations to come out of it afterward.
Within this in-between space, it is possible for one and the other to exist together: 
the familiar and the strange(r), the known and the unknown, the old and the 
new. This means that their opposition dissolves: in this in-between space 
opposites might lose their connotations and begin signifying something new.
With regard to these philosophical “tools” that Jullien has defined throughout 
his work, I asked him to speak about dizziness, to try to locate dizziness as 
such a tool or concept within his own thinking. Jullien responded extensively 
to this request, coming up with conceptual correlations and écarts that 
helped the artistic research to reorient some preliminary assumptions and to 
sharpen the focus on dizziness as a resource. Resources, in Jullien’s sense 
anyway, are the raw materials of what he finds outside and out of which he 
forges his double concepts. With the input from Jullien’s contribution and  
inspired by his way of thinking, the artistic research team also forged its own 
double concepts.6 In the following, I chose significant parts of the interview 
with Jullien from 2015. Some of them are echoed in my contribution to this book, 
“Dizziness: From Aporia to Method?”
Karoline Feyertag (KF): You aim at a dismantlement/disturbance on both sides, 
the European and the Chinese?
François Jullien (FJ): Yes, on both sides, and this means disturbing and 
not doubting which is well-known philosophical posture. The word ébranler 
means to question the underpinnings, the basis of thought—it’s an activity 
that is neither critical nor suspicious, in Nietzsche’s sense. Ébranler 
means to shake the foundation. The basis, which one doesn’t know—the 
basis is that which philosophy itself ignores. It’s only through this act  
of agitation that philosophy realises that it has a basis or foundations. It’s 
these foundations that philosophy takes as evident; it’s the implicit 
choices philosophy makes, which constitute the unthought, which are 
buried (enfouis) by rationality.
KF: I also wanted to ask you about the notion of dizziness, which is at the 
center of our artistic research project, and how you would translate the term 
into Chinese?
FJ: I’m less interested by the medical term “vertigo.” What seems more in-
teresting to me is the moment when confusion comes up and how this 
confusion can then be productive. The philosophical question I ask is: 
What could be productive in such a temporary moment of confusion, 
and what could be its outcome?
6 “Dizziness and the Compossible Space in 
Research-Creation” was one output in the 
form of an article in the journal Emotion, 
Space and Society. Another output was 
the contribution “Le vértige comme 
méthode” to the magazine artpress 2,  
no. 46 (August–September 2017) for the 
special issue, “Des concepts proposés à 
l’art,” which focused on Jullien’s philosophy.
7 Jullien distinguishes ambiguity and 
equivocalness. Chinese thought respects 
the ambiguity of reality, whereas Greek 
philosophy tried to ban all equivocalness: 
the equivocal is located on the level of 
discourse and language. For Jullien, it’s 
the negative term in contrast to ambiguity, 
which is the more general term for 
describing two things at the same time.
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This is what I consider a sas—the moment when precedent determinations 
and oppositions are undone and unravel their fundamental, when they 
are not yet split (tranché) into ambiguity, from which other determina-
tions, other oppositions will result. This is the moment when the prece-
dent determinations and oppositions, by which we have been thinking, are 
fusing—“con-fusing.” From this con-fusion emerges a fundamental ambigu-
ity, the non-separation of opposites that is fertile because it enables an 
outside of our current oppositions, and from this outside other determi-
nations could result.
I distinguish ambivalence and ambiguity because ambivalence is a Freudian 
term, coming from Eugen Bleuler to psychoanalysis, and it signifies that 
within one subject there could be two opposites, for example, like someone 
could love and hate the same person. This is ambivalence. But ambiguity 
always contains the “ambi” meaning “both.” It means something can be 
the one as well as the other because they are somehow inseparable. 
Ambiguity actuates literature in opposition to, at least, classical philosophy 
because philosophy has banished ambiguity as equivocalness, meaning 
a confusion of words. In contrast, modern literature and critical thought 
has exactly considered this ambiguity as something that philosophy has 
omitted and, therefore, claimed to think like literature, that is, thinking 
the ambiguity of a feeling, of a life, and so on. Actually, ambiguity is the 
modern mission of thought and it’s often taken into charge by literature 
against the clarity of thought, which proceeds the expulsion of equivo-
cations, as it was the duty of classical philosophy.
KF: Yes, I’ve also made this observation: that within classical European thought 
there is the tendency to decide whether it’s this or that, black or white, and 
not being able to think two opposites at the same time and to acknowledge 
this gray zone or blandness.8 
FJ: Yes, it’s the gray, the intermediary, the in-between, that is interesting—
it’s ambiguity that makes us go back to the in-between of the non- 
separation of two opposites and that cracks our reflection and allows for 
new possibilities to unfold. This is why China is interesting. Greek 
thought isn’t able to think outside of the gray zone, and classical philosophy 
still agrees with this perspective. Actually, China is very comfortable 
with thinking confusion and dizziness. The Tao is dizzy (confus)—that is 
what Laozi says. The only determination of the Tao is: confusion, fuzziness, 
vagueness, undeterminedness, blandness, indistinctness.
How could we think of being? From the moment we think of being we have 
to think determination, because it’s determination that brings into life 
the concept of being. Put in a different way, Hegel says being and nonbeing 
is the same. It’s determination that makes being become being, that  
actualises being effectively as being.
From the moment when there is a philosophy of being, there is an oppo-
sition to confusion and dizziness. The ontological thinking of being is 
clear and distinct. The interest, which I find in China, is that it makes us 
step out of the philosophy of being, and move toward a thinking of  
processes, of the flux, and so forth. China privileges the transition, the 
amorce (lure or trigger) and the phase when it’s neither one nor the  
other—this phase of confusion/dizziness, when both are possible, com-
possible, occurs when there is no separation between the two. This is 
why I consider Chinese thought a resource: to think in the mode of con-
fusion and dizziness, and not in the mode of the distinct.
KF: I also want to ask you about the phrase “The great image has no form.”9 
What does it mean?
FJ: When reading this sentence, it is important to ask what “great” means. 
It’s obviously not about being big in size. Great means being compossible—
being something that can be this and the other as well. In relation to 
your project on dizziness (Taumel), this seems to be the most interesting 
aspect to me, because in the end, dizziness, which I call ambiguity, is 
compossibility—the one as well as the other, not separated (cut through). 
In this sense, I believe that dizziness, when it’s productive, makes us 
vacillate and go back to this compossibility or ambiguity, back to the fact 
that there is both, the one and the other, because of the non-separation 
of opposites. So, Laozi’s belief that “the great image has no form,” is great 
because it unsettles (ébranler) our European thought.
The expression is embedded in the following context: “The great square 
has no corners.” What does the term “great” stand for? Great means 
what is not limited to its nature of square—it’s not a square square; the 
square is not fully defined by its definition. Obviously, it’s not because  
of its big size that it has no corners. It’s because the square is not limited 
by its definition (of what a square is). Maybe it’s round. This means that, 
basically, the square is not confined within the limitation of what would 
be its definition.
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8 See François Jullien, In Praise of 
Blandness: Proceeding from Chinese 
Thought and Aesthetics, trans. Paula M. 
Varsano (New York: Zone Books, 2007).
9 François Jullien, The Great Image Has No 
Form, or On the Nonobject through 
Painting, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2009), 47.
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KF: I would like to come to the passage about the happy fish as final point of 
this interview.11
FJ: Oh yes, I looked it up yesterday. But just another word on “occasion.” 
You know, China always thinks in binomials (compounds). So the term for 
translating “crisis” is wei-ji (wēijī). Wei means danger and ji means oppor-
tunity. Danger also means opportunity. This is interesting when compared 
to the idea of dizziness. Because dizziness could mean imperilment and 
endangerment of vitality or rationality, or something similar. Now how could 
being endangered be considered an opportunity at the same time?! This  
is still yet to be understood. This is interesting to think about in Chinese 
terms: wei is at the same time ji; danger is at the same time opportunity.
About the passage of the Zhuangzi now: when I translate from the Chinese 
text,12 it reads: “Look how the minnows are there between the rocks”13—
the Chinese term is not rocks, it reads more like emerging, evolving 
completely at ease, at will. The Chinese image—and this is the great 
theme of the Zhuangzi—is the capacity to evolve. I stick to the French 
term evolve (évoluer): evolve like a fish that comes and goes, without  
direction, without telos. Evolving in this context means exactly without 
any destination or intent. Evolving at ease: this doesn’t mean “freely”  
because it’s not about liberty, but it means in a completely available  
(disponible) way.14 Evolving without going somewhere, without tending 
somewhere—this is the first word of the Zhuangzi. It means to evolve, 
emerging, evolving, without any aim, at ease, at will. This is the happiness 
of fish.
The other one, Huizi, answers: “No, as you are not a fish, how do you know 
about the happiness of fish?” The first one, Zhuangzi, replies: “You are 
not I, inevitably, so how do you know (that I don’t know what makes fish 
happy)? You don’t know me.” Zhuangzi’s reply to his interlocutor at the 
end of their conversation is interesting: “Let’s go back.” In Chinese this 
reads: “Let’s come to what is fundamental!” It’s not back; it means the 
decent (souche). I translate it with “Come to the ground (foncier)” or “let’s 
The following formula is even more interesting: “The great work avoids 
coming about.”10 At this stage of the “just before,” of the potential, the 
ambiguous, the non-separation, the work of art avoids coming about, 
taking place because if it takes place, it is only this and not that anymore; 
it becomes exclusive. The great work keeps itself at work, because it 
keeps itself at this stage of the “just before,” “upstream” of a definitive 
actualisation, which would follow its definition.
Finally, the formula “the great image has no form” means: The image or 
great work has no form exactly because it is not limited by one single 
form. It stays within the compossible, on this ground/foundation (foncier), 
which can’t be split into opposites and therefore is apt to expansion.  
I’ve interpreted this formula in the following sense: an artwork, which 
claims to be totally finished, is dead. All interest lies in this moment of the 
“just before,” when the artwork is still within the realm of non-separation 
and elementary ambiguity. It maintains us at this stage of the compossi-
ble, which is a kind of a virtuality not yet defined, stopped, limited.
I think this formula is very beautiful, and I dedicated a book to the phrase 
“the great image has no form” because it does not destroy the concept 
of the image. The concept of the image in Chinese is very complicated because 
it means phenomenon as well as image—so there is no idea of mimesis 
or imitation, the Chinese image is not belonging to the register of repre-
sentation. I think this is a very fruitful Chinese term: when I say image,  
it also means phenomenon, it’s “phenomenon-image.” We are not in the 
Greek register of bisection in-between reality and its representation, the 
reproduction of reality, mimesis, and so on. That’s why the sentence “the 
great image has no form” actually means that the phenomenon is much 
more effective when it hasn’t let itself be determined by a particular form.
In the end, there are two stages: the effective and the determinative. The 
determinative is damaged and worn off. We need to go back from the 
determinative to the effective, something that avoids coming about, that 
avoids determinations to maintain the polyvalence and fundamental 
ambiguity, this fertile moment of the “just before”/the “upstream.” This  
is what China gives us to think about—this fertile moment before any 
determination. […] I mean fertile in the sense of something that is com-
posed of more than that what is known, as something that has not yet 
come about.
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10 Jullien, 70.
11 This passage refers to the happy fish 
debate between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi  
(aka Huizi) in “Autumn Floods,” a chapter 
in Zhuangzi. Prior to the interview, I asked 
Jullien to speak about this short dialogue 
that I only knew in a mediocre English 
translation.
12 Jullien uses Guo Qingfan‘s classic edition 
of the Zhuangzi, Xiaozheng Zhuangzi jishi, 
 2 vols. (Taipei: Shijie shuju). See Jullien, 
The Great Image Has No Form, xxiii.
13 Jullien revises the English translation that 
I presented: “See how the minnows dart 
between the rocks! Such is the happiness 
of fishes.” See “Anarchist Anthropology, 
Happy Fish, and Translation: Where Do 
You Get That?,” https://paper-republic.org 
/lucasklein/anarchist-anthropology-happy 
-fish-and-translation/).
14 Jullien, The Great Image Has No Form, 164–65.
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15 “If I, not being you, cannot know what you 
know,” replied Huizi, “does it not follow 
from that very fact that you, not being a 
fish, cannot know what makes fish happy?” 
See “Anarchist Anthropology, Happy Fish, 
and Translation.”
16 “Let us go back,” said Zhuangzi, “to your 
original question. You asked me how I 
knew what makes fish happy. The very fact 
you asked shows that you knew I knew—as 
I did know, from my own feelings on this 
bridge.” See “Anarchist Anthropology, 
Happy Fish, and Translation.”
17 “The expression I translate as ‘foundation-
fount’ is fond(s) which combines two 
French terms, each with a wide range of 
meanings. Fond means, among other 
things ‘bottom’ and ‘foundation’; it is also 
contrasted to forme in the form/content 
binary, and to figure in figure/ground.  
Au fond or dans le fond means ‘fundamen-
tally’ and au fond may also mean ‘deep 
down.’” Jane Marie Todd, “Translator’s 
note,” in Jullien, The Great Image Has No 
Form, xii. 
follow the ground/the fount.” When Huizi asks, how to know the happi-
ness of the fish, it’s because he already knows that Zhuangzi knows that 
Huizi would ask him15—and afterward Zhuangzi says in your English 
translation: “As I did know from my own feelings (perceptions/observa-
tions) on this bridge.”16
I think it’s much simpler than that: “I know it, I know this on the bridge.” 
There is neither perception nor observation, nothing. There is only “I 
know, I realize” and the bridge over the river. The only verb is “to know, 
to realize,” but there are no choices in-between feelings, perceptions, or 
observations. This is the European psychological spectrum.
The Chinese text speaks about the ground, the fundament, the foundation-
fount,17 where there is no distinction between feelings, perceptions, 
and so forth. On this ground I, Zhuangzi, can know the happiness of the 
fish. So, this ground is beyond our particular individuations, beyond 
this “I’m this or that.” Here again reappears the connection to ambiguity. 
Let’s go back to the stem, the root—it’s in this root that I know that you 
know that I know that I know—isn’t it? So, there is a sort of communication 
on this ground of things that cannot be grasped by individuations like 
you, me, fish. It’s not like in Buddhism in which individuations are consid-
ered illusory. It’s more about the insight that individuations are what 
they are from a ground that makes us communicate. It’s exactly on this 
ground that the singular individuations—you, me, fish—communicate. 
That’s why I can tell about the happiness of fish.
So this ground is just before there are particular individuations, distinctions, 
and determinations.
KF: … and it’s from there that emerge other …
FJ: … other determinations and other individuations. This is what I call le 
fond indifférencié. There is a non-differentiated ground that enables the 
communication among all differences. Your idea of dizziness—and that’s 
what I find interesting—is that it makes us flourish again, puts us back to 
this non-differentiated ground of confusion where the differences are 
fused and melted together and from where other differences could come 
out as well. It’s a kind of melting pot where all differences melt and where 
reality again communicates beyond its individuations and particular  
demarcations. The Chinese Tao is this. The Tao is this undivided, non-
differentiated ground, from which all differences and divisions emerge.
Maybe the interest of the kind of vertigo, of dizziness as you use it, is to 
put us back to this ground of seeming confusions, but which is actually 
ground of ambiguity, non-separation, and communication of opposites 
with each other.
KF: Yes, dizziness is also about children spinning around to provoke vertigo, 
to lose orientation.
FJ: In French we say déboussolé when you lose your compass. It’s exactly 
this loss that is not necessarily a trance, but that which results in a loss 
of orientation and confusion, which can exactly become the moments 
when this ground reappears. It is the ground that is beyond and before 
any demarcations, determinations, and oppositions.
Translated from the French by Karoline Feyertag and Fiona Wooton
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Dizziness Is My Name
In the video Dizziness Is My Name (2016) by Ruth Anderwald and Leonhard 
Grond, a refrain-like phrase can be heard over and over again: “Dizziness is 
my name … I am a pendulum without rope and gravity … my gravity is move-
ment …” And then: “Here is what I, Dizziness, have to offer to you … confusion 
guided by clear sense of purpose … leave shattered what was lost … hold on 
to our purpose and hold on to hope.”1
The use of poetry in this video is extraordinary, possibly because Anderwald 
and Grond used a process of metaphorization of dizziness as the main method 
in their artistic research. It is, by the way, strictly connected with the phenom-
enon under analysis.
The first step in this process of metaphorization is to attribute the mulitfaced 
phenomenon of dizziness with a proper name, and furthermore with a character. 
This is a tremendous shift. Anderwald and Grond suggest that dizziness is not  
a concept. It is as if though they are saying: You shall never understand it. At 
best you can encounter it. You can find its infinite number of faces, look at 
them, listen to them, but you will never have the privilege of understanding.
Dizziness is the name attributed to what disrupts communication, understand-
ing, and comprehension. It suspends beyond all certainty. Hence dizziness  
is not a notion as it gets in the way of comprehending. 
Anderwald and Grond use prosopopoeia in their film to give dizziness a voice. 
Dizziness speaks to us in what sounds like a female voice, though we are  
uncertain whether it is a woman, or even a person for that matter. Dizziness 
communicates with us in the video; in other situations, it sends us signs,  
signals, and imposes its symptoms. It reveals some of its countless faces through 
the images of the exhibitions.2 Dizziness reveals itself by its own proper name 
while hiding behind it. 
The Semantics of the Proper Name 
The semantics of the proper name have always been troublesome from the 
view point of the theory of meaning. The dispute revolving around the main 
question, that is, “Do proper names make sense?”3 can always, as John Searle 





Ruth Anderwald + Leonhard Grond,  
Dizziness Is My Name, video, 2016, revised 2019
1  See “Prelude,” in this volume, 16–19. 
2 “Dizziness. Navigating the Unknown,” 
Kunsthaus Graz, February to May 2017; 
“Utrata równowagi,” U-jazdowski Castle 
CCA Warsaw, September 2017–February 
2018.
3 John R. Searle, “Proper Names,” Mind 67, 
no. 266 (April 1958): 166–73.
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translation of the word enforces the differences even more. The most obvious 
Polish equivalent would be zawrót głowy, meaning vertigo, however it con-
veys only one of the senses contained in both the English and German words. 
Therefore, rozchwianie, meaning “instability” or “staggering,” would be much 
closer (though the medical connotation is lost). Furthermore, one of the key 
meanings of Taumel is gone from both Polish and English equivalents. At the 
same time, it is a meaning that the Brothers Grimm’s dictionary offered as the 
first and fundamental one: the literal circular movement to and fro, with a later 
addition: dizziness of the head, instability, and a more metaphorical mental 
confusion. While both the Polish and English terms denote the state only, Taumel 
indicates a specific type of movement, a staggering or rather a staggering 
combined with moving in circles. At the same time, Taumel describes the state 
resulting from such movement—which is the key element of this entire project. 
As there is no Polish equivalent that would convey the combination of move-
ment in circles with instability, when translating the title of the exhibition, 
“Taumel. Navigieren im Unbekannten” (“Dizziness. Navigating the Unknown”)—
we decided to accentuate the moment that is shared by the movement in 
circles and the state this can lead to, that is, a moment that triggers reaction 
and enforces action. Hence utrata równowagi actually means a loss of balance.
We could say that the process of translating the title of the exhibition was a way 
to assign a proper name to the show. Taumel, dizziness, utrata równowagi—
the relationship between the names is based on the rule of close affinity but 
not identity. 
“Utrata równowagi” in the Exhibition Program
The exhibition at U-jazdowski was differently edited from the one presented 
at Kunsthaus Graz (2017) and through the insititutions’ different architectures 
it created a completely different experience. Works by Polish artists Józef  
Robakowski and Norbert Delman were added. The relations among the artworks 
were also structured differently. Thus the new proper name of the exhibition in 
Warsaw (2017–18) was no coincidence. As at the Kunsthaus Graz, it was a meeting 
with what evades comprehension and therefore it required naming anew. 
The mechanisms of metaphorization, which are so important in the artistic 
research of Anderwald and Grond, continued over the course of the exhibitions. 
While the video Dizziness Is My Name was a prosopopoeia in the literal sense, 
the sound installation in the exhibition was also one—but much more meta-
phorically so. They have sought to give a voice to instability, and they have por-
no sense but a reference only—they denote but do not connote. According to 
the second option, names do have a sense and the reference appears contin-
gently.4 It may be assumed that the functioning of a proper name is based on 
the irresolvable nature of the following contradiction: a proper name carries a 
deep sense and, at the same time, it acts by means of reference. 
Anderwald and Grond strengthen this undecidability. By giving dizziness the sta-
tus of a proper name, they assign the effects of this name to the phenomenon. 
Searle analyzes—though he doesn’t resolve the dispute between the sense 
and the reference—the principles on which a proper name functions. First of 
all, a proper name refers to a single object, without needing to define it or to 
assign any predicates to it. “But proper names refer without so far raising the 
issue of what the object is.”5
Supplementing this kind of logical deliberations on psychoanalytical conse-
quences, Jacques Lacan stressed that a proper name is used, first and foremost, 
to cover up a shortcoming (such as the impossibility to identify an object).  
A proper name makes it possible to avoid the question about what an object 
is in a situation when it is impossible to answer such a question. At the same 
time, it includes the object, whose full identification is impossible, into a sym-
bolic system to give it significance. 
Since a proper name is related to a lack, it is a “moveable function.”6 It is easy 
to trigger a whole series of shifts with its help. Anderwald and Grond set a 
whole chain of synonyms in motion with dizziness floating in between: insta-
bility, staggering, vertigo, imbalance, uncertainty, confusion, disorientation, 
extravagation, errancy, falling, crisis, emergence, rising, creating. 
Dizziness is not a name for any of these, however, it refers to each one, if only 
for a moment, before it moves on in its uncertain motion.
Confusion in Translation—The Affinity of Proper Names 
One of the key traits that Lacan assigned to proper names is their untranslat-
ability.7 A proper name indicates a single object, but it is not a word that can 
be exchanged for a different one. We grappled with this impossibility when 
preparing the exhibition at U-jazdowski Castle Centre for Contemporary Art in 
2017. 
The confusion is present from the very beginning. We have to return the status 
of words to names as a way to shed more light on the mechanics of this  
confusion. Anderwald and Grond use the German term Taumel and the English 
word “dizziness,” though the meanings of both are not identical. The Polish 
4 Searle, 169.
5 Searle, 172.
6 Russell Grigg, “On the Proper Name as the 




trayed states of dizziness with the use of different means of visual art. More-
over, it has also been an attempt to reflect on the possibilities of visual art. 
For the curators, the exhibition “Utrata równowagi” was an experiment in a research 
project, which is quite exceptional in comparison to other artistic research 
endeavors popular in the area of contemporary art in recent years. To my mind, 
the show’s uniqueness lay in the type of methodology used: the never-ending 
metaphorization that stemmed from the fact that the word Taumel is used to 
denote motion, first and foremost. Movement is the principal rule of the project. 
In the U-jazdowski program, “Utrata równowagi” could be seen as a counter-
point to the exhibition “Dust, Public Spirits” and “Gotong Royong: Things We 
Do Together.” In all the three endeavors, the key intention was to introduce a 
non-European point of view on the most burning issues today, thus creating 
conditions for a different types of thinking.
Anderwald and Grond’s project offers the possibility of a different thinking from inside 
of the European tradition by introducing a radical shift. And this is its true stake. 
What Is at Stake in the Exhibition: A Different Rationale 
The key to the artistic research founded in the word Taumel lies in the combi-
nation of movement and its effects, the semantic intertwining of staggering 
with instability that sets up metaphorization. At first glance, the core of the 
research looks like an arrangement of metaphors, because it is difficult to find 
any other justification for this surprising movement from the neurology of the 
brain, the psychology of reception, to the philosophy of compossibility,  
anthropology of social rituals, or the analysis of political destabilization and 
economic instability and, further, to the artistic explorations of losing and  
recovering balance, both in the physical and psychological sense. In any other 
discipline, it would mean extreme methodological flippancy, but in the artistic 
research by Anderwald and Grond, the fusion of the research method with the 
subject of the research and the researching subjects by means of the meta-
phorization movements is what makes the project such a forceful one. 
And force is necessary, because there is much at stake in the project. The 
project develops and supplements the movements taking place in European 
(or, perhaps, continental) thought, as seen in the Catherine Malabou’s philos-
ophy in particular. She proposes a shift that could be called the “neurologisa-
tion of reason,” in which the brain and its plasticity can serve as the basis for 
the materialistic theory of thinking. It leads her to reject the Enlightenment, 
or classical rationality, which was key to constructing our societies and has 
doubtlessly fallen into a state of crisis. 






In one of her recent books on the philosophy of Kant,8 Malabou postulated 
the creation of “a different rationality”: 
This rationality goes beyond the critique of reason and refuses to legitimate 
thinking simply on the grounds of the exposition of its intrinsic condi-
tions of possibility: philosophical discourse can no longer result from 
the consciousness of laws, nor can concepts or judgments be founded  
on the “spontaneity of thinking.” Instead, it is a matter of understanding 
from which non-conscious, not necessarily human and not programmed, 
formative instances thinking derives. The philosophical turn from the 
twentieth to the twenty-first century is thus notable for the in-depth 
search for the origin of thinking outside of consciousness and will.9
Anderwald and Grond question Malabou’s search for “the origins of thinking 
outside of consciousness and will,” and are themselves involved in a radical search 
for a different origin. It could be said that they are going further than Malabou 
by moving beyond the neurology of the brain—this privileged thinking organ. 
They seek the sources of thinking in the vestibular system, or sense of balance 
and orientation. This specific sense that is sensitive to linear and angular accel-
eration is one that, at the same time, helps us keep our relation with the ground. 
Obviously, dizziness is interlinked with the sense of sight and the entire nervous 
system—it would be impossible to maintain balance without this cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it is the physiology of vestibular system (or the inner ear) and 
the studies of its disorders that were the starting points for the entire project 
carried out by Anderwald and Grond. Beginning with the disorders of the  
labyrinth and through the process of metaphorization, the artists arrived at 
the question about the potential of instability in contemporary reality. The 
physiology of the balance opens up the possibility of a philosophy of orienting 
oneself in a situation when the ground slips from under one’s feet. 
When Dizziness tells us in the video that it is free from gravity—the statement 
could be seen as a call for a type of thinking that is not based on a particular 
support or foundation, but one that could refer to the possibility of an infinitely 
erroneous, staggering, and instable movement. 
A different thinking will allow for a different rationality. 
Translated from the Polish by Centrum Sztuki Współczesnej Zamek U-jazdowski
8 See Catherine Malabou, Avant demain: 
Épigenèse et rationalité (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2014).
9 Catherine Malabou, Before Tomorrow: 
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Shread (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 34.
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MANHATTAN, DESERT, LABYRINTH, KAFKA, TRUTH, BRIEF THEORY OF INSECTS, 
MAELSTROM, SCHNORI, PAIN, DANCE OF THE CONCEPTS, CHILDHOOD, 
PARADISE, CERTITUDO, TURBULENCE
Manhattan
In his essay on fatigue, “Versuch über die Müdigkeit,” Peter Handke describes 
the state induced by a “long-winded” trip from Alaska to New York as a kind 
of dizziness. He is exhausted, but rather than lie down he gives into the temp-
tation to take a seat “on a café terrace bathed in sunshine,” “close to the noisy 
action and the clouds of gasoline vapor.” Joining the crowd, he tries to immerse 
himself in it: “still dazed, even inwardly teetering from fatigue and jetlag.”1 
Handke portrays the shrill good cheer that sets in when one is so exhausted 
that one can no longer sleep. A unique time then opens before one, a window 
between two realities that are false and specious. For an instant, the tired 
subject glimpses the abyss of the world. He becomes aware that nothing is 
more real than this abyss, the hole or cleft at the heart of reality. In fatigue, 
the ephemeral realities disintegrate into flimsy figments. The day melts away 
into the medium of irredeemable exhaustion. The tired poet experiences  
the inconsistency of his world. For an instant, fatigue is his “friend”: “I was back 
in the world and even—and not because this was Manhattan—at its center.” 
What Handke means is this: the abyss is the Manhattan of our world.
Desert
Since birth, if not before, the subject has been dizzily reeling through a desert 
that can be characterized as a space of freedom as much as unfreedom. Other 
deserts extend within it. Through being and acting, he gains access to the 
latitude of his world. In Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, he is the nomad; in 
Jean-Paul Sartre, condemned to freedom; in Immanuel Kant, subject to the 
imperative of the law. In the desert expanse that is the space of his life, he 
wanders, errant, like a blind animal. Picking up scent after scent, he follows 
an uncertain trace. The subject of the desert doesn’t differ from the desert’s 
other animals. Shadow shelters him from the sun. Fleeing other animals, he 
joins the collective, aligning himself with hosts, with the horde or pack we 
customarily call family. In the desert, he tries to find his bearings. He squints 
at the stars in the night sky. His freedom, in his experience, is forever coex-
tensive with his unfreedom. They are indistinguishable. The experience of 




1 Peter Handke, Versuch über die Müdigkeit 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 47. 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations 
are by Gerrit Jackson.
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when you look out of the window, or lay your head in your hands. You and 
I would ride past the entire world, hand in hand, seemingly united, and 
none of it would be true. In short, though you might lean toward me far 
enough for you to be in danger, I would be excluded from you forever.  
If this be true, Felice—and to me there seems to be no doubt—then surely 
I had good reason to want with all my might to part from you six months 
go, and moreover good reason to fear any conventional bond with you, since 
the consequences of any such bond could only be the severing of my 
desire from the feeble forces that still sustain me—who am unfit for this 
earth—on this earth today. I am stopping, Felice, I have written enough 
for today.5
Kafka as an impotent animal: he fears being an “unthinkingly faithful dog,” 
trapped in the immanence of deceptive feelings. All feelings lie, though fear and 
pain perhaps only very slightly. Kafka’s theory of affect implies an animaliza-
tion of self, like Nietzsche’s, who describes himself as a creature of instinct. It 
is not an abandonment of rationality but rather grounded in the suturing of 
reason and emotion. The organization of affects is economic. They have functions. 
The unthinking animal risks being dispersed among them. Martin Heidegger 
spoke of captivation (Benommenheit). The animal is neither world-making, like 
man, nor worldless, like the stone. World-poor, harnessed into its environment, 
it staggers dizzily. Condemned to “silence and eternal separation,” it stares into 
the abyss of the world. A crater opens up. At the center of language: a hole. 
The animal Kafka understands himself to be must reckon with that hole. In the 
encounter it experiences distance. Excluded from the zone of complementary 
feelings, it is incapable of imagining itself as a complement of a fulfilling rela-
tionship. What remains to it is apodictic solitude. Kafka’s self-portrait reads 
like a response to the famous section 125 in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (1882). 
With the killing of God, Nietzsche writes, the earth has been unchained from 
the sun—and so has Kafka: from Felice and the lie of complementarity.
Truth
Lacan already notes the impossibility of speaking the truth in any other way 
than telling only half of it. As long as truth is in play, the subject grasps at 
nothing. He touches on the abyss of the inconsistency of his reality. Yet this 
outer bounds become indistinct as the horizon, in the shimmering heat, blurs 
into the ocean. The nomadic subject, Deleuze and Guattari write, adds “desert 
to desert, steppe to steppe, by a series of local operations whose orientation 
and direction endlessly vary. […] There is no line separating earth and sky; there 
is no intermediate distance, no perspective or contour; visibility is limited; 
and yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology that relies not on points or 
objects but rather on haecceities, on sets of relations (winds, undulations  
of snow or sand, the song of the sand, or the creaking of ice, the tactile qualities 
of both).”2 Nancy quotes this passage in sketching the experience of freedom 
as one of the desert in which the subject must find his way.3 Like it or not, the 
coextensiveness of freedom and unfreedom characterizes his situation. It  
is all he has. That there is no place beyond the desert is to say that here is a 
multiplicity of deserts the subject experiences as a menacing freedom.
Labyrinth
Jean-François Lyotard says that every philosopher is trapped in “a kind of rational 
system of delusions.”4 Every philosopher, inevitably, constructs his own cage. 
The concepts are the building blocks of an architecture that is as precarious as 
it is audacious. Even Friedrich Nietzsche, who breaks with the system, gets 
caught in its labyrinth. Self-consistency his not his objective, prompting Karl 
Jaspers to remark that a reader who does not, for every one of his sentences, 
come across one that contradicts it somewhere in the oeuvre, has not read him. 
The philosophers’ conceptual cages can be complex architectures. Many are 
caves in which the subject, dizzy, reeling, loses his way. Perhaps Lyotard calls 
them rational systems of delusions because reason is itself a delusion, insofar 
as erring is part and parcel of thinking; it is where evidence is extinguished to 
let thinking touch on a truth that amounts to the loss of its certainties.
Kafka
The letter dated April 1, 1913, is a document of blazing despair. Franz Kafka 
confides in Felice. One must read the text in its entirety:
My one fear—surely nothing worse can either be said or listened to—is 
that I shall never be able to possess you. At best I would be confined, 
like an unthinkingly faithful dog, to kissing your casually proffered hand, 
which would not be a sign of love, but of the despair of the animal  
condemned to silence and eternal separation. I would sit beside you and, 
as has happened, feel the breath and life of your body at my side, yet  
in reality be further from you than now, here in my room. I would never 
be able to attract your attention, and it would be lost to me altogether 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 421.
3 See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of 
Freedom (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 145.
4 See Florian Rötzer, ed., Französische 
Philosophen im Gespräch, 2nd ed. 
(Munich: Boer, 1987), 104.
5 Franz Kafka, Letters to Felice, ed. Erich 
Heller and Jürgen Born, trans. James Stern 




The arché, the whirling origin that archaeological investigation tries to 
reach, is a historical a priori that remains immanent to becoming and 
continues to act in it. Even in the course of our life, the vortex of the origin 
remains present until the end and silently accompanies our existence  
at every moment. At times it gets closer; at other items it distances itself 
so much that we are no longer able to glimpse it or to perceive its hushed 
swarming. But, at decisive moments, it seizes us and drags us inside it; we 
then suddenly realize that we are ourselves nothing other than a frag-
ment of the beginning that continues to spin in the whirlpool from which 
our life derives, to swirl in it until it reaches the point of infinite negative 
pressure and disappears—unless chance spits it out again.6 
Agamben associates the vortex with a black sun. It is a dark attractor, a hole 
that engulfs. Much earlier, the Platonic idea of the good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα) 
was already said to be “beyond being” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς ουσίας). It is itself a dark 
sun, evading the light it emanates. Metaphysical thinking always already  
revolves around its abyss, which allows it to be and equally pulverizes it. Thinking 
is the willingness to assimilate to the whirling motion in order to entrust  
oneself to the hazard of self-loss. It implies dizziness and impotence, for it is 
grounded in the insight into its groundlessness. The abyss need not be a  
crater. It is often the impulse of an inadvertent motion that carries the subject 
into the unknown, where his evidences are extinguished, guiding his thinking 
toward novel and often disturbing findings.
Schnori
There is a character in Robert Walser’s short story called “Schnori” who recalls 
Kafka’s Odradek. It is said that some called him Schnori since he never 
opened his mouth “for years,”7 because he was so lazy. What is more is that 
he “loves to stutter,” out of listlessness or to vex his fellow men. He never 
makes things easy for anyone. Asked a question, Schnori responds with a 
smile. He resembles an “abyss.” “No one rivaled his ability to be ungarrulously 
loquacious and chattily taciturn.” There is something strange about the 
Schnori. And yet he is an utterly untragic figure. One might think him a dizzily 
stumbling lucky devil. Still, he is far from dumb. Let others think of him as 
they please. He laughs about it: “For then life on the whole appeared to him like 
a not untalented comedian.” The Schnori is impossible to ignore—“one would 
have preferred to overlook him, but to no avail”—and therefore a nuisance. 
implies that he has long revolved around a hole, a circular motion that propels 
him into a vortex. His desire, his ὄρεξις, his appetitus all resemble a dizziness. 
This is the case, incidentally, not simply for the subject called male. Any subject, 
the female, the male, the female-male, transsexual, or queer subject, casts 
himself into the abyss of his inconsistency as soon as he starts to think, which 
is to say, as soon as he ventures to depart from the space of his factual security 
to expose himself to the experience of his the contingency of his identity. Such 
exposure inevitably entails seduction and surrender, and be it self-seduction 
and self-surrender. The attempt to desexualize the dialectic of thinking, which 
is a dialectic of desire, of restlessness and fever, is bound to fail. The moment  
a subject tickles at his origin, he falls into the hole of a truth that is a synonym 
of his ontological inconsistency. In the end, as Derrida knows, one must 
resolve to cease to credit the credible. The sexual-theological connotation is 
eminent. God is dead, meaning: truth has died with him. Even better: the 
death of God is bound up with the resurrection of a truth other than the truth 
of fact. Under its sway, the subject with his realities teeters—plunged into the 
abyss of indeterminacy.
Brief Theory Of Insects
There is no thinking that blinds itself to specters, since the latter have long 
acted in league with it in order to offer opposition to their invisibility by flying—
like dizzy insects—into the light of the fire that consumes them.
Maelstrom
Thinking the subject has been torn from his origin, he tears himself away from 
himself. This tearing away tears him apart, becoming torn open toward the 
sphere of his negation. In lurching motion, he opens up to the negative that 
marks the center of his being (his soul). Negation or void, insignificant depth, 
yawning abyss that represents nothingness in being, or being as nothingness, 
as evanescence and becoming. Giorgio Agamben cites Walter Benjamin to 
sketch this maw, which—with Edgar Allan Poe—we call maelstrom, rapacious 
turbine, vortex of origin, and original vortex, the immaterial call of ultimate 
inconsistency. Others have spoken of the chaos whose irreducibility is incon-
trovertible. The hole in being holds it together and annihilates it in one and 
the same motion. All philosophers have sought to spell out its implications. 
How is one to live in the face of this force? What is the subject in the vortex? 
Is he a subject? How to think thinking in relation to the abyssal abyss? Who 
would vouchsafe for its consistency and cohesiveness? The least we can say 
is that we have never conclusively dealt with the origin or the void. No one 
succeeds in leaving them behind. Agamben writes: 
6 Giorgio Agamben, “Vortexes,” in The Fire 
and the Tale, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2017), 59–60.
7 Robert Walser, “Schnori,” in Es war einmal: 
Prosa aus der Berner Zeit, 1927–1928 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 
352–54.
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Dance of the Concepts
Is the concept of creation obsolete? As a category of art, it gestures toward 
its origin in theology as well as the romantic-masculinist aesthetics of genius. 
In the world of finance, it stands for value made out of nothingness = monetary 
metaphysics. And yet Deleuze and Guattari use this concept. They do so to define 
philosophy as the creation of concepts. They also do so to impel language 
into complications. The result is a dance of the concepts that opens them up 
to the nonconceptual with which they have long been in communication. It  
is the dance of a thinking that demands more of itself than being a record of 
what is. A minimum of levity is indispensable to any thinking that ventures 
beyond the confines of established reality to enter into a coalition with chaos. 
Thinking requires letting oneself in for this dance, which means losing one’s 
head in the most precise manner. That turns into a flirtation with the impossible. 
It implies the willingness to consent to a dizziness that engenders its own laws. 
In the vertigo of thinking, the subject affirms the loss of his ground. He begins 
to soar above himself so as to intensify, in soaring, his contact with what he 
soars over. Creation is not a romantic category. Creation means loss of orien-
tation, the courage to enter the unknown, paired with the sober-mindedness 
and discipline of the conceptual athlete who resists the doctrines of his 
time.10
Childhood
Hannah Arendt opens her 1968 essay on Walter Benjamin with an excursus on 
childhood: a stage of life, she writes, littered with “countless little catastrophes.”11 
Children’s love of fairy-tale characters, pixies, and monsters is at bottom a 
heightened realism. Where adults have confidence in the consistency of their 
realities, the child celebrates their fragility. He experiences his life as a series  
of inexplicable crises. To parry them, he embraces specters. Benjamin does the 
same thing. His thinking observes the principles of the child’s love of specters, 
His “jocular existifying” is a source of unease. It would be better if he did not 
exist. Just as Odradek in Kafka’s story bothers the paterfamilias with his exis-
tence, the Schnori bothers those around him with a smile that is all the more 
infuriating because it is without scorn. One must poke fun at him. How else to 
bear him? The Schnori provokes resentment, hatred, envy. He accomplishes 
“delightful creations,” and yet seems not even to care. It is as though he were 
indifferent to the fact that he is an artist. Odradek is a nuisance by virtue of 
his unconcern, and so is the Schnori, who could not care less that people call 
him by the wrong name.
Pain
Pain is not an epiphenomenon of thinking but part of it—its outermost bound. 
When the bow bends, just before it snaps, so as to seize the cogito and plunge 
it into madness, an incommensurable pain shoots through it that announces 
the loss of its certainties. The cogito risks forfeiting the minimal inconsistency 
that separates it from chaos or the void. It touches on the abyss implicit in it. 
In pain, it can itself tear apart. In her book Über-Empfindlichkeit: Spielformen 
der Idiosynkrasie (2000), Silvia Bovenschen, concluding a discussion of  
Paul Valéry, who may be regarded as a Cartesian of pain, quotes Simone Weil: 
“Physical pain heightened to the extreme, without any admixture of consolation 
because it is accompanied by utter moral despair, that is the totality of time 
and space entering into few instants and the diminutive extension of a body 
and tearing the soul apart.”8 We recognize the experience of the extreme and 
the outermost bound, the rift that separates the subject from himself. With 
pain, the inconsistency flashes up that is the true stuff of which the subject 
is made. Weil calls it physical, but it strikes at the soul, which may be regarded 
as synonymous with the insubstantial substance that constitutes the void inherent 
to the subject. The experience of pain is owed to contact with that void. It is 
self-affection in the guise of other-affection. The void within me threatens to blow 
me apart if I do not resist it. What we call “life” is one name of this dynamic of 
resistance in which the subject responds with fabricated consistencies (imag-
inations, hopes, consolations, chimeras, etc.) to the ontological inconsistency 
that no knowledge can undo. Hegel was aware of this, as were Lacan and Deleuze. 
Weil became a mystic of the void by plunging herself into nothingness, as  
attested, finally, by her death of hunger. Bovenschen is right: “The power of 
pain is characterized by empty cruelty.”9 Only this is the cruelty of life. It indi-
cates the presence of death within it. In pain, the subject dizzily lurches to-
ward his truth = finitude. To think means neither to contest it nor to submit to 
it. There is no thinking without pain. That is the least one can say of it.
8 Simone Weil, quoted in Silvia Bovenschen, 
Über­Empfindlichkeit: Spielformen der 
Idiosynkrasie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2007), 95.
9 Bovenschen, 261.
10 All that counts in the history of thinking is 
owed to the scrupulous loss of one’s head. 
This is true also of Immanuel Kant. His 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781) is an excess 
of sober-mindedness. By fixing the outer 
bounds of the human cognitive faculties, 
the book is an affirmation of inevitable 
transgressions of these boundaries. It is in 
the nature of reason that it is wrenched 
above and beyond itself. No philosophy can 
be spared the excess of reason, or else it 
would be no more than the adminis tration 
of established knowledge. To think is to do 
what one cannot do—but to do it with 
great precision.
11 Hannah Arendt, introduction to Walter 
Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. 
Harry Zohn (New York: Random House, 
1968), 6.
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whence its particular intractability and hardness. Instead of falling for the idealism 
of false maturity, it plunges into the shadowy realm of contingency, which 
teems with six-headed dogs, stuttering cats, reeling gnomes. Benjamin shares 
Robert Walser’s hyperbolic attention to what is overlooked. His thinking is 
guided by the wish to see even the invisible. Arendt insists on narrating Benjamin’s 
life as a “sequence” of “piles of debris.” Benjamin, presumably, would not 
have contradicted her. Does not every one of his texts reflect its labyrinthine 
quality, its winding passages and sudden turns? In the trope that transforms 
the author he is into a hare, constantly zigzagging to outrun himself? The “un-
worldliness” that Arendt, quoting Benjamin, identifies as his defining trait is  
a symptom of aggressive openness to the world. Benjamin entrusts himself to 
the share of the unfamiliar in his realities. This lets him remain a marveling 
child who communicates with specters. The polemical force of his thinking 
derives from the refusal to see only the visible. His is a doubly critical intelli-
gence at work. We may call it dialectical. It does not hesitate to take aim at itself. 
Instead of walling itself in among evidence, it sets out for the unknown. There 
are humans who need guardian angels to master the challenges of their every-
day lives. Benjamin is one of them. By turning his intelligence against himself, 
he opens up a niche at the heart of reality. All children hole up in the interme-
diary zone between dream and reality. Instead of letting certainties numb 
him, Benjamin resists the authority of the ordinary. And his resistance is of 
spectral intensity.
Paradise
The fall from paradise corresponds to the precipitate plunge into insight. It  
inflicts the infelicity of being a reflective animal. Deleuze and Derrida meditated 
on dumbness and animal existence. It is a mistake to call animals dumb, yet a 
persistent theologeme has it that animal life comes with a felicity lost to man: 
paradisiacal thoughtlessness. In a novella titled Der Hanswurst, Robert Walser 
says of his protagonist that he is “happy in his skin” because he knows “only 
jollity.”12 Unperturbed by the concerns that vex others, he coasts through the 
world as though on tracks. The danger of a derailment, it appears, is averted. 
His jollity grows out of the incapacity to imagine his future as any different 
from his present. Absorbed in his presence, he knows only felicity. “He is and 
remains a child, an imbecile, unable to distinguish the significant from the  
insignificant, what is worthy of esteem from what is worthless.”13 With discon-
certing trust in the world, the Hanswurst [buffoon] moves through his reality. 
Animal and child are made to serve as allegories of a present unclouded by 
reflection.14 In their ignorance of the serious side of life (or their apparent 
failure to have even an inkling) of it, their felicity resembles that of the sages, 
who, as Chinese thinking has it, are “without idea.”15 Walser’s Hanswurst is a 
figure of the coincidence of wisdom and dumbness. He exemplifies the limi-
Dizzy Thinking
tation of reflective intelligence as much as the dubiousness of paradisiacal 
theology.
Certitudo
A minimum of destruction can result in a maximum of freedom. The latter is 
no doubt not an absolute freedom, which remains a metaphysical-idealistic 
chimera. It is freedom within objective unfreedom, a particular alteration of 
one’s weaving oneself into the texture of reality. Franz Kafka portrays it as an 
escape that leads one not into a better world but, in an altered state, into this 
one. The point is breaking with the evidences. They anaesthetize the subject 
by presenting themselves as obvious truths to evade being called in question. 
Hans Blumenberg writes: “Certainties are destructible, and the ones whose 
obviousness has rendered them unnoticeable and therefore immune to ques-
tioning are the frailest.”16 To think means to review all certainties in order to 
confront them with the ontological inconsistency of the totality we call reality. 
Certainties are nothing but certainties. They function in relation to a system 
of reference that lacks ultimate consistency.17 That is the meaning of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s declaration in On Certainty: “What I know, I believe.”18
Turbulence
Thinking entails turbulence. The subject, dizzy, reels. Now and then he crashes. 
No thinking without risks. The most dangerous option is not always the best 
one. On the other hand, the one that poses no danger at all is not an option. 
Art and philosophy have this in common: that they expose themselves to  
the hazard of not knowing. That is true even of the systems erected by the 
German idealists. What are the systems Hegel draws up other than a scaffold, 
sprawling, and coming apart on all sides, under permanent reconstruction? 
12 Robert Walser, “Der Hanswurst,” in Kleine 
Dichtungen (Geneva: Kossodo, 1971), 138.
13 Walser, 138.
14 See Marcus Steinweg, “Wittgenstein’s 
Animal,” in Inaesthetics 2: Animality, ed. 
Wilfried Dickhoff & Marcus Steinweg 
(Berlin: Merve Verlag, 2011), 35–41.
15 See François Jullien, Un sage est sans 
idée, ou, L’autre de la philosophie (Paris: 
Seuil, 1998).
16 Hans Blumenberg, Die Vollzähligkeit der 
Sterne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2011), 318.
17 If philosophy were to entail an appeal, it 
would that all certainties be subjected to 
review. That is the skepticism that is 
constitutive of thinking. It is in league with 
the affirmation of the inconsistency of the 
world. No certainty resists its questioning. 
Rather than nostalgia, as Novalis thought, 
philosophy is a longing for far-flung 
places. It opens up to the alien share in 
reality by calling its meaning in question. 
Nothing is more uncertain than its 
purport, whence the ridicule it incurs. 
Taking it seriously by making fun of it is 
part of the repertoire of common sense.
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. 
Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 25e.
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At the scaffold’s center: the absolute = the void. Just as a dead god resides at 
the heart of all belief, nothingness persists within the system, its negation and 
by the same token its affirmation. There is no non-architectural thinking. 
Even thinking in scattered notes has an architecture. It is not an index of the 
existence of a transcendental signified, or else it would not exist and have  
no meaning. To think means to approach the inexistence of God. It is only in 
the willingness to give oneself up for lost that something like a self consti-
tutes itself. Or a subject. As long as by subject we mean the placeholder of his 
absence. Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of the intoxication of reason turned toward 
the absolute. It edges its way toward the nameless that has long begun to haunt 
it. Taking possession of that namelessness can never be the point. It is by 
definition incapable of being possessed. The point is to recognize its presence 
as the index of my ontological inconsistency. This same recognition, which 
can cost me everything, is what we may call thinking. 
Translated from the German by Gerrit Jackson
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[Ilinx games] are based on the pursuit of vertigo and […] consist of an 
attempt to momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a 
kind of voluptuous panic upon an otherwise lucid mind. In all cases, it is 
a question of surrendering to a kind of spasm, seizure or shock which 
destroys reality with sovereign brusqueness. 
—Roger Caillois1
We must look at the world through the wrong end of the telescope as 
well as the right one, see things inside out and backwards, in bright and 
dim light. In this philosophy space proliferates with points of view. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche2
Art is the reinforcement of the capacity to endure disorientation so that 
a real and significant problem may emerge. 
—Morse Peckham3
We begin with pleasure: Who has not tried to derange their senses? We spin 
ourselves with small steps, disabling our vestibular-ocular reflex,4 and affecting 
audio visual as well as internal (vestibular, proprioceptive, interoceptive) 
senses until, dizzy, staggering, losing our balance, we collapse, and finally 
stationary, relish the passing feelings of spinning, of floating, even of losing  
a sense of our position in the world.5 We discover the pleasures of vertigo, of 
dizziness, of disorientation. From whirling on our feet we graduate to the 
foot-propelled merry-go-round and swings that induce the delights of pendular 
movement, or their delicious combination, the tire swing. We insert ourselves 
into amusement park rides, purpose built for intense, vertigo-inducing experiences. 
Our pleasure increases to the degree that our equilibrioception is impaired, our 
proprioception toyed with, our interoception made alarmingly conscious, 
our orientation deranged, our sense of connection the earth and its gravity  
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1 Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games, 
trans. Meyer Barash (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1961), 23. 
2 Quoted in Stephen Kern, The Culture of 
Time and Space, 1880–1918 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 150.
3 Morse Peckham, Man’s Rage for Chaos: 
Biology, Behavior, and the Arts 
(Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1965), 314.
4 This is a reflex of eye movement that 
attempts to stabilize images on the retina 
when the head moves, by sending the eye 
in the direction opposite to that of the head’s 
turn, thereby maintaining the image at the 
center of the visual field. See, e.g., Ernst 
Mach, Contribution to the Analysis of the 
Sensations, trans. C. M. Williams (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1897), 65ff.
5 There is a degree of confusion and con-
flation in the terminology of what some 
call internal, haptic, or somato senses: the 
vestibular sense of “equilibroception,” 
which, based on our inner ear structures 
regulate our balance and orientation; 
proprioception (synonymous with “kinaes-
thesia”), sensory knowledge derived from 
nerves related to our muscles, tendons and 
other structures, letting us know about 
our bodily movements and positioning; and 
interoception, sensations of our inner 
organs. To confuse matters, senses are often 
referred to in combination, e.g., “audio-
visual,” and “vestibular-ocular reflex.”
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riven, and all is intensified when in pure terror we close our eyes or our con-
veyance—such as a roller coaster—enters zones of darkness. We rediscover 
these feelings when we induce them with alcohol and other drugs.6 In all 
these ways we take pleasure in what French writer and philosopher Roger 
Caillois has referred to as ilinx.
6 See, e.g., the remarkable description of 
sensory disorientation in Henri Michaux’s 
“Les effets de la mescaline,” in L’infini 
turbulent (1957) (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).
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Fig. 25 
László Moholy-Nagy, untitled (Aeroplane Swing, Brighton), 1935–37
Fig. 26
Nightime view of a lit merry-go-round in movement, Blackpool, 
England, 1929
Fig. 24 
Max Krajewsky, Elevator Shaft of the 
Grünefeld Department Store, Berlin, 1928
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The development of aviation was contemporaneous with the intensification of 
amusement park ride culture in the early twentieth century, culminating in 
the emergence of First World War fighter pilots who perfected the techniques 
of flight in a space of spherical coordinates, thereby subverting the steady 
horizon of balloon flight and the bird’s-eye view. As Charlotte Douglas phrases it:
 
The spreading craze for flight early in the new century led people […] to 
find themselves strangely unhooked from the earth, and ever more often 
gazing down upon the abstract patterns of towns, fields, and rivers. But 
flight brought more than views from above […] Flight seemed to do away 
with all the nineteenth century mechanics of weight, direction, and firm 
destinations: even the notion of time began to seem pedestrian…. Artists, 
as well as aviators, experienced a sudden sensation of multitudes of di-
rections. The compass became spherical, rather than flat, and one could range 
around in unmarked space, assume any angle, observe any orientation.11
In addition to an unprecedented freedom of movement, flight was the source 
of a hitherto unknown type of sensory derangement, “pilot vertigo,” in which 
perceptual orientation ceases to accord with reality, resulting in “non-visual,” 
that is, vestibular and proprioceptive illusions, particularly when the horizon 
is indistinct. Antoine de Saint Exupéry wrote: “Horizon? There was no longer a 
horizon. I was in the wings of a theater cluttered up with bits of scenery. Vertical, 
oblique, horizontal, all of plane geometry was awhirl. [...] For a single second,  
in a waltzing landscape like this, the flyer has been unable to distinguish between 
vertical mountain sides and horizontal planes.”12 We came to realize that  
our senses evolved on earth and could not be trusted during our longed-for, 
dreamed-of escape from it. As artist and theorist György Kepes phrased it: 
“All our senses—sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, temperature sensitivity, 
balance, kinesthesis—are elementary. We are creatures of evolution, equipped 
with senses which are naturally sensitive only to those aspects of nature which 
Caillois discusses ilinx within the framework of a theory of play. It was Arthur 
Rimbaud’s insight to link it to art, when in 1871 he wrote that to be a poet, one 
should “arriver à l’inconnu par le dérèglement de tous les sens.”7 Symbolist 
theater followed Rimbaud in attempting “to alter the audience members’ normal 
states of perception” and in addition to defamiliarization, the Surrealists’ 
surely meant sensory disorientation with the term dépaysement.8 The aestheti-
cization of ilinx is a marker of a larger trend, a shift in the sense of our senses, 
the conception and range of our sensory experience. Sara Danius has argued 
that “from, roughly, 1880 to 1930 […] modernist aesthetics […] is an index of  
a technologically mediated crisis of the senses […] that ultimately cuts across 
the question of art. [...] The specific aesthetics of perception on which so much 
of classical modernism turns is tightly bound up with modern machine culture.”9 
As communication and conveyance technologies were introduced that affected 
our perception, a crisis of the senses was induced with, as Peckham suggests, 
profound implications for art. 
Though the amusement park has a long history, by the late nineteenth century 
entrepreneurs were specifically catering to the popular desire for ilinx play. 
The first roller coaster was built at Coney Island, Brooklyn, in 1884. The Ferris 
wheel was introduced at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago. 
A particularly lively and competitive culture of amusement park innovation 
developed at Coney Island in Brooklyn starting in 1895, with the establish-
ment of Paul Boynton’s Sea Lion Park. The owners of Steeplechase Park, Luna 
Park, and Dreamland vied with each other to introduce ever-newer devices  
of eccentric physical movement invoking vertigo, and satisfying the public’s 
seemingly insatiable desire for sensory novelty and stimulation, particularly  
of the internal vestibular and proprioceptive senses, that is, for dizziness.10 
7 Arthur Rimbaud, Lettre à George Izambard, 
May 13, 1871, in Arthur Rimbaud, Oeuvres 
complètes (Paris: Pleiade, 1972), 249.
8 Serena Keshavjee, “L’art inconscient: 
Imaging the Unconscious in Symbolist Art 
for the Théâtre d’art,” RACAR 34, no. 1 
(2009): 62. In his article “L’oeil de l’ilinx: 
Les avant-gardes à Luna Park,” Clément 
Chéroux discusses the Surrealists’ fascin a-
tion with the amusement park. In Dream lands: 
Des parcs d’attractions aux cités du future, 
ed. Didier Ottinger and Quentin Bajac 
(Paris: Centre Pompidou, 2010), 84–87.
9 Sara Danius, The Senses of Modernism: 
Technology, Perception and Aesthetics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 
1–2.
10 On this, see Dreamlands and Michael 
Immerso, Coney Island: The People’s 
Playground (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002).
11 Charlotte Douglas, “Aero-Art, the Plane-
tary View: Kazimir Malevich and Lazar 
Khidekel,” in Lazar Khidekel and Supre­
matism, ed. Regina Khidekel (Munich: 
Prestel, 2014), 27–34.
12 Antoine de Saint Exupéry, Wind, Sand and 
Stars (1939), quoted in György Kepes, The 
New Landscape in Art and Science 
(Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1956), 81.






new sensory and spatial theories, that sensory derangement as an aesthetic 
strategy, an art of ilinx, emerged. And, inasmuch as sensory derangement 
was a by-product of the overload induced by technologies of modernity, it 
was the Futurists who were the first to engage with it. Even before the Great 
War, prior to their focus on flight, these young artists expressed an interest  
in the components of the ilinx drive, that is, in speed and simultaneous expe-
riences of movement in opposing directions. “Futurism is grounded in the 
complete renewal of human sensibility brought about by the great discoveries 
of science,” wrote Filippo Tommaso Marinetti.22 “Looking at objects from a 
new point of view, no longer from in front or behind, but from above—that is 
to say, foreshortened—I was able to break the old logical shackles and the 
plumb-lines of the old understanding.”23 Meanwhile Umberto Boccioni pondered 
absolute and relative movement in space, that is, the impossibility of motion-
lessness.24 He and Gino Severini developed the notion of a non-Euclidean, 
“spherical expansion in space,” which inevitably knows of simultaneous 
multiple centrifugal and centripetal directionalities.25 
This de-orientation had implications for the production of art. Marinetti dreamed 
of a theater that “destroys all our conceptions of perspective, proportion, 
time, and space.”26 Russian Futurist poet Alexander Kruchenykh posited a “10th 
Land” in his Futurist opera Victory over the Sun, produced at the St. Petersburg 
Luna Park in 1913 in collaboration with Kasimir Malevich and Mikhail Matiushin, 
in which “normal perceptions of space and time [were] destroyed completely 
since not only does darkness reign but the logic of the four dimensions ceases 
once were significant for biological survival.”13 Thus, “spatial disorientation” 
as it came to be known, led to the “graveyard spin” and crashes that would 
have come as deadly surprises to pilots certain they had been flying horizon-
tally.14 In addition to being creative (Rimbaud) or pleasurable (ilinx), sensory 
disorientation was now known to be deadly. 
As well as new technologies, this sensory crisis was rooted in destabilized 
conceptions of space, time, orientation, and of our perception of them early 
in the twentieth century that unfolded as the culture of fairground rides  
and aviation did. Stephen Kern has recounted that after Einstein declared an 
“infinite number of spaces in motion with relation to each other” in 1901,15  
scientists such as Elias de Cyon, Henri Poincaré, Jakob von Uexküll, and Róbert 
Bárány built on Austrian physicist Ernst Mach’s earlier research in basing our 
concepts of time, space, and orientation in the physiology of our bodies, of 
our sensorium, including not only vision, hearing, and touch, but also our 
“muscle” and “equilibrium” senses, as Mach referred to the somatosenses.16 
Mach went so far as to propose that “bodies do not produce sensations,  
but [rather] complexes of sensations […] make up bodies.”17 Belorussian psy-
chiatrist and philosopher Alexander Bogdanov, a Machian, argued for   
social construction, that is, the relativity of time and space.18 This striving was 
often rooted in popular concepts of the Fourth Dimension. Linda Henderson 
points to P. D. Ouspensky’s potential “sensations of infinity” and Charles H. 
Hinton’s citation of freedom from gravity and conventional orientation, as 
steps toward perceiving the Fourth Dimension.19 As she writes of Hinton’s 
project to train us to perceive the Fourth Dimension, “first [...] perception that 
was to be ‘cast out’ was the sense of gravity.” But “since Hinton’s goal was a 
totally free and reversible perception, the sense of left and right also had to be 
overcome.”20 Hinton’s training regimen resonated with the avant-garde as 
they promoted preparation for the sensory onslaught of modernity. 
Of course the ultimate sensory onslaught of modernity was the “storm of steel,” 
as Ernst Jünger phrased it, of the Great War: “The earth shook, the sky seemed 
like a boiling cauldron. Hundreds of heavy batteries were crashing […] innu-
merable shells criss-crossed hissing and howling over our heads. All was swathed 
in thick smoke, which was in the ominous underlighting of colored flares. 
Because of racking pains in our heads and ears, communication was possible 
only by odd, shouted words. The ability to think logically and the feeling of 
gravity, both seemed to have been removed.”21 This ultimate, deadly Gesamt-
kunstwerk was the collective experience of those who went to war or to 
whom the war came. Is it any wonder that an aesthetic concern with sensory 
derangement intensified after the cessation of hostilities in 1918?
It was out of the Golden Age of early twentieth-century amusement park ride
culture, through the technological progress of military aviation, and from the 
13 De Saint Exupéry, 102.
14 Fred H. Previc and William R. Ercoline, 
eds., Spatial Disorientation in Aviation 
(Reston, VA: American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004).
15 Quoted in Kern, Culture of Time and 
Space, 136.
16 Mach, Contribution to the Analysis of the 
Sensations, 73ff.
17 Mach, 22.
18 Kern, Culture of Time and Space, 135–37. 
On Bárány, see Previc and Ercoline, 
Spatial Disorientation in Aviation, 5–6.
19 Linda Dalrymple Henderson, The Fourth 
Dimension and Non­Euclidean Geometry 
in Modern Art (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2013), 216, 384. 
20 Henderson, 380.
21 Jünger, Storm of Steel (1920), trans. 
Michael Hoffman (London: Penguin, 1961), 
95. The many damaged inner ears and 
severed body parts of its survivors no 
doubt also inspired renewed research on 
the somatosenses.
22 F. T. Marinetti, “Destruction of Syntax—
Imagination without Strings—Words-in-
Freedom” (1913), in Futurist Manifestos, 
ed. Umbro Apollonio (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1973), 96. 
23 Marinetti, Technical Manifesto of Futurist 
Literature, 1912, as quoted in Pontus 
Hulten, Futurism and Futurisms (New York: 
Abbeville, 1986), 423.
24 Umberto Boccioni, “Absolute Motion + 
Relative Motion = Dynamism” (1914), in 
Appolonio, Futurist Manifestos, 150–54.
25 Gino Severini, “The Plastic Analogies of 
Dynamism—Futurist Manifesto” (1913), in 
Appolonio, 124.
26 Marinetti, “The Variety Theatre” (1913), in 
Appolonio, 129.
27 Kruchenykh is quoted and translated in 
Hubertus Gassner, “Tight Rhythms: Unstable 
Constructions in Russian Constructivism,” 
Dædalos 20 (September 1990): 65. On the 
Luna Park siting, see Chris Salter, Entangled: 
Technology and the Transformation of Per for­
mance (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2010), 11–12.
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spectacular aspect of Azari’s project. And yet it is clear that Azari was fasci-
nated by the invocation of our somatosenses through flight. In April of 1919 
he scattered his manifesto, “Théâtre Aérien Futuriste,” while flying over the 
streets of Milan.35 The sheets floating down declared “Flight as an Artistic 
Expression of States of Mind.” Note that it is the act of flight itself that is de-
clared to be art, an activity that involves the full somatosensory participation 
of the pilot.36 Azari continues by citing experience of the Great War: “The Ital-
ian aviator who has conquered the better-armed enemy, surprising him with 
more inventive and amazing maneuvers, has created a style of marvelous, 
fantastic, unsurpassable aerial acrobatics.”37 Invoking acrobatics, Azari under-
lines the embodied, experiential aspect of the activity:
We Futurist aviators, we love to roar up perpendicularly and dive verti-
cally into the void; to turn in the intoxication of yaws with our bodies 
glued to the small seats by centrifugal force, and to abandon ourselves 
to the whirl of spirals that press around the spiral staircase embedded in 
the void; to turn over two, three, ten times in an increasing happiness of 
loops and to lean over in whirling barrel rolls; to swirl, skidding; to rock 
ourselves into long falls like dead leaves or to stun ourselves with a breath-
less series of spins; in short, to rock, to roll, to flip over on the invisible 
trapezes of the atmosphere, to form with our airplanes a great, aerial 
pinwheel. We Futurist aviators today are able to create by means of flight 
a new artistic form […] analogous to dance, but […] infinitely superior  
to it because of its grandiose background […] its superlative dynamism, 
and the greatly varied possibilities that it permits.38 
With the emergence of Aeropittura during the 1920s, and the turn toward  
aerobatic air shows, this Futurist moment of the inner senses passed. The focus 
returned to the spectacle of flight on the one hand, and to the painterly  
depiction rather than experience of ilinx, on the other.39
to apply.”27 Of their thinking at this time, Hubertus Gassner writes: “Perception 
of space has lost its orientation. [...] Malevich saw his Suprematist paintings 
as pointing the way forward for perception in the darkness of this hitherto 
unknown Tenth Land. Subdividing space into an above and a below, a right and 
a left, an interior and an exterior they were intended to convey to the observer 
the feeling of floating and thus the transcendence of terrestrial gravity.”28 This 
orientationlessness was suggested by the geometric shapes floating in Malevich’s 
horizonless paintings. Documentary photographs of these paintings nearly al-
ways show some of them hung upside down or sideways, a strategy (if it indeed 
was one on Malevich’s part) that was codified in his protégé Lazar El Lissitzky’s 
Proun: Eight Positions, which, as its title indicates, could be hung in eight alter-
native orientations or displayed horizontally so that a viewer could choose an 
almost infinite variety of angles of view.29 Malevich went as far as to posit that 
matter itself “is the product of rotating energy,” the cosmos consisting of “an 
infinite number of fields of force turning around their centres of excitation.”30 
Gassner posits that Latvian Suprematist Gustav Klutsis’s painting Dynamic City 
was an attempt to illustrate this idea of the genesis of matter, particularly in 
its collage version, in which the placement of collage elements of buildings 
and people make it clear that the black disk at the center of the work and its 
attendant architectonic elements are meant to rotate.31
Theorists held that the dimensions we perceive were functions of our (imperfect) 
sensory apparatus, and so at a certain point the mere depiction of the new 
spatiotemporal concepts was felt to be passé. Artists started to ponder both 
having and offering the public experiences of the new spaces. Such experi-
ences would allow the artists and their publics to engage corporeally with the 
crisis of perception/orientation, and to train people to live with it, that is, with 
Modernity. Morse Peckham argues that “there must [...] be some human activity 
which serves to break up orientations [...] to prepare the individual to observe 
what the orientation tells him is irrelevant, but what very well may be highly 
relevant. That activity, I believe, is the activity of artistic perception.”32 
The Futurists’ derangement of the senses was to be induced by viewers’ ex-
periences of paintings, sculpture, the proscenium theater, and sound. Senses 
other than the audiovisual perception were sidelined. It was after the out-
break of war and the discovery of flight that in their Futurist Reconstruction of 
the Universe, Giacomo Balla and Fortunato Depero called for “PLASTIC-
MOTOR-NOISE MUSIC IN SPACE and the LAUNCHING OF AERIAL CONCERTS 
above the city.”33 This idea was realized in the spring of 1918, when Fedele  
Azari, a Futurist painter and pilot of the Italian air corps introduced his “elementary 
aerial theater” in the sky above Busto Arsizio. Erkki Huhtamo points out that 
“for Azari, flight was an aerial version of Marinetti’s parole in libertà, free move-
ment through space, unrestricted by grammars or syntaxes.”34 It is notable 
that in his discussion of Azari, Huhtamo refers only to the audio-visual, that is, 
28 Gassner, 64–65.
29 Gassner, 69. See Lazar El Lissitzky,  
Proun: 8 Stellungen [Proun: 8 Positions], 
ca. 1923, oil and gouache with metal foil 
on canvas, 139.3 × 139.3 cm (National 
Gallery of Canada Inv. no. 17640).
30 Quoted in Gassner, 69.
31 Gassner, 70. Klucis, Dynamic City, ca. 
1919–21, oil with sand and concrete on 
wood, 87 × 64.5 cm (SMCA–Costakis 
Collection, Thessaloniki); Klucis, Dynamic 
City, 1919, collage, unknown location. 
32 Peckham, Man’s Rage for Chaos, xi.
33 Quoted in Appolonio, Futurist Manifestos, 
199.
34 Erkki Huhtamo, “The Sky Is (Not) the Limit: 
Envisioning the Ultimate Public Media 
Display,” Journal of Visual Culture 8, no. 3 
(December 2009): 18.
35 Michael Kirby, Futurist Performance (New 
York: Dutton, 1971), 150.
36 On flying as an artform, see Steve Poleskie, 
“Art and Flight: Historical Origins to Contem-
porary Works,” Leonardo, 18, no. 2 (1985): 72.
37 Kirby, Futurist Performance, 218–20.
38 Kirby, 218–20.
39 Azari later collaborated with Mino 
Somenzi on aerial spectacles and died in a 
plane crash in 1930. Margaret Fisher, Ezra 
Pound’s Radio Operas: The BBC 
Experiments, 1931–1933 (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2002), 49.
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The arena within which sensory reorientation was now invoked, was theater 
and—most radically—in sensorially challenging immersive environments.  
Enrico Prampolini began thinking about an essentially new theater in his mani-
festo on Futurist scenography of 1915 and developed it in 1924 when he declared 
the “polydimensional Futurist stage.” As Oliver Grau describes it, “The traditional, 
box-shaped horizontal stage, seen from one direction only and with a clearly 
delineated area for the audience’s attention, was to give way to ‘spherical 
expansion.’ The stage would contain ‘new vertical, oblique, and polydimensional 
elements’ that are set in motion electromechanically. These would enlarge 
the perspectival view of the horizontal, which, in concert with the light elements, 
would move ‘in simultaneous penetration toward a centrifugal irradiation of 
infinite visual and emotional angels of scenic action.’”40 That the Futurist the-
atrical experiments were pedagogical is indicated by their statement that 
“every night the Futurist theatre will be a gymnasium to train our race’s spirit 
to the swift, dangerous enthusiasms made necessary by this Futurist year.”41 
Lazar El Lissitzky and Klucis also sought to transcend the two-dimensional or 
painterly representation of the new, “alogical” space (as in Malevich’s work) 
intending, rather, to posit structures, or rather anti-structures that would embody 
these notions.42 For El Lissitzky, “this dynamic architecture creates a new 
theatre of life.”43 Lissitzky and Klucis proposed a revival of Victory Over the Sun 
involving a scaffold that was, in Gassner’s phrasing, to float “above the Earth 
free of gravity and devoid of a floor in an empty space and without any anchor-
age. [...] The electro-mechanically driven machinery used to create movement, 
light and noise was. [...] designed for the rhythmic subdivision of urban space and 
movement within it, and scarcely for the creation of a stable, statically sound 
structure.”44 While this was clearly an unrealizable project, Lissitzky’s accom-
plished drawings for its figures indicate the seriousness with which he too  
the proposal.45 
In Berlin during the 1920s, László Moholy-Nagy was also thinking in terms of 
offering people experiences in order to train their senses for modernity.46 
These ideas were first put forward in the manifesto “Dynamisch-Konstruktives 
Kraftsystem” (Dynamic-constructive energy system), written with the Hungarian 
art historian, Alfréd Kemény in 1922.47 In 1921 Kemény had attended the Third 
Comintern Congress in Moscow where he encountered the thought of Bogdanov 
through the Constructivists he was meeting.48 I have argued elsewhere that the 
“Dynamic-constructive Energy System” is Bogdanovian in nature.49 Kemény and 
Moholy-Nagy articulate Bogdanov’s notion that reality is composed of energy 
relationships, an understanding of which leads to the “science of building,” or 
“architectonics” (Tektologiia), an early form of Systems Theory, which is evidently 
what the two Hungarians wished here to apply to the production of art, using 
the term Konstruktivität (constructivity): “Vital constructivity is the form in 
which life appears, and the principle of all human and cosmic development. 
40 Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion  
to Immersion, trans. Gloria Custance 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 143–44.
41 F. T. Marinetti, Emilio Settimelli, and Bruno 
Corra, “The Futurist Synthetic Theatre” 
(1915), in Appolonio, Futurist Manifestos, 
183. Given the later relation ship between 
what was the nascent Fascist movement in 
1915, and the Futurists, it is worth pointing 
out here that it is precisely in states of 
altered sensory perception that the 
potential for political manipulation is 
possible. 
42 Gassner, Tight Rhythms, 65.
43 El Lissitzky, “The Suprematism of the 
Construction of the World” (1920), quoted 
in Gassner, 65. 
44 Gassner, 65–66.
45 Published as Die Plastische Gestaltung der 
Elektro­Mechanischen Schau Sieg über die 
Sonne (Hanover, 1923).
46 Oliver Botar, Technical Detours: The Early 
Moholy­Nagy Reconsidered (New York: Art 
Gallery of the Graduate Center of the City 
University of New York, 2006), 170ff.
47 Der Sturm, no. 12 (December 1922): 9–12. 
Kemény and Moholy-Nagy had been at law 
school together in Budapest; but Kemény 
switched to art history.
48 On Bogdanov and the avant-garde, see 
Jarolsav Andel, “The Constructivist 
Entanglement: Art Into Politics, Politics 
Into Art,” in Art into Life: Russian Construc­
tivism 1914–1932 (New York: Rizzoli, 1990), 
225–26; and Charlotte Douglas, “A Lost 
Paradigm of Abstraction: Alexander 
Bogdanov and the Russian Avant-Garde,” 
in The Russian Avant­Garde: Representation 
and Interpretation, ed. Yevgenia Petrova 
(St. Petersburg: Palace Editions, 2001).
49 Oliver Botar, Természet és Technika: Az 
Újraértelmezett Moholy­Nagy 1916–1923 
(Budapest: Vince Kiadó, 2007), 192ff.
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Fig. 28 
Fédèle Azari, Untitled 
(Propaganda Drop over a 
Boulevard), gelatin silver 
print, n.d. [ca. 1914–19]
Fig. 29 
Fédèle Azari, Untitled 
(Airplanes), gelatin silver 
print, n.d. [ca. 1914–29]
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Translated into art, this today entails the activation of space by means of dy-
namic-constructive energy systems, that is, the construction into each other of 
energies that are actually at tension in physical space, a space (tension) that 
also functions as energy.” A critique of the sculpture and painting of contem-
porary avant-garde efforts is followed by the statement that “this is why we 
must replace the static principle of classical art with the dynamic principle of 
universal life. In practical terms: instead of static material constructions […] 
dynamic construction (or vital constructivity, i.e. the relation of energies) must 
be involved, in which the material is employed only as the carrier of energies.” 
The result, according to the authors, might be the “Dynamic-constructive  
Energy System, whereby a person, up to that point merely receptive in his obser-
vation of works of art, experiences an intensification of his capabilities like 
never before, and himself becomes an active factor in the unfolding energies.” 
They go on to relate this new paradigm of art to “the problem of freely 
floating sculpture as well as of film as a projected spatial movement. The first 
attempts at dynamic-constructive energy systems can be only experimental 
demonstrations testing the connections between matter, energy and space. 
[Only] then follows the use of these experimental results for the design of 
works of art free from mechanical-technical movement.”50 
It is important to note their call for the eventual dematerialization of the artwork 
into an unspecified form of pure energy—free as they put it, from “mechanical-
technical” movement, a free-floating art involving the active participation of 
(presumably) equally free-floating participants. Moholy-Nagy dates his concep-
tion of two key projects to the time of the formulation of this manifesto: the 
“Lichtrequisit einer elektrischen Bühne” (Light prop for an electric stage) and 
the “Kinetisches konstruktives System: Bau mit Bewegungsbahnen für Spiel 
und Berförderung” (Kinetic constructive system). Structure with movement 
50 Lásló Moholy-Nagy and Alfréd Kemény, 
“Dynamisch-Konstruktives Kräftesystem: 
Manifesto der kinetischen Plastik,” in Der 
Sturm, no. 12 (December 1922): 9. Unless 
otherwise stated, all translations are my own. 
51 László Moholy-Nagy, Malerei, Photographie, 
Film (Munich: Albert Langen, 1925), 35. He 
developed these ideas in other publications, 
e.g., “Probleme des neuen Films,” Telehor, 
no. 1 (1936): 122–26. On Moholy-Nagy’s 
program for an education of the senses, 
see Oliver A. I. Botar, Sensing the Future: 
Moholy­Nagy, Media and the Arts (Zurich: 
Lars Müller, 2014), 17ff. 
52 Sergei Eisenstein, The Film Sense (New 
York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), quoted in 
Kepes, New Landscape in Art and Science, 
80. Note that Kepes quotes this text as 
part of his presentation of scientific 
photography revealing realms “in a sequence 
from very large to very small” in which “a 
world of sense patterns is projected which 
contains spatial and temporal structures 
different from anything to which men are 
accustomed” (p. 104). Our orientationless-
ness within the spaces imaged by tech-
nologies of modernity is, however, a subject 
that will have to be dealt with elsewhere. 
For a start, see Oliver Botar, “György Kepes’ 
‘New Landscape’ and the Aestheticization 
of Scientific Photography,” in The Pleasure 
of Light: György Kepes, Frank Malina,  
ed. Nina Czeglédy and Róna Kopeczky 
(Budapest: Ludwig Múzeum, Museum of 
Contemporary Art, 2010), 124–43. 
53 For an attempt at a realization of the poly-
cinema concept, see Lancelot Coar and 
Patrick Harrop, with Oliver Botar, Polycinema, 
2014 (after the ideas of László Moholy-
Nagy), shown at the exhibition “Sensing 
the Future: Moholy-Nagy, Media and the 
Arts,” Bauhaus-Archiv, Museum für Gestal- 
tung, Berlin, 2014–15; see also Botar, 
Sensing the Future, 104ff and 167.
tracks for play and conveyance). The reference in the manifesto to “film as a 
projected spatial movement” also makes it clear that it was in 1922 that Moholy-
Nagy began to formulate his ideas for what he later referred to as Polykino 
(poly-cinema). 
In his first Bauhaus book, Malerei, Photographie, Film (Painting, Photography, 
Film, 1925), and in subsequent texts Moholy-Nagy asked questions concerning 
the projection of films, the paradigmatic medium of the era. His response was 
the proposal for an environment, the “simultaneous or poly-cinema,” within 
which a dispositif of multiple projectors fastened to machine-driven pivots or 
equipped with tracking mirrors would project several moving films simul tane ously 
onto large concave and other kinds of surfaces, textured, convex, geometrical 
solids, etc., thus making “new demands on our optical organ of perception, 
the eye and our center of perception, the brain” in emulation of modern urban 
life, which has “increased the capacity of our perceptual organs for simul-
taneous acoustical and optical activity.”51 Moholy-Nagy’s friend Sergei Eisenstein 
described this experience of metropolitan urbanity: “All sense of perspective 
and realistic depth is washed away by a nocturnal sea of electric advertising. 
Far and near, small (in the foreground) and large (in the background), soaring 
aloft and dying away, racing and circling, bursting and vanishing—these lights 
tend to abolish all sense of real space, finally melting into a single plane of 
colored light points and neon lines moving over a surface of black velvet sky.”52 
While Moholy-Nagy was never able to realize the poly-cinematic emulation of  
the city, this section of Painting, Photography Film is one of the first theoretical 
texts on and proposals for what would later be termed “expanded cinema.”53
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Fig. 30 
László Moholy-Nagy and Alfréd 
Kemény, “Dynamisch-konstruktives 
Kraftsystem” (Dynamic-constructive
energy system), in Der Sturm, 1922
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Moholy-Nagy did realize a motorized light projection device, a kind of poly-
cinema projector without films. While he conceived of this idea in 1922, it was 
not until 1930 that, with his studio assistant, the Hungarian architect István 
Sebök, he had the opportunity to realize this project as the “Lichtrequisit einer 
elektrischen Bühne,” a “light prop for an electric stage” that, though originally 
conceived to be placed in a box with round openings, could project moving 
light, reflections, and shadows in one or all directions, thereby transforming a 
room into a dynamic space of kaleidoscopic vision, a forerunner of the psy-
chedelic light shows of the 1960s. Moholy-Nagy was able to fund its manufac-
ture by presenting it as a device to animate the stage, but he also expressed 
a desire for is mass-production and remote activation via radio broadcasts.54 
He emphasized that the light prop was merely an intentionally simplified “first 
step,” because “most people are not prepared for or practiced” in being able to 
perceptually take in a more intense display.55 It is important to note that it was 
the space (within the box or in a room) transformed by the machine, or rather, 
the visual-kinaesthetic experience of this transformed space, that was to be 
the “work of art,” rather than the device itself, thereby realizing the intention 
expressed in the manifesto “for the design of works of art free from mechanical-
technical movement.” Because the prop was so beautifully made (using glass, 
chrome, and steel), and as the notion of kinetic sculpture gained momentum 
with the work of Alexander Calder during the ‘30s, and particularly during the 
golden age of kinetic sculpture in the ‘50s and ‘60s, Moholy-Nagy’s prop 
came to be seen as a pioneering kinetic sculpture, obscuring its originally in-
tended function, though it inspired experiments of similar intention, such as 
in the work of Otto Piene.56
In “Theater, Zirkus, Varieté,” Moholy-Nagy’s awareness of the Futurists’ “Theater 
of Surprises” is indicated by his insistence on the mechanization of traditional 
theater to open it up from a mainly horizontal to a more vertical orientation, 
incorporating devices such as film, cars, elevators, airplanes, and mirrors.57 
Developing Futurist ideas as well as those expressed in “Dynamic-constructive 
Energy System,” Moholy-Nagy insists that “in today’s theater the STAGE AND 
AUDIENCE are too separate and too divided into activity and passivity to be 
able to secure creative contact and tension. An activity must finally come to 
pass, which rather than leaving the masses to observe in silence, grabs them, 
draws them in, and […] allows for a liberating ecstasy to flow together with the 
action on the stage.”58 In order to effect this integration, he proposed a prosce-
nium extending deep into the viewers’ space, operable bridges, and platforms 
at various levels linked by a cylindrical elevator shaft. Farkas Molnár illustrated 
Moholy-Nagy’s ideas with his plans for a “U-Theater.” Molnár’s drawing-photo-
montage of the U-Theater in dizzying action has figures jumping, diving,  
and climbing in space, making it appear as though these performers and perhaps 
audience members were moving without or in spite of gravity, recalling  
El Lissitzky’s ideas for Victory over the Sun.59 
Moholy-Nagy conceived of the integration of audience and performer in his 
proposal for a Kinetic-Constructive System, a “structure with movement tracks 
for play and conveyance” (henceforth, “structure”). Rather than a theater (which 
it is still mistakenly identified as), this was to be an environment in which the 
“audience” could become “actors,” that is, they could participate in ludic 
physical activity. It was this “play,” moreover, this activity involving the proprio-
ceptive, vestibular, tactile, and visual senses that would constitute the “art,” 
rather than the structure itself, which, after all, remained a “system” and a 
“structure,” in other words, a mere scaffold for activity. Though a sketch exists 
for the Kinetic-Constructive System dating it to 1922, the designs for these 
proposals were only finalized in 1928, with Sebök’s technical assistance. The 
54 Moholy-Nagy, “Lichrequisit einer elektri schen 
Bühne,” in Die Form (Berlin: Verlag Hermann 
Reckendorf, 1930), 297–99.
55 Moholy-Nagy, 297.
56 At some point after Moholy-Nagy’s death 
in 1946, probably around 1969, it was 
rechristened the Light Space Modulator, a 
move that cemented its new status as a 
work of art, and a name that has stuck. On 
this, see Botar, Sensing the Future, 112ff.
57 László Moholy-Nagy, “Theater, Zirkus, 
Varieté,” in Moholy-Nagy, Oskar Schlemmer, 
and Farkas Molnár, Die Bühne im Bauhaus 
(Munich: Albert Langen, 1925), 54.
58 Moholy-Nagy (my translation).
59 Moholy-Nagy, 62.
Fig. 31
Schematic diagram for the “Simultaneous or Poly-Cinema,”  
in László Moholy-Nagy, Malerei, Photographie, Film, 1925
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photomontage elements depicting people moving within the structure on the 
beautiful planometric oblique projection of 1928 drawn by Sebök recall the 
collaged photographs in Klutcis’s Dynamic City and Molnár’s rendering of the 
U-Theater in use. This underlines both the genealogy of Moholy-Nagy’s con-
ception of dynamic art within the Russian avant-garde, and his close colla boration 
with Molnár and Sebök, collaborations that helped Moholy-Nagy work out 
some of the practical and conceptual issues of this proposal. 
While, like El Lissiztky’s design for the revival of Victory over the Sun, the 1922 
and 1928 renderings seems to have been meant more as conceptual diagram 
than as bases for the eventual generation of construction blueprints, had the 
structural and mechanical details been worked out and the structure built,  
it would have stood about twelve stories high, with a fixed, tubelike elevator 
shaft at its core akin to the one that Molnár had drawn for the U-Theater and 
that would have extended from near the Structure’s apex, down to about its 
midpoint. The Structure’s principal component would have been a spiral ramp 
equipped with handrails that would have defined its (otherwise unclad) exterior. 
While it would have been the building’s main structural support, this outer ramp 
would have itself rotated, corkscrew-like, thereby spinning the entire assembly 
around its own axis. The visual equivalent of this axis, the fireman’s pole, which 
would have extended from the top platform of the Structure to the ground 
level, would have been fixed at its top but movable at its base, rendering the 
entire structure a dynamic, seemingly unstable assembly especially since it 
was, as Peter Yeadon has determined, to have been a “frustrum,” that is, a 
“leaning” tower.60 On the inside of the structure, nested within the exterior ramp, 
there would have been another spiraling ramp “of the steepest practicable 
incline, for the use of more athletic visitors.”61 This one would have extended 
from the ground up to and beyond the top of the exterior ramp, ending in a 
third platform at the Structure’s pinnacle. 
Friedrich Kiesler’s Raumbühne (Spatial stage), realized at the center of the 
Wiener Konzerthaus in 1924 for the International Exhibition of New Theater 
Techniques, also consisted of a spiral ramp, a circular stage platform at top, 
and had originally been intended to have a lift on its central axis to move the 
actors to the various levels.62 In all these ways it is a kind of simplified version 
of the Kinetic-Constructive System. But it was, after all, a stage. A closer  
parallel was to be found in Kiesler’s “Railway Theater” proposal of that same 
year, in which the audience would have been conveyed “electromechanically” 
around a spherical theater space on a turning, spiral viewing ramp, much like 
60 Canadian architect Peter Yeadon prepared 
a digital model of the Structure in 2006, 
called the Kinetic Re­constructive System, 
and commented on its structural nature. 
See Botar, Technical Detours, 173ff.
61 Quotations are from Moholy-Nagy’s explana-
tory text, in Von Material zu Architektur 
(Munich: Albert Langen, 1929), 205.
62 Barbara Lesák, “Visionary of the European 
Theatre,” in Frederick Kiesler, ed. Lisa 
Phillips (New York: Whitney Museum of 
American Art, 1989), 39.
Fig. 32 
Kálmán Brogyányi, 
A Fény Művészete (The art of light), 1932 
Figs. 33–34
Farkas Molnár, overhead view of design for an U-Theater 
(present whereabouts unknown), with translucent fold over page
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the external ramp of the Kinetic-Constructive System that would have spun 
participants around its interior elements.63 That Kiesler was inspired by the 
“Dynamic Constructive Energy System” manifesto is evident from his own 
manifesto “Vitalbau-Raumstadt-Funktionelle Architektur,”64 in which he  
announced that in this new architecture, “we want” (among other things)  
“to be let free of the earth,” to “abandon the stationary axis” and, rather than 
foundations and walls, “a system of spans (tension) in open space.”65
Similar in form to Kiesler’s stages was Andor Weininger’s proposal for a Spherical 
Theater (1926–60s) that, had it been built, would have provided the possibility 
of viewing the circus-like acrobatic action taking place on the hanging spiral 
and other contraptions at the centre of the building from below, the sides, or 
from above, depending on where one sat. Weininger himself emphasized the 
sensory-educational function of the new theatrical space: “Situated along the 
inner wall of a sphere, the spectators experience a new relationship to space; 
due to the total view, due to the centripetal force, they experience a new mental, 
optical, acoustic situation: they face new possibilities of concentric, eccentric, 
polydirectional, mechanical space-stage events [...] objective: to educate 
people to new modes of viewing by confronting them with new rhythms of move-
ment.”66 This would have caused sensory challenges to audience members, 
but these challenges would have been tame when compared to those of visitors 
to the Kinetic-Constructive System. Just as in the Spherical Theater there would 
have been views in all directions, but rather than a central, suspended spiral, 
in Moholy-Nagy’s Structure these views would have revealed as a dense,  
Piranesian complex of interconnecting spiral ramps and tubes. The more 
“athletic visitors” careening down the steeper spirals or descending the fire-
man’s pole would have been observed by those on the external ramp, itself 
spinning around the daredevils’ ramps; a complexity of dizzying sensory input, 
visual, vestibular and proprioceptive, conducive to ilinx. This would also force 
the participants to enact the angles of vision that were central to Moholy-Nagy’s  
conception of “New Vision” (bird’s-eye view, worm’s-eye view, vision in motion, 
etc.) whereby the less “normal” views of the world would be privileged in 
photography and film in order to defamiliarize it, thereby rendering our 
perception of it more conducive to change, and easing our adaptation to that 
change.67 Unlike Kiesler’s and Weininger’s closely related proposals, in the Kinetic-
Constructive System visitors would have become “active factors” in coming 
to understand the relations between space, gravity, and their sensoria. In an 
important early theoretical article, “Production—Reproduction” (1922), the 
text Moholy-Nagy developed with the help of Lucia Moholy, we find a passage 
that reads: “Man is the synthesis of all his functional apparatuses [Funktions-
apparate], i.e. at his various stages [in seiner Periode] he will be most perfect 
[vollkommendste] when he is most fully conscious of the functional appara-
tuses—cells just as much as the most complex of organs—of which he is com-
prised, and when these apparatuses are trained to the limits of their capability  
[bis zur Grenze ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit].”68 Given the potential dangers and thrills 
of the Kinetic-Constructive System, its participants would have been pushing 
their bodies to such limits and they would have been employing their vestibular-
proprioceptive systems to sense these “cells” and “organs” in motion or imbalance. 
Rather than a towering artwork or work of architecture, in the Kinetic-Constructive 
System, Moholy-Nagy would have offered people, opportunities to have visual, 
proprioceptive, and vestibular experiences. 
As has been pointed out by Klaus Weber and Barbara Lesák,69 the Kinetic-
Constructive System resembles a fairground ride. Given that Moholy-Nagy’s Berlin 
63 “Railway Theater,” in Kiesler, ed., 
Internationale Austellung Theatertechnik 
(Vienna: Konzerthaus Wien, 1924), 11. 
64 De Stijl, nos. 10–11 (1925): 435–37. Cited 
in Lesák, “Visionary of the European
 Theatre,” 168, 170, 173.
65 Kiesler, “Vitalbau – Raumstadt – Funk tio nelle 
Architektur,” in Lesák, 170 (my translation). 
On the question of Kiesler’s “fields of energy,” 
see also Lisa Phillips, “Environmental 
Artist,” in Phillips, Kiesler, 114.
66 Andor Weininger, “Das Kugelteather,” 
bauhaus, no. 3 (1927): 2. Jiři Svestka and 
Katherine Jánszky Michaelsen, eds., Andor 
Weininger: From Bauhaus to Conceptual 
Art, trans. Jürgen Riehle (Düsseldorf: 
Kunstverein für die Rheinlande und 
Westfalen, 1991), 113 (translation modified).
67 On Moholy-Nagy’s new vision as a means 
of sensory training, see Botar, Sensing the 
Future: Moholy­Nagy, Media and the Arts 
(Zurich: Lars Müller, 2014),
68 “Production-Reproduction,” De Stijl 5 (July 
1922): 98–100 (my translation).
69 Klaus Weber, “Kinetisches konstruktives 
System 1922,” in Experiment Bauhaus, ed. 
Magdalena Droste and Jeannine Fiedler 
(Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv – Museum für 
Gestaltung, 1988), 374; and Lesák, 
“Visionary of the European Theatre,” 168.
Fig. 35
László Moholy-Nagy, with István Sebök, 
Kinetisches konstruktives System: Bau mit 
Bewegungsbahnen für Spiel und Beförderung 
(Kinetic-Constructive System: Structure 
with Movement Tracks for Play and 
Conveyance), 1928
Fig. 36 
Detail of fig. 35
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residences were located in the western part of the city, near Luna Park, then 
the largest amusement park in Europe,70 it comes as no surprise that in “Filmváz: 
A nagyváros dinamikája” the first, Hungarian-language version of the “film 
script” “The Dynamics of the Metropolis” (1922–24), Moholy-Nagy included an  
ecstatic description of its pleasures: “Fireworks in the Luna Park / Ride on the / 
R o l l e r C o a s t e r / Speeding / FERRISwheel / Funhouse / Distorting  
mirrors / Other gimmicks.”71
Moholy-Nagy was not alone among avant-garde artists of the 1910s and early-
to-mid-1920s in his fascination with the pleasures of ilinx. While, apart from 
Max Pechstein and Rudolf Belling’s Expressionist decorations of peep-show 
structures at Luna Park executed between 1919 and 1920, and the wildly  
expressionistic exterior of the main roller coaster at that park dating from the 
same period,72 I have come across no evidence of artists actually designing 
amusement-park rides, but as Lesák has remarked, there was a fascination 
with them among avant-garde artists during the 1920s.73 During an extended 
stay between 1911 and 1912, Joseph Stella, an Italian who emigrated to America, 
discovered Cubist and Orphist paintings of the Parisian avant-garde as well as 
the work of the Italian Futurists. After his return to New York late in 1912, he 
painted an astonishing series of works depicting the Coney Island amusement 
parks between 1913 and 1914.74 In 1915 Giacomo Balla and Fortunato Depero 
proposed a kind of theme park or amusement park in their Futurist Recon-
struction of the Universe, involving kinetic assemblages of various materials 
(“complexes”), “aerial concerts,” the “roto-plastic noise fountain,” and so on. 
They wrote: “We will find abstract equivalents for all the forms and elements 
of the universe, and then we will combine them according to the caprice of 
our inspiration, to shape plastic complexes (rotating on one axis) which we 
will set in motion.”75 Moholy-Nagy’s fellow Bauhausler Max Buchartz called for 
the reform of Luna Park in 1924, invoking all the senses discussed here: 
The joy in in intense movement (flywheels alongside sleds and swings); 
the pleasure in surprise and sensation; the daring of bold skill; the delight 
in watching action, form, and color. [...] Direct the large slideways above, 
through and around the main restaurants (take advantage of differences 
in the levels of the existing buildings). [...] Design of the directional possi-
bilities of standstill and movement, of fast and slow, of sudden and gradual 
as well as of horizontal and vertical, of up and down, of forward and 
backward, of rotating and swinging. [...] Distinction should be made between 
machines that are compelled to carry out particular courses of movement 
and those that call for active participation in mastering one’s balance.76 
Lesák has observed the resemblance of the mobile audience ramp of Kiesler’s 
“Railway Theater” proposal of 1924 to a roller coaster,77 and that same year the 
Danish artist Knud Lönberg-Holm, then teaching at the University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, took his students on roller-coaster rides “in order to experience 
modernity.”78 Perhaps it comes as no surprise that as an editor, with Walter Gropius, 
of the Bauhausbücher series, Moholy-Nagy had planned to publish volumes 
by Burchartz, Kiesler, and Lönberg-Holm around 1926, if not earlier.79 
According to Linda Henderson, Marcel Duchamp, in his notes for The Large 
Glass (1915–23), was thinking about gravity and the need to rid ourselves of 
an orientation system of up/down and left/right.80 In his manifesto “Présentism” 
70 Bodo-Michael Baumunk, “Luna-Park und 
Metropol,” in Berlin, Berlin: Die Ausstel lung 
zur Geschichte der Stadt, ed. Gottfried Korff 
and Reinhard Rürup (Berlin: Nikolai, 1987), 
412.
71 Moholy-Nagy, “Filmváz: A nagyváros 
dinamikája,” Ma, “Musik und Theater,” 9, 
nos. 8–9 (September 15, 1924): unpaginated.
72 Baumunk, “Luna-Park und Metropol,” 411.  
I have not been able to confirm that, e.g., 
Belling, Pechstein, or another Expressionist 
artist was responsible for the exterior of 
this roller coaster, but it does seem to have 
been painted by an artist of the German 
avant-garde.
73 Lesák, “Visionary of the European Theatre,” 
54.
74 See Dreamlands, 60–61; and Barbara 
Haskell, Joseph Stella (New York: Whitney 
Museum of American Art, 1994), 40ff. On 
Stella’s stay in Europe and his contact with 
the Futurists, see Haskell, 27–39.
75 Appolonio, Futurist Manifestos, 197–98.
76 Burchartz, “Luna Park,” G (June 1924): 
138–39. Translation in Detlef Mertins and 
Michael W. Jennings, eds., G: An Avant­
Garde Journal of Art, Architecture, Design 
and Film, 1923–1926, trans. Steven Lindberg 
with Margareta Ingrid Christian (Los 
Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2010). 
77 Lesák, “Visionary of the European 
Theatre,”52.
78 Marc Dessauce, “Against the Style,” 
Casabella (September 1993).
79 The list, published as a promotional 
brochure by Albert Langen Verlag in Munich 
around 1926 (the year of the latest book in 
the series that had appeared up to that 
point) is reproduced in Lesák, “Visionary 
of the European Theatre,” 169.
80 These remarks are contained in notes 
published as A l’infinitif in New York in 
1966. Henderson, Fourth Dimension and 
Non­Euclidean Geometry, 280.
Fig. 37 
Friedrich Kiesler, Raumbühne, 
Vienna, 1924
Fig. 38 
Andor Weininger, Kugel-Theater 
(Spherical theater), 1926
110 111Oliver A. I. BotarThe Pleasures of Sensory Derangement
of 1921, Raoul Hausmann writes that “we want to be hurled around and torn 
asunder by the mysterious dimension, our sixth sense, motion. In this way 
we may be conscious of living, of living today! And so we want to dissolve the 
rigidly concentrated look at one thing.”81 In his discussion of space, time, and 
our ability—or rather our inability—to perceive them as anything but three- 
dimensional and one-dimensional, respectively, El Lissitzky is very specific 
about the senses involved in their perception: “A transition from the third into 
the fourth dimension can be comprehended neither by our visual sense nor 
by touch.”82 Given that this vein of early twentieth-century art engaged the 
vestibular, proprioceptive, and interoceptive senses so saliently, senses that 
had—apart from dance—never previously been thought of as the bases for 
aesthetic production, why did the artists fail to mention them? The reason 
seems to have been a combination of a lack of awareness as much as a lack 
of vocabulary. Research on the internal (also “motor” or “haptic”) senses (by 
Mach, Cyon, and Poincaré) was both recent and obscure, and most importantly 
its terminology had not penetrated the popular or even intellectual imagination. 
Except for “kinaesthesia,” the terminology we now have in place for the pro-
prioceptive and vestibular systems was not yet in use.83 Though one writer of 
the time described dance as “an unbridled dynamism, the sensually turbulent 
ecstasy of movement in the frenzied lunge towards the Immeasurable that is our 
life,” turning to research by Jaques-Dalcroze, Rudolf von Laban, and Vsevolod 
Meyerhold into recording, describing and systematizing bodily movement would 
not have helped, for these pioneers also lacked the relevant vocabulary,  
besides which they sought to describe and control proprioception rather than 
derange it.84 Hausmann, together with László Péri (Peter Lazlo), an erstwhile 
actor and one of Moholy-Nagy’s closest artist friends in Berlin, proposed the 
“PRÉ” theater, in which they aimed to “realize the absolute regularity and 
clarity of space-time movement within the unitary form of body, surface and 
sound: a new type of dance, stage and music.”85 This must have been one of 
the first manifestos by artists for proprioceptive performance, but again, they 
lacked the terminology to describe all the senses thus invoked. Thus, though 
the artists engaged the inner senses to make art, these attempts have been 
overlooked because they described them or invoked them rather than naming 
them. As a result, modernism tends to be seen as exclusively ocular-centric. 
Jennifer Fisher, a Canadian art historian of the “tactile, kinaesthetic and pro-
prioceptive senses” holds that “the challenge [...] is to move beyond modernism’s 
preoccupation with the singularity of the visual, to pose a more immanent and 
relational aesthetics: an aesthetics which refers to experiences as well as objects.”86 
81 Raoul Hausmann, “PRÉsentismus: Gegen 
den Puffkeismus der Teutschen Seele”  
(Présentism: Against the Philistinism of 
the Germanic Soul), quoted in Andreas 
Haus, Moholy­Nagy: Photographs and 
Photograms (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 10.
82 Lazar El Lissitzky, “A. and Pangeometry,”  
in Europa Almanach, trans. Carl Einstein 
and Paul Westheim (Berlin: Gustav Kiepen-
heuer Verlag, 1925), 352. The translation is 
from Lissitzky, Russia: An Architecture for 
World Revolution (1930) (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1984), 147.
83 The Online Etymological Dictionary dates 
the usage of “proprioception” in English 
to 1906 (http://www.etymonline.com). 
However even the 1959 edition of The 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press) doesn’t include it. While 
the earliest usage of “kinaesthesia” is dated 
to 1880, I have not come across the term 
in the period literature I have reviewed. 
The 1991 edition of Webster’s Dictionary 
(New York: Lexicon Publications) does list 
“pro prioceptive” and “kinesthetic,” but 
not “vestibular.” As we have seen, Mach 
employed “muscle sense” and “sense of 
equilibrium.”
84 Wolfgang Graeser quoted in Karl Toepfer, 
Empire of Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement 
in German Body Culture, 1910–1935 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997), 13. The index of this exhaustive 
survey includes not a single sensory term. 
Toepfer writes that the “Labanotation” 
system “showed that the dancing body 
produced such complex disturbances of 
perception that empirical analysis of 
dance was much more difficult than almost 
everyone realized” (106). He also points 
out that “body culture was hardly lacking 
in enthusiasm for system” (12) and that 
Dalcroze’s was “an eminently rational 
vision of bodily movement” (16). See also 
Salter, Entangled, 228–32.
85 Hausmann and Péri, “Die Absichten des 
Theaters PRÉ, Der Sturm 13, no. 9 
(September 1922): 138 (my translation).
86 Jennifer Fisher, “Relations Sense: Towards 
a Haptic Aesthetics,” Parachute, no. 87 
(Summer 1997): 4–11. See also Salter’s 
introduction for an account of current 
thinking on performativity. Salter, 
Entangled, 228–32.
Fig. 39 
Detail showing rollercoaster sequence, 
storyboard for A nagyváros dinamikája 
(Dynamics of the Metropolis)
Fig. 40 
László Moholy-Nagy, Waterslide, Zurich, 
vintage silver gelatin print, n.d.
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Fisher’s discussion marks a shift in recent decades that takes full account of 
the somatosenses. While Stephen Blundell has advocated their reconsideration 
in the making of three-dimensional art,87 Barbara Montero claims that “proprio-
ception is an aesthetic sense and that one can make aesthetic judgments 
based on proprioceptive experience.”88 Following and extending upon the 
ideas of John Dewey, who shifted the locus of art from the object to experience, 
Loke and Robertson write that “the kinaesthetic is an important aspect of 
aesthetic experience.”89 There is at least one study of our aesthetic enjoyment 
of nature that sidelines visual and auditory perceptions “that are so abundant 
and evident when we act in or move into nature.” The philosopher and theologian 
Joseph H. Kupfer focuses instead on vestibular, kinaesthetic, and propriocep-
tive sensory input in his discussion of the aesthetic experience of nature. Fisher 
has enumerated and discussed a number of artworks (mostly of the 1990s) that 
she sees as evincing the incorporation of the “haptic” senses (proprioception, 
kinaesthetics, equilibrioception).
And what of the more contemporary art of “sensory derangement,” of ilinx 
experiences? This would take more space than is available to me here. Suffice 
to mention that the camera work and lack of narrative in Stan Brakhage’s early 
films, such as Dog Star Moon (1961–64) or Carolee Schneemann’s Fuses (1967), 
approach the disorientation or rather reorientation of the art of the early 
twentieth century described above. Perhaps the most radical expression of 
this impulse was the three-hour-long dismantling of our common-sense orien-
tation enacted by Michael Snow on the earth’s surface no less, in his 1971  
video installation La Région Centrale, filmed by a specially constructed robot 
that could rotate the camera in all directions, at all angles, and does so.  
Described as “an avant-garde equivalent of an amusement park simulator ride [...] 
the film begins as a slow, soothing meditation on the otherworldly textures 
of the Canadian wilderness, but gradually morphs into a dizzying, terrifying 
freakout, a relentless spinning gaze that pummels the equilibrium of the human 
eye.”90 Snow himself described it in his application for funding to the Canadian 
Film Development Corporation in 1969 as “a kind of goodbye to Earth.”91
Eduardo Kac has written of “gravitropism in art beyond its biological origin, 
to underscore the fact that forms and events created in zero gravity to be  
experienced in the same environment might be radically different.”92 In his Inner 
Telescope, assembled by French astronaut Thomas Pesquet on the Inter-
national Space Station in March 2017, Kac took the first step toward such an 
art. Pipilotti Rist has made her audience comfortable on couches and carpets, 
only to bombard them with spatially disorienting but pleasant filmic assaults 
on their sensoria.93 Olafur Eliasson has been mounting a concerted assault on 
our senses, working self-consciously in the tradition of Moholy-Nagy.94 Carsten 
Höller has realized aspects of Moholy-Nagy’s Structure in his giant slide 
works, most recently in his twenty-eight-meter-tall structure at the Aventura Mall 
87 Stephen Blundell, “The Forgotten Sense – 
Proprioception,” a paper given at 
“Un common Senses: An Interdisciplinary 
Conference on the Senses in Art and 
Culture,” Lonergan College, Concordia 
University, Montreal, April 27–29, 2000. 
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Dompierre (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier 
University Press, 1994), 55.
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http://www.ekac.org/levitation.html.
93 See, e.g., Sjarel Ex, ed., Elixir. The Video 
Organism of Pipilotti Rist (Rotterdam: 
Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, 2009).
94 See, e.g., Olafur Eliasson, Your Engagem ent 
Has Consequences—On the Relativity of 
Your Reality (Baden: Lars Müller, 2005). 
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Müller, 2010), unpaginated.
Fig. 41
Eduardo Kac, Inner Telescope, 2017
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in Miami. Tomás Saraceno has, with his installation On Space Time Foam, 
succeeded in creating an “installation, a multi-layer transparent surface accessible 
to visitors, suspended at a height of 20 meters and covering 1200 square  
meters on three levels [... transforming] architecture into a living organism, one 
that breathes thanks to the movements of those who cross it, visualizing the 
infinite relationships that tie us to space.” This makes it possible for visitors 
to experience something like weightlessness, in three dimensions.95 
We have seen that the technologies of modernity and a resultant crisis of the 
senses, as well as the playful pleasures of vertigo, the deliciousness of dizziness, 
have led to a desire on the part of artists to train our sensorium, to engage in 
an aesthetics of sensory derangement, an art of ilinx, a realization that the internal 
senses may be the source of artistic expression and aesthetic delectation.  
All these tasks have been carried out intuitively by artists starting early in the 
twentieth century. We now have a vocabulary for them, even the beginnings 
of a formalized aesthetics. Let us take pleasure in this. 
95 The text is quoted from the official press 
release, e-flux, November 10, 2012. The 
show opened at HangarBicocca, Milan, 
October 2012.
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On the high wire, the very heart of prowess and the only aim is to master 
vertigo.
—Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games
Tell me, am I wrong to mock vertigo from summit to abyss, to reveal the 
world as I see it? 
—Philippe Petit, To Reach the Clouds 
Dangerous Crossings 
It is hard to find in history a figure that encapsulates the pursuit of balance 
more vividly than the funambulist.1 The art of rope walking, formerly known 
also as rope dancing, evokes a feeling of liberation from gravity that sums up 
the human longing for weightlessness. This acrobatic art, whose origins date 
back to Ancient Greece, flourished as a form of entertainment in Europe  
during the Middle Ages and went on to become a regular feature of the modern 
circus. With the industrial revolution, the tightrope came to symbolize the 
human drive to conquer nature. Hemp ropes were gradually replaced by metal 
wires, first made of copper then steel, allowing ever more audacious stunts 
to be carried out over gorges and rivers, as well as urban gardens and squares. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, wire walking had become one of the most  
favored types of public spectacle. 
A watershed was marked on June 20, 1859, when the French celebrity high-
wire walker known as the Great Blondin (born Jean-François Gravelet) was the 
first to cross Niagara Falls. In the process, Blondin also traversed the invisible 
borderline between two countries, the United States and Canada.2
In his book Falling (2003), Garrett Soden explores the desire to master gravity 
that pervaded the nineteenth century, which he dubs “the gravity century.”3 
While a plethora of machines were engineered to induce the thrill of controlled 
fall, as epitomized by the roller coaster, at the same time embodied practices 
that played on the dangers of gravity, like high diving and parachuting from 
balloons became popular forms of open-air entertainment. That is also when 
funambulism had its peak of popularity. Blondin performed at Niagara Falls over 
two seasons, in 1859 and 1860, carrying out ever more challenging stunts—
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Jerome Robbins, Descent of Madame Saqui, surrounded by fireworks, 1822
1 The terms “funambulism” and “funambulist” 
(from the Latin funis, “rope,” and ambulare, 
“to walk”) denote respectively the art 
of tightrope walking and the artist who 
performs it.
2 Blondin’s crossings made also symbolic 
reference to the history of slavery in North 
America. See Barbara Penner, “Niagara:  
It Has It All,” Places Journal (September 
2009), https://doi.org/10.22269/090924.
3 Garrett Soden, Falling: How Our Greatest 
Fear Became Our Greatest Thrill (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2003), 74.
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Amid the feats and achievements of the “gravity century,” the figure of the 
funambulist acquired new allegorical meanings. In the prologue of Nietzsche’s 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883), the modern prophet harangues a crowd assem-
bled in a market square where a rope is hanging between two towers. “Man is 
a rope stretched between animal and overman—a rope over an abyss”—he 
says to deaf ears.4 An aerialist begins to walk over the square with the aid of a 
balancing pole, only to be chased by a malign jester who makes him fall to the 
ground. Zarathustra then consoles the dying man by praising his attempt at 
the “dangerous crossing”—a graphic image of the Nietzschean will to power. 
Of this text, Steven Connor observes: “The tightrope walker enacts the tense 
passage between worlds.”5 Time and again, this passage has been associated 
with a spiritual journey. The tightrope designates a perilous crossing that 
pushes the boundaries of human ability: a balancing act that brings people 
together to contemplate the fine line between life and death.
After reaching its climax of popularity in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, this performance art began to lose its appeal. All endeavors to rival 
Blondin’s formidable stunts were ultimately seen as less of an achievement. 
Hence the “noble gravity daredevil” largely retreated into the circus.6 Mean-
while, the modern metropolis was shaped into a place of artificial mountains 
and canyons, as the advent of steel frame construction—coupled with the  
invention of the elevator—ushered in the skyscraper era. While high-rise buildings 
provided a glaring expression of the modern will to power, the birth of avia-
tion seemed to have forever fulfilled the human dream of flying.
Although the imaginative force of the tightrope gradually wore out, the art  
of funambulism was kept alive by myriad lesser-known performers over the 
twentieth century. The outstanding figure was Karl Wallenda, a high-wire art-
ist hailing from a German circus family who moved to the United States in the 
1920s and led his own progeny to legendary status—“The Flying Wallendas.” 
In the mid-’60s, he sky-walked across natural gorges in a bid to revive the 
feats accomplished by his famous precursor a century earlier. Wallenda’s final 
walk took place in 1978, when he dramatically fell to his death during a pub-
licity stunt on a wire, battered by heavy winds, between two hotel buildings in 
San Juan, Puerto Rico. According to Soden, this tragic event, which was re-
corded on camera, ended the era of “gravity heroics” epitomized by the figure 
of the wire-walker.7 Although Wallenda went down in history as the “last of 
the circus’s ‘great’ gravity performers,” his demise did not spell the end of 
blindfolded; on stilts; with his manager on his back; and so on. Although a 
number of aerialists sought to emulate his feats, only a few of them attained 
the status of gravity heroes: notably, Maria Spelterini, William Hunt (aka “The 
Great Farini”), and Henri L’Estrange, the balloonist-cum-funambulist who 
earned himself the epithet of the “Australian Blondin.” 
Davide Deriu
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, 
trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4. 
“Overman” here translates Nietzsche’s 
term Übermensch.
5 Steven Connor, “Man Is a Rope,” in 
Catherine Yass—High Wire (London: 
Artangel, 2008), n.p.
6 Soden, Falling, 133.
7 Soden, 137.
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George Barker, Blondin’s rope 
ascension over Niagara River, 
n.d.
Fig. 44 
Henri L’Estrange, tightrope 
walker, crossing Middle 
Harbour [in Sidney], 1877, 
State Library of New South 
Wales
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In the aftermath of 9/11, Petit’s legendary “coup” gained renewed acclaim 
through a flurry of representations that invigorated the image of the wire-walker. 
Aside from the story of a young man chasing his dream, the World Trade  
Center walk revealed how funambulism was reborn as an urban art that confronted 
the vertiginous depths of the city. Vertigo is a theme that inevitably crops up 
in various accounts of that event. Yet, it received diverse treatments in Petit’s 
autobiographical book, To Reach the Clouds, and in its subsequent cinematic 
adaptations. The remainder of the essay unpacks the dizzying perception of space 
that was associated with that act and discusses how vertigo was variously  
expressed, evoked, and simulated through different media. 
Tightrope and Vertigo
Before delving into the crux of the essay, it is useful to elaborate on the notion 
of vertigo. As Lucy Yardley explains, this is an ambivalent term that takes  
up different meanings in the scientific discourse and in common language:
In everyday use, the word vertigo most commonly describes a fear of 
heights, although it is sometimes also used to refer to generalised feelings 
of giddiness, faintness, confusion, anxiety or insecurity, regardless of 
the precise nature and cause of these sensations. However, “vertigo” is 
strictly defined medically as an illusion of movement of the self or of 
the environment. […] In the medical context, the term “vertigo” is therefore 
simply a technical label for the symptom of perceptual disorientation, 
which can be due to a wide variety of causes.9
In short, perceptual disorientation occurs when the sensory inputs that our 
body sends to our brain in order to manage our posture and self-motion are 
discordant. These inputs are processed by three sensory systems whose inte-
gration is essential to maintain an overall sense of balance: the vestibular,  
visual (“optokinetic”), and proprioceptive (“somatosensory”) systems. Yardley 
notes that “when an apparent mismatch occurs between the different sensory 
inputs to the balance system, the perceptual uncertainty this creates is itself 
experienced as a sensation, which may be described as dizziness, disorientation, 
or vertigo.”10
Medical research deals mostly with the vestibular apparatus, whose malfunc-
tioning is responsible for the majority of balance-related disorders. Ordinary 
sensations of dizziness, however, can also be caused by a discrepancy between 
funambulism.8 It might be argued, in fact, that a new phase began in the 1970s; 
one that climaxed with Philippe Petit’s extraordinary high-wire walk between the 
twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City on August 7, 1974.
8 Soden, 133. 
9 Lucy Yardley, Vertigo and Dizziness 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 1–2.
10 Yardley, 8–9.
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Jean-Louis Blondeau, Philippe Petit walks on wire 
across the twin towers of the WTC, 1974
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in such games.18 In fact, they inform those ludic practices whose specific aim 
is to counter the loss of balance by setting up new stability challenges:  
“The desire to overcome an obstacle can only emerge to combat vertigo and 
prevent it from becoming transformed into disorder or panic. It is, therefore, 
training in self-control, an arduous effort to preserve calm and equilibrium. Far 
from being compatible with ilinx, it provides the discipline needed to neutralize 
the dangerous effects of ilinx, as in mountain climbing or tightrope walking.”19
Among the games of vertigo, the latter is the one that exemplifies a meticulous 
quest for equilibrium. “The tightrope,” writes Caillois, “is the profession corre-
sponding to ilinx.”20 He continues: “On the high wire, the very heart of prowess 
and the only aim is to master vertigo. The game consists expressly in moving 
through space as if the void were not fascinating, and as if no danger were 
involved.”21 This theory appeared a century after Blondin’s Niagara walk, at a 
time when funambulists had largely retreated into the circus. Later on, in the 
early 1970s, the intimation to master vertigo became a core principle of Petit’s 
performances, as the young Frenchman breathed new life into the wire.
Gravity Outlaw
Although the story of Petit’s Twin Towers coup has been told in numerous 
books, interviews, and films, it is worth summarizing the circumstances that 
led up to it. The event was preceded by two other performances—at Notre-
Dame de Paris (1971) and at the Sydney Harbour Bridge (1973)—in which the 
funambulist cut his teeth at building what he later described as “ephemeral 
bridges” across major landmarks. These were not only illicit stunts that invariably 
resulted in him being arrested by local polices but also, significantly, urban 
performances that engaged with towers of varying heights. Petit’s acrobatics 
the inputs of the visual and proprioceptive systems. A typical scenario is the 
experience of high places where the perception registered by our propioceptors 
does not match the one registered by our eyes (e.g., looking down below 
while sensing the ground with our feet). Naturally, this kind of short circuit is 
experienced in different ways by different individuals, and the levels of per-
ceptual disorientation that result also depend on a complex set of psycholog-
ical as well as physiological factors.11 We can, nonetheless, begin to draw a 
connection between the biomedical notion of vertigo, an illusion of movement 
that often has little to do with altitude, and the popular association of this 
term with the “fear of heights”—also known as acrophobia.12
This link is not only a semantic one. Neurological research has investigated 
the spectrum of “visual height intolerance,” which ranges from conditions of 
minor (“non-phobic”) discomfort to severe acrophobia.13 The experience of 
heights is notoriously polarized: it attracts some people as much as frightens 
others. Hence, terms such as height dizziness and height vertigo have multiple 
connotations that might evoke feelings of thrill and elation as well as anxiety 
and panic. The full spectrum encompasses subjects who cope well with the 
exposure to altitude, and extends to those who find pleasure in it and keenly 
embrace the related risks: “Height-tolerant individuals perceive the physical 
danger of heights but compensate either by habituation or a comfort level with 
their sense of physical danger. Height-seeking individuals actually enjoy the 
sense of physical danger when exposed to heights.”14 
Tightrope walking is often regarded as the activity that best embodies this 
height-seeking drive, or acrophilia.15 If the voluntary exposure to danger is a 
trait that funambulists share with other height practitioners, such as free 
climbers, the ethereal and seemingly effortless act of walking on a wire marks 
it out as a unique art. It is not surprising that Petit’s performances, which  
include symbolic gestures and dancing routines, have been likened to a theat-
rical form.16
Moving from biomedical discourse back into the realm of art and culture, it 
shall be useful now to consider a classic theory that regards vertigo as a 
structure of human play, and the tightrope as its quintessential manifestation. 
In his 1958 book, Man, Play and Games, Roger Caillois adopted the ancient 
Greek word ilinx (whirlpool) to describe the voluntary pursuit of vertigo. 
Building on the seminal work of Johan Huizinga, whose Homo Ludens investi-
gated the role of the play element in culture, Caillois studied a typology of 
“vertigo games” previously neglected by Huizinga because of their alleged 
lack of cultural values. These are games “which consist of an attempt to 
momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a kind of voluptuous 
panic upon an otherwise lucid mind.”17 Although ilinx is defined as “a pure 
state of transport,” this does not mean that rule and discipline find no place 
11 Danielle Quinodoz, Emotional Vertigo: 
Between Anxiety and Pleasure (London: 
Routledge, 1997).
12 The relationship between vertigo and 
acrophobia is discussed more extensively 
in Gavin J. Andrews, “Spaces of Dizziness 
and Dread: Navigating Acrophobia,” 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography 89 (2007): 307–17.
13 See, for instance, Doreen Huppert, 
Eva Grill, and Thomas Brandt, “Down on 
Heights? One in Three Has Visual Height 
Intolerance,” Journal of Neurology 260 
(2013): 597–604.
14 John R. Salassa and David A. Zapala, 
“Love and Fear of Heights: The 
Pathophysiology and Psychology of 
Height Imbalance,” Wilderness & 
Environmental Medicine 20 (2009): 380.
15 Jim LeBlanc, “The Acrophobe and the 
Funambulist: Existential and Cinematic 
Perspectives on the Phenomenology of 
Extreme Vertical Space,” Emotion, Space 
and Society 4 (2011): 1–7.
16 Kurt Wurmli, “Theater in the Sky: Philippe 
Petit’s Unique Art of Theatrical Highwire 
Performance,” Journal of American 
Culture 20 (1997): 117–23.
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derived from a distinctive combination of self-taught street art and poetic 
reverie, which he characterized as a mode of “writing in the sky.”
After the early exploits which culminated in the 1974 coup, Petit became a 
recognized high-wire artist and throughout the 1980s and ’90s was invited to 
perform at various locations around the world, such as Paris, Tokyo, Jerusalem, 
and Frankfurt as well as in his adopted home of New York City. By the turn of 
the twenty-first century, Petit was in all likelihood the most renowned living 
funambulist. A long-standing artist-in-residence at the Cathedral of Saint John 
the Divine in Manhattan, he had several books to his name too. The main one, 
On the High Wire (1985), was translated from the French by Paul Auster, who 
had accidentally witnessed Petit’s Notre-Dame walk while living in Paris and 
later befriended him in New York. Championing his friend’s treatise, Auster 
called for wire walking to be taken seriously as an art form on account of its 
unique aesthetic force:
The high-wire walker’s job is to create a sensation of limitless freedom. […] 
No art, it seems to me, so clearly emphasizes the deep aesthetic impulse 
inside us all. Each time we see a man walk on the wire, a part of us is up 
there with him. Unlike performances in the other arts, the experience of 
the high wire is direct, unmediated, simple, and it requires no explanation 
whatsoever. The art is the thing itself, a life in its most naked delineation. 
And if there is beauty in this, it is because of the beauty we feel inside 
ourselves.”22
As mentioned above, the figure of the funambulist had long inspired thinkers 
and writers, including eminent philosophers like Goethe and Kant.23 Auster’s 
commentary laid stress on the enduring power of this art in the age of sky-
scrapers, an art that found in Petit an eloquent narrator as well as a skillful 
performer. By walking back and forth on a wire rigged between the tallest 
towers in the world, without any harness, he momentarily occupied the sky 
over the city: for about forty-five minutes, his body reclaimed the vertical 
space of Manhattan.24 Thereby, as Auster noted, this fragile figure somehow 
managed to humanize the colossal, corporate architecture he had conquered 
with the help of his accomplices. After the Twin Towers collapsed, the collec-
tive memory of that act acquired a new significance as its aura was magnified 
by a poignant sense of nostalgia. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, Petit set out to write a tribute to what he called “his 
towers.” The ensuing memoir, To Reach the Clouds (2002), tells the story of 
the coup in an engaging style that blends lyricism with humor. Republished 
six years later in paperback edition as Man on Wire, the book became the sub-
ject of an award-winning documentary, issued under the same title with the 
added tagline: “1974. 1350 feet up. The artistic crime of the century.”25 The idea 
22 Paul Auster, “On the High Wire,” in 
Collected Prose (London: Faber & Faber, 
2003), 302. On the High Wire later 
appeared in French as Traité du funam­
bulisme (1997) with a preface by Auster.
23 Steven Miller, “The Coup: Behind the 
Scenes of the Act with Philippe Petit,” 
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies 28 (2017): 119.
24 Although the first World Trade Center was 
surpassed in 1973 by Chicago’s Sears 
Tower, the WTC complex had the tallest 
twin towers in the world until the Petronas 
Towers were unveiled in Kuala Lumpur in 
1998.
25 Man on Wire was an international box-
office hit and won several awards, most 
notably the Grand Jury Prize at the 2008 
Sundance Film Festival; the 2009 BAFTA 
award for Outstanding British Film; and 
the 2009 Academy Award for Best 
Documentary Feature.
26 This idea is also reflected in other books 
written by Petit, such as L’Art du 
Pickpocket (Arles: Actes Sud, 2006) and 
the more recent Creativity: The Perfect 
Crime (New York: Riverhead Books, 2014).
27 Petit, Reach the Clouds, 17.
that the greatest high-wire walk of all times was carefully devised and executed 
like a bank robbery is central to Petit’s narration. He had been arrested several 
times before, first while working as a street artist then after his clandestine high-
wire walks in Paris and Sydney, and his memoir refracts the image of a rebel-
lious young man willing to defy the law for the sake of his art.26
To Reach the Clouds offers a captivating account of how the 1974 coup was 
prepared over eight months, then finally staged at the World Trade Center on 
the morning of August 7. Petit and his partners in crime managed to break 
into the towers with heavy and cumbersome gear, then spent the night rigging 
the wire amid all kinds of delays and difficulties. As in the two previous walks, 
trespassing was necessary in order to accomplish the “artistic crime.” The  
funambulist’s ultimate violation, however, was committed against the law of 
gravity. If Blondin’s Niagara walk dared to defy nature at the point of its 
grandest fall, Petit’s Twin Tower coup transposed the challenge onto the peaks 
of urbanized nature. By stepping into what he called “no man’s land,” the  
funambulist revealed the newly created abyss of the city in all its vertiginous 
depth, achieving in the process a remarkable case of counter-vertigo. 
How did that episode unfold? Petit himself writes about the gradual habituation 
to the void he gained through a series of reconnaissance missions on the 
south tower prior to the walk. When he had an opportunity to explore the edge 
of the rooftop and the adjacent ledge at the lower level, he resisted the temp-
tation to let his gaze plunge:
Then I lean over the edge […] so I can look straight down. I do not. […]  
I had not dared to reach the ledge, had not risked looking down. It was 
enough to look across.27
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Fig. 48 
Jean-Louis Blondeau, Philippe Petit walks on wire 
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The day after, he found his way up one more time:
Again, I consider climbing down to the lower edge, where the sheer alu-
minum cliff initiates its vertiginous descent. Yesterday I dared not. Today 
I must. […] It cannot be done all at once. To overpower vertigo—the keeper 
of the abyss—one must tame it, cautiously.28
The confrontation with the “almighty void” posed a stern challenge:
Ah, yes, my mind registers, far, far down, the ground, the streets—but 
my eyes refuse. Yet I breathe in voluptuously the unknown that eddies 
below. I keep fighting.29
The battle against “the keeper of the abyss” was not over until he stepped on 
the wire. Even then, the initial moments were fraught with hesitation. It was 
only after completing the first crossing, from the south to the north tower, 
that fear was entirely overcome:
As I move along the edge […], I can’t resist the visual dive: I glide in, feel 
the width of the abyss, I slide down and taste its depth, with delight I 
brush by the marble plaza at street level, then I hurtle back up along the 
silver facades onto the dazzling surprise of my sight landing exactly 
where it started.30
It is as though the first crossing had allowed the funambulist to own the 
space in all its magnitude. Now he could finally look down, and the sight was 
no longer a source of anxiety but of pleasure. Soon he was off again, lured by 
the irresistible call of the wire. As his steps became easier he could embrace 
the view in a state of serene control, sit on the wire, and salute the city: “I 
stare proudly at the unfathomable canyon, my empire.”31 The abyss had been 
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The Smell of Balance
The fact that high-wire walking is often considered to be one of the most  
acrophilic activities, and one that presupposes an absolute mastery of vertigo, 
may falsely suggest that performers are somehow immune to emotions of 
fear or anxiety engendered by heights. The reality is far more complex. Petit 
described the tension that pervades the funambulist at the end of his treatise, 
On the High Wire. The incipit of the final chapter, “Fear,” sums up the pressure 
that needs to be withstood when facing the abyss: “A void like that is terrifying. 
Prisoner of a morsel of space, you will struggle desperately against occult el-
ements: the absence of matter, the smell of balance, vertigo from all sides, 
and the dark desire to return to the ground, even to fall. This dizziness is the 
drama of high-wire walking, but that is not what I am afraid of.”32
As we have seen, the sensation of vertigo caused by exposure to heights de-
rives from an individual’s psychic as well as physical states, and their complex 
relationship explains why the level of height tolerance in the same person 
may well vary through time. The idea that particular ethnic groups might be 
immune to vertigo is a contested one. A relevant case in point is the popular 
credence that has long surrounded the supposedly “fearless” Mohawk iron-
workers who built many of New York’s skyscrapers.33 While native Americans 
hailing from southern New England embraced, since the late nineteenth century, 
dangerous building tasks that caused many accidents and casualties, their ability 
to cope with heights was due to a process of cultural habituation that involved 
practicing at altitude rather than to an innate absence of fear.34 Interestingly, 
this myth also comes up in a conversation that Petit, disguised as an architec-
tural journalist, had with the World Trade Center’s head when he sought  
permission to interview the builders on the roof of the south tower under con-
struction. The man reportedly told him about the workers: ‘“They’re famous for 
their absence of vertigo, you know.”’35 This passing comment, which would 
have been commonplace in 1974, serves Petit to draw an analogy between the 
coup plotters and the so-called sky-framers “who assemble steel at dizzying 
heights.”36 Neither the ironworkers nor the wire walkers are shielded from the 
paralyzing effects of heights: both have to develop ways of coping with them.
Petit’s account of the coup illustrates Caillois’s point about the importance of 
cultivating discipline and self-control in order to impede the potential conse-
quences of ilinx: “The tightrope walker only succeeds if he is hypnotized by 
the rope, the acrobat only if he is sure enough of himself to rely upon vertigo 
instead of trying to resist it. Vertigo is an integral part of nature, and one con-
trols it only in obeying it.”37 The painstaking training that allowed Petit to tame 
vertigo and perform in such extreme conditions takes up a substantial part of 
the story narrated in his memoir and subsequent adaptations. Endowed with 
new significance in the aftermath of 9/11, the Twin Towers act revived not only 
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the time-honored figure of the funambulist but also its cultural significance  
as an allegory of the human longing for balance. The popular reception of 
this “artistic crime” indicates that its riveting beauty transcends the aesthetic 
expression of the performance itself and arouses responses that pertain to 
the moral and existential spheres. In this respect, Auster’s comment about the 
“sensation of limitless freedom” evoked by the funambulist can be read as 
praise of a life-affirming act rather than of a death-defying feat.38
This crucial difference has also been highlighted by psychoanalysts. Notably, 
Danielle Quinodoz takes Petit as a reference point in her wide-ranging study 
Emotional Vertigo, which devotes a chapter to “dangerous games with vertigo.” 
For Quinodoz, the funambulist’s painstaking training, in which nothing is left to 
chance, exemplifies the work of various practitioners—such as extreme climbers 
and mountaineers—who take calculated risks to achieve goals that look im-
possible at first sight. These individuals do not toy with self-destruction, as one 
might think, but rather seek a vital affirmation by striking a balance between 
life and death drives. The search for equilibrium, argues Quinodoz, depends on 
the ability to reconcile the inner voices that speak in the conflicting registers of 
“omnipotence” and “realistic power.”39 Whereas the former is the legacy of an 
infantile drive, the latter countervails it with the rationality of the evolved self.
Petit’s performances are in equipoise between these opposite tendencies. The 
ability to de-idealize one’s limits and the obstacles they pose allows the funam-
bulist, as well as like-minded players of “dangerous games,” to keep vertigo at 
bay: “It seems plain, in fact, that if they do not have vertigo it is because they 
design their game very carefully instead of seeking illusory magical victories 
likely to let them down; they aim for triumphs that are both spectacular and 
attainable: that is, brilliant but in no way magical.”40 In the case of the Twin Towers 
walk, the intent of accomplishing a seemingly impossible feat was realized 
through careful preparation. Petit managed to balance his drive to omnipotence 
with a grounded awareness of his human limits, and thereby achieved success 
on the wire. If he appeared to Auster “as if suspended magically in space,” 
this was not by means of illusory tricks but as a result of a human, all too human, 
act of supreme composure.41
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From Sensation to Sensationalism
As mentioned above, the great deal of attention that has surrounded Petit’s 
coup in the first two decades of this century was catalyzed by the tragic 
events of 9/11. His memoir provided a narrative account that in turn inspired 
two cinematic adaptations: the documentary Man on Wire (2008), directed 
by James Marsh, and, subsequently, the fictional film The Walk (2015), directed 
by Robert Zemeckis.42 These call into question Auster’s comment on the 
“unmediated” quality of the wire-walker’s experience. While the aura of Petit’s 
performance was mainly enshrined for nearly three decades in the memories 
of those who witnessed it, and in news reports, the event gained new drawing 
power through its twenty-first century’s representations.
Marsh’s documentary features Petit as the main narrator and remains largely 
faithful to his memoir. The images are drawn from a disparate range of sources 
complemented by the partial reenactment of topical scenes. For the walk it-
self, the filmmaker pieced together the limited footage available from a police 
helicopter with the photographs that were taken by Petit’s accomplices from 
the towers’ rooftops. None of these pictures is ostensibly dizzying per se. As 
Jim LeBlanc notes, “There are no dolly zoom, vertigo shots in Man on Wire,  
although cameras do occasionally point straight down seemingly bottomless 
staircases and gaze both up at the funambulist and down from the top of  
the structures between which Petit performs.”43 Rather than seeking to visualize 
the event through unsettling views, Marsh chose to evoke it mainly through 
interviews with the protagonists. Working through the gaps between words 
and images, the documentary adheres to Petit’s account of the coup and es-
pouses his tribute to the towers while refraining from any comments on what 
they signified.44 If a sense of vertigo is conveyed, it derives from the emotional 
impact of the story rather than from dizzying camera work.
Quite the opposite happens in Zemeckis’s fictional adaptation. This film, 
which reconstructs the coup through stunning visual effects, was released in 
2015 for IMAX 3D as well as 3-D and 2-D cinemas.45 The lead actor, Joseph 
Gordon-Levitt, was trained by Petit himself to walk on a wire at low height and 
his steps—combined with those of an acting funambulist—were then composited 
in a computer-generated model of the Twin Towers and New York’s cityscape.46 
As the walk unfolds, the climactic sequence displays a gamut of vertigo- 
inducing shots of the man on the wire from above and from below, interspersed 
with improbable point-of-view shots from his feet and zooming shots plunging 
down to the street and back up to the towers’ rooftops, in an immersive expe-
rience that seeks to replicate Petit’s own perspective. Unlike Marsh’s treatment 
of the subject, Zemeckis’s does not evoke the imagination of heights but re-
places it with a hyperrealistic picture that induces in the spectator the thrill of 
vicarious ilinx.47 Reviewing the film in the New Yorker, critic Richard Brody 
aptly observed: “The 3-D views of the street below as seen from above are 
somewhere between exhilarating and terrifying, depending on a viewer’s  
tendency to acrophobia. But Zemeckis, in indulging his own propensity to thrill 
and delight, in emptying onscreen his own bag of cinematic tricks in the 
course of a sequence that’s intended to realize what Petit considers a work  
of exalted beauty, betrays and degrades that very beauty. […] Zemeckis reduces—
or, rather, inflates—the walk from sensation to sensationalism.”48
This inflation was echoed by a publicity campaign that extolled the film’s high-
tech wizardy with the slogan “Experience the impossible.” By casting the 
protagonist as an idealized character similar to a gentle superhero, the film 
transposes on the sphere of magic what in fact belongs to the human realm.  
A poetic and transformative act is digitally fictionalized as a record-breaking 
feat. By so doing, the film contradicts the fundamental principle of funam-
bulist practice with regard to vertigo, as noted by Quinodoz. Not only is the 
beauty of the walk devalued by an orgy of digital simulation, but the subject of 
high-wire walking, too, is transformed in the process from a figure of counter-
vertigo to an agent of thrill simulation. It is as though the dynamic imagination 
inherent in Petit’s attempt to reach the clouds had been lost to a simulacrum 
powered by cloud computing. By striving to recreate a perception of the coup 
through special effects, the filmmaker appropriated the poetic image of the 
funambulist and effectively obliterated its imaginative élan.49
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evoked and momentarily tamed, to the realm of hyperreality in which vertigo 
is artificially simulated, and stimulated, through immersive technologies.  
As the status of high-wire walking shifts from a performance art to an ersatz 
attraction for thrill-seekers, its mystical aura gradually dissipates into an artificial 
cloud. And yet, beyond the fog of pixels generated by the film studios, the 
coup remains an extraordinary event to behold and reflect upon: a significant 
moment in the time-honored art of funambulism but also in the history of ur-
ban perception. By reviving an ancient practice on the wane, Petit transposed 
onto the sky of Manhattan the gravity challenge Blondin had brought on  
Niagara Falls, thereby redefining the experience of the abyss for the urban age. 
Later on, he played a key role in shaping the collective imagination of a  
performance act that still embodies, perhaps more than any other, the human 
impulse to master vertigo.
Furthermore, this image-making operation had an interesting architectural  
offshoot. In preparation for the launch of The Walk in Australian cinemas, in 
October 2015, a new design feature was added to the Skydeck of Melbourne’s 
Eureka Tower: a glass box jutting out of the eighty-eighth floor and hanging 
over the void. The attraction, called The Edge, consists of “a specially con-
structed green screen set that gives guests the illusion that they are crossing 
a tightrope suspended high above the city of Melbourne.”50 This gimmick  
reflects a wider trend for vertigo-inducing experiences that, since the late 
noughties, have become rife across spatial and visual cultures alike. The ongoing 
craze for high-level glass floors and sundry “skywalks” evidences a widespread 
pursuit of ilinx that manifests itself through various states of suspension.51
As glass platforms become common features of high-rise buildings around the 
world, the embodied act of “walking on air” is simulated within environmentally 
controlled spaces for the benefit of thrill seekers. This phenomenon, whereby 
the encounter with the abyss is reduced to a vicarious experience, signals a 
shift in the cultural significance of the tightrope. The human longing for weight-
lessness, that age-old dream personified by the funambulist, has been appro-
priated by an entertainment industry that caters for, and in turn produces, a 
distinct type of subject: the consumer of ever-new thrills that, for a few in-
stants, give the illusion of an unlimited degree of freedom. With The Walk and 
its related virtual experience, the act of liberation performed by Petit was 
commodified to suit the predominant neoliberal subjectivity.
Conclusion
Summing up, Petit’s role in the history of funambulism appears to straddle 
the line between performance and mediation. If, on the one hand, he revived 
the glorious tradition of high-wire walking by casting the vertical city as the 
modern-day nature to be conquered, on the other he came to embody a new 
figure of funambulist-cum-artist that combines dexterity on the wire with a 
penchant for storytelling. Having conceived of wire-walking as a poetic form 
of “writing in the sky,” Petit then revealed in his words the world as he saw it. 
Thereby, the last of the romantic funambulists inspired the formation of a 
whole mythography in which his most legendary performance was documented, 
reproduced, and simulated through an array of media. Having overpowered 
vertigo on the highest of wires, Petit became the subject of a popular narrative 
driven by artistry and ingenuity—his labor of passion providing a pure incar-
nation of the American dream for the post-9/11 period.52
The Twin Towers coup and its representations show that the funambulist 
continues to stage “the tense passage between worlds”: in this case, a passage 
from the realm of poetic imagination in which the keeper of the abyss is 
50 The Walk Experience was advertised with 
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at Eureka Skydeck!”: https://www 
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52 Vanderwees, “A Tightrope,” 242–43.
136 Taming Vertigo: Philippe Petit and the Subject of High-Wire Walking
Andrews, Gavin J. “Spaces of Dizziness 
and Dread: Navigating Acrophobia.” 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography 89 (2007): 307–17.
Auster, Paul. “On the High Wire.” In 
Collected Prose. London: Faber & Faber, 
2003.
Caillois, Roger. Man, Play and Games. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001.
Connor, Steven. “Man Is a Rope.” In 
Catherine Yass—High Wire, n.p. London: 
Artangel, 2008.
Deriu, Davide. “Skywalking in the City: 
Glass Platforms and the Architecture of 
Vertigo.” Emotions, Space and Society 
(August 2018): 94–103.
Huppert, Doreen, Eva Grill, and Thomas 
Brandt. “Down on Heights? One in Three 
Has Visual Height Intolerance.” Journal of 
Neurology 260 (2013): 597–604.
LeBlanc, Jim. “The Acrophobe and the 
Funambulist: Existential and Cinematic 
Perspectives on the Phenomenology of 
Extreme Vertical Space.” Emotion, Space 
and Society 4 (2011): 1–7.
Miller, Steven. “The Coup: Behind the 
Scenes of the Act with Philippe Petit.” 
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies 28 (2017): 116–33.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. 
Translated by Adrian Del Caro. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006.
Petit, Philippe. On the High Wire. New 
York: Random House, 1985.
———. To Reach the Clouds: My High­Wire
Walk between the Twin Towers. London: 
Faber & Faber, 2002.
Quinodoz, Danielle. Emotional Vertigo: 
Between Anxiety and Pleasure. London: 
Routledge, 1997.
Salassa, John R., and David A. Zapala. 
“Love and Fear of Heights: The Patho phy s-
iology and Psychology of Height 
Imbalance.” Wilderness & Environmental 
Medicine 20 (2009): 378–382.
Soden, Garrett. Falling: How Our Greatest 
Fear Became Our Greatest Thrill. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2003.
Vanderwees, Chris. “A Tightrope at the 
Twin Towers.” In Recovering 9/11 in New 
York, edited by Robert Fanuzzi and 
Michael Wolfe, 228–47. Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2014. 
Weitzman, David. Skywalkers: Mohawk 
Ironworkers Build the City. New York: 
Roaring Brook Press, 2010. 
Wurmli, Kurt. ‘Theater in the Sky: Philippe 
Petit’s Unique Art of Theatrical Highwire 
Performance.” Journal of American 
Culture 20 (1997): 117–23.




A person who has never felt distraught is lacking something.
—Roger Caillois, Le fleuve Alphée
Even if the history of civilization has undoubtedly brought forth many philoso-
phers and artists who knew how to use dizziness as a creative resource and 
an instrument of emancipation, only few knew to put it to the test in their own 
work and to push it to its limits on a theoretical level as effectively as the 
French philosopher and literary theorist Roger Caillois (1913–1978). In his auto-
biographical work Le fleuve Alphée, which was published in 1978 in search  
of his “true sources”1 and only a few months before his death, he looks back 
on what might be considered an “insignificant episode” in the life of a child 
that grew up during World War I, but which nonethe less had the “most decisive 
influence” on him: “It sowed the seed of panic in me,” remembers Caillois, 
“that every child feels at a moment of ecstasy or horror that is difficult to predict, 
those delightful or devastating raptures that seem to shake what I cannot  
not call the visceral soul. It is shaken to its core and seems to uproot all hope for 
even the merest stability in its confusion. This shock that only affects the 
bodily organs also rattles the consciousness the conscious ness.”2 What had 
happened to Callois that not only challenged and unhinged his physical 
existence to such an extent, but also his conscious mind? “On the edge of the 
destroyed town a military airfield was left standing; there were burnt-out 
hangars and runways that had suffered more from the rigors of the weather 
than from the artillery. A rusty pole stood out there. One day I decided to climb 
it. The iron ladder that led to the top was almost undamaged. Halfway up, I had 
my first experience of dizziness, that terribly heightened emptiness that comes 
ever closer, that you cannot resist and that forces you to counter it. What is 
left is only the horrible feeling of not being able to climb, neither up nor down. 
I forced myself to continue on my way up, both out of fear and obstinance. 
After I had regained my composure, I made my way down again, my eyes fixed 
on the sky above me, my feet feeling for the support of the next rung with every 
step. This misadventure left me with a feeling of unease and triumph. I have 
subsequently encountered many different forms of dizziness in my life. It is 
not always physical; it can also be moral or intellectual. What absurdities can 
the consequences of a daring decision lead to? What is the highest wager to 
defy misfortune? What is the greatest risk to challenge caution? To deliberately 
dare to go a little too far down a slope, to come a little too close to a system 
of gears near to the point where your speed makes it impossible to turn around?”3
Dizziness as 
Method 
Roger Caillois and 
the Lure of 
Material Space
Sarah Kolb
1 Roger Caillois, Le fleuve Alphée (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1978), 11. On Caillois’s “true 
sources,” see also the afterword of the 
German edition: Sarah Kolb and Anne  
von der Heiden, “Caillois’ geheime 
Elixiere,” in Roger Caillois, Der Fluss 
Alpheios, trans. Rainer G. Schmidt, ed. 
Anne von der Heiden and Sarah Kolb 
(Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 2016), 175–86.
2 Caillois, 42–43. Unless otherwise noted, 




He feels himself becoming space, dark space where things cannot be put. He 
is similar—not similar to something, but just similar. And he invents spaces of 
which he is ‘the convulsive possession.’”13 Thus, according to Caillois “the 
ulti mate problem turns out […] to be that of distinction: distinctions between 
the real and the imaginary, between waking and sleeping, between ignorance 
and knowledge, etc.,” and “there is assuredly none more clear-cut than that 
between the organism and its surroundings.”14 But as immediate the distinction, 
as immediate is the need to resist it and to abandon oneself to that “tempta-
tion by space,” which in turn can result in a loss of identity, be it temporary 
or fundamental: the yearning to transcend bodily boundaries, finiteness, and 
evanescence, and to blossom in the “absolute Other”15—much like in the case 
of the Phyllia that imitate leaves so successfully that they eventually end up 
devouring each other.16
Against the background of this truly existential experience that goes along 
with the physical and psychological extravagances of certain individuals, it  
This first experience of such fundamental uncertainty obviously made a deep 
and lasting impression on Caillois. He was literally caught up in a certain need 
to push his individual experience to its limits, causing him to become a member 
of the esoteric literary circle Les Phrères simplistes and the Surrealist move-
ment in the following years. After critically distancing himself from his early 
fascination for the irrational, he would even go further and question the 
boundaries of knowledge itself with his concept of “Diagonal Sciences,” which 
he formulated in 1959 based on his earlier writings dating back to the mid- 
1930s.4 
The category of ilinx, with which Caillois ranks dizziness among the four main 
types of games in his seminal 1958 book Man, Play and Games,5 not only ad-
dresses the “intentional disturbance of physical balance” that one experiences in 
dances, roundabouts, carnival attractions, or extreme sport, but also “any 
danger or challenge that, with full knowledge, includes the possibility of loss 
of intellectual, moral, or emotional balance, if not of the whole of existence 
itself.”6 According to Caillois, ilinx is characterized by a “confusion that is simul-
taneously accepted and suffered” in that it goes hand in hand “with the un-
certain expectation, then with the elation, to reattain those praised goods, 
incalculable in a moment, left up to sheer coincidence, at the very last mo-
ment through pure daring.”7 As Caillois underlines, such “ambivalent desire,” 
which bears a “metaphysical challenge” and even risks survival itself just for 
the sake of an “interchangeable temptation,” not only affects human beings, but 
can also be found in the animal kingdom; it is evident not only in rites and 
passions, in the “ecstasies of eroticism,” or in the consumption of drugs,8 but 
can also be seen in instinctive drives, and even in physical traits that, far from 
only safeguarding further existence, can be a pure, and in some cases even 
“dangerous luxury” with the potential to threaten life itself.9
It is important to note that Caillois had come to this conclusion already in his 
early text “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia,” which was published in  
the Surrealist magazine Minotaure in 1935. By establishing a cross connection 
between entomology and psychoanalysis, he calls attention to certain striking 
parallels between the mimicry strategies of certain insects and the psychological 
disposition of humans suffering from schizophrenia. As Caillois argues, due  
to a disorder in the perception of the self and the concomitant “drive to self-
abandonment,”10 both the insects and the schizophrenic fall prey to a “real 
temptation by space,”11 or, to be more precise, a veritable “lure of material space.”12 
In other words, both are subject to a “depersonalisation through assimilation 
to space”: “To these dispossessed souls, space seems to be a devouring force. 
Space pursues them, encircles them, digests them in a gigantic phagocytosis. 
It ends replacing them. Then the body separates itself from thought, the indi-
vidual breaks the boundary of his or her skin and occupies the other side of 
his or her senses. He tries to look at himself from any point whatever in space. 
Dizziness as Method: Roger Caillois and the Lure of Material Space Sarah Kolb
4 See Roger Caillois’s articles “La Mante 
religieuse: De la biologie à la psychanalyse,” 
Minotaure 5 (1934): 23–26; “Mimétisme et 
psychasthénie légendaire,” Minotaure 7 
(1935): 5–10; “Sciences diagonales,” 
Nouvelle Revue Française 76 (April 1959): 
679–83, also contained in Méduse et Cie, 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 9–18. English 
versions contained in The Edge of Surrealism: 
A Roger Caillois Reader, trans. Claudine 
Frank and Camille Naish, ed. Claudine Frank 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); 
“The Praying Mantis: From Biology to 
Psychoanalysis,” 66–81; “Mimicry and 
Legen dary Psychasthenia,” 89–103; “A New 
Plea of Diagonal Science” (1970), 343–47. 
See also the English version of “Mimicry 
and Legendary Psychasthenia,” October 31 
(Winter 1984), trans. John Shepley, 16–32.
5 Roger Caillois, Les Jeux et les hommes: Le 
Masque et le vertige (Paris: Gallimard, 1958). 
English edition: Man, Play and Games, 
trans. Meyer Barash (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2001). Caillois subsumes the 
various kinds of play and games under the 
categories agôn (competition), alea (chance), 
mimicry (simulation), and ilinx (dizziness). 
As for ilinx, see Caillois, 23: “Ilinx. The last 
kind of game includes those which are 
based on the pursuit of vertigo and which 
consist of an attempt to momentarily 
destroy the stability of perception and 
inflict a kind of voluptuous panic upon an 
otherwise lucid mind.” With ilinx, Caillois 
refers to activities like “Children ‘whirling’ 
/ Horseback riding / Swinging / Waltzing / 
Volador / Traveling carnivals / Skiing / 
Mountain climbing / Tightrope walking” 
(Caillois, 36).
6 Caillois, Le Fleuve Alphée, 44.
7 Caillois.
8 Caillois, 45.







15 According to Jacques Lacan, the “absolute 
Other” is the counterpart to the subject, 
the place of language where subjectivity 
is constituted. See Jacques Lacan, Book II: 
The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis (1954–55), 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: 
Norton, 1988). It is interesting to note in 
this context that Lacan emphasized how 
much he owed to Caillois’s concept of 
“morphological mimicry as an obsession 
with space in its derealizing effect” with 
regard to his own theory of the mirror 
stage that he developed in 1936. Jacques 
Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of 
the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience,” in Jacques 
Lacan, Écrits. A Selection, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (London: Routledge, 2001), 4.
16 See Caillois, “Mimicry and Legendary 
Psychasthenia,” 25.
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of knowledge melt. There, the building up and ceaseless crumbling of fragile 
edifices is, perhaps, necessary. The metaphor assists (or corrupts) the syllogism; 
visions feed (or mislead) precision. Between the fixity of stone and mental 
frenzy, a type of stream flows, memorable indeed, where I find, for a moment, 
wisdom and comfort.”27 Within the realm of stones, Caillois hopes to find “the 
possible burst of an unknown and paradoxical kind of mysticism,” causing his 
soul “to dissolve in some inhuman immensity” that indeed is anything but 
esoteric or otherworldly: “But that abyss would have nothing of the divine, it 
would be pure matter, only matter, active, turbulent matter of lava and fusion, 
is not surprising that towards the end of his life, Caillois rediscovered the 
“metaphysical challenge” of dizziness also within inert material, and particularly 
within the realm of stones and minerals.17 The clear dividing line that is usually 
drawn between nature and culture, between what is alive and what is dead, is 
utterly artificial to Caillois.18 Therefore, after his “long detour through the 
ocean of sciences”19 that had led him to such diverse subjects as entomology, 
sociology, geography, literature, and art, and many more,20 he focused on 
the fascinating world of stones and minerals, began to collect them with a 
passion, and went on to make them a central theme in his work.21 In 1966 he 
published his first book on Stones,22 a “quasi-mystic text” in terms of an “areli-
gious” and “almost materialistic mysticism,” characterized by a metaphysics 
of nature and its unity.23 Within the realm of stones, of dead and inert materials, 
of that great and sudden abyss we are confronted with through the promising 
luxury of dizziness, Caillois rediscovers what had always been so fascinating 
to him about humans, animals, and plants: “I speak about stones as algebra, 
vertigo, and order; stones as hymns and quincunxes; stones as stings and corollas, 
on the brink of dreams, catalyst and image; about this stone, a cascade of 
hair, opaque and stiff, a drowned person’s strand, dripping on no temple; in 
which the sap becomes more visible and vulnerable in the midst of a blue 
vein; about those stones, similar to de-crumpled paper, noncombustible and 
sparkled with uncertain sparks; or, to the most hermetic vase in which a liquid 
dances, leveled behind absolute walls, and whose preservation would have 
required cumulated miracles. I speak about stones older than—and which 
outlast—life itself, standing on the cold planets on which they came to being. 
I speak about stones that do not even have to wait for death and that have 
nothing to do besides letting sand slide on their surfaces, along with rain shower, 
backwash, storm, and time.”24 As they are “neither independent nor sensitive,” 
Caillois notes, “it takes a lot to move them: blowtorch and electric arc’s tem-
peratures, violence and earthquakes, volcanoes’ convulsions. This, before 
mentioning the vertiginous passing of time.”25 It is structures that are “molded 
and ennobled by the harshest actions” and as such only subjected to “the 
law of balance,” to the free game of “unstable and approximate compensations, 
which slowly put an end to the jolts of a solidifying star” in order to get a 
moment of consistency out of the grand ups and downs of existence: “There 
may be no better signs of true beauty than the immersed shapes of large 
acrimonies.”26 Those acrimonies can well be seen as Caillois’s own, as the 
pains of the writer who aspires to find words for the chaos of the world while 
realizing that in his attempt he is actually only losing ground. So when Caillois 
turns to stones, it is least to get to the bottom of his work despite all the 
staggering and doubting: “I struggle to picture them in my mind at the exact  
moment of their genesis. This brings me a very specific kind of excitement.  
I sense myself taking on parts of the nature of stones. And at the same time, I 
bring them close to mine, giving them unexpected qualities, speculating both 
with precision and carelessness, in a narrative where dream and the chain  
17 Whereas a mineral is an inorganic, 
crystalline formation that has a fixed 
structure and that occurs naturally in the 
earth, a stone is more generally defined as 
a concretion of earthy or mineral matter. 
Hereinafter, the term “stones” can be 
understood in the comprehensive sense 
of both stones and minerals.
18 See Roger Caillois, Méduse et Cie (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1960), hereinafter quoted from 
the German edition: Méduse & Cie, trans. 
Peter Geble (Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 
2007), 48–49 (English trans. Christopher 
Hütmannsberger): “A form of reflex pushes 
the scientist to think it sacrilegious, a 
scandal, even ludicrous, to compare the 
regrowth of living tissue to that of crystals. 
And yet it is a fact that crystals, just as 
other organisms, recreate what was 
damaged, and that the affected area 
displays an excess of regenerative activity 
in order to compensate for the damage, 
the imbalance, the dissymmetry produced 
by the wound. Is this really nothing but a 
deceptive analogy, a simple metaphor? 
We must not forget that the regular 
condition of the mineral, just as that of the 
animal, is recreated through intense 
activity. Of course, I am aware of the abyss 
that separates living and unliving material. 
And yet, I could well imagine that both the 
one and the other do show characteristics 
that ensure the intactness of its structures 
in the end—no matter if we are dealing 
with living or unliving material. […] It is almost 
impossible to ignore that living organisms, 
plants, and stars are bound to the same 
laws.”
19 Caillois, quoted in “Entretien avec Jean-
Louis Ézine (April 27, 1978),” in Les Cahiers 
de Chronos: Roger Caillois. Témoignages, 
études et analyses, précédés de 39 textes 
rares ou inédits de Roger Caillois, ed. 
Jean-Clarence Lambert (Paris: Éditions de 
la Différence, 1991), 138. See also Caillois, 
Le Fleuve Alphée.
20 See in particular Roger Caillois, Cases 
d’un échiquier (Paris: Gallimard, 1970). 
See also Sarah Kolb, “Einführung: ‘Eine 
Form des Wunderbaren, die das Wissen 
nicht scheut’: Roger Caillois als Grenz-
gänger zwischen Literatur, Philosophie 
und Wissenschaft,” in Logik des Imagi nären. 
Diagonale Wissenschaft nach Roger 
Caillois, vol. 1: Versuchungen durch Natur, 
Kultur und Imagination, ed.  Anne von der 
Heiden and Sarah Kolb (Berlin: August 
Verlag, 2018), 25–77.
21 See Roger Caillois, La Lecture des pierres, 
preface by Massimilano Gioni and 
afterword by Henri-Jean Schubnel (Paris: 
Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle and 
Éditions Xavier Barral, 2015). This richly 
illustrated volume does not only contain 
large-size images of many of the stones 
and minerals from Caillois’s private 
collection, but also three of Caillois’s 
writings on stones: Pierres (1966), 89–237; 
L’Écriture des pierres (1970), 239–367; and 
“Agates paradoxales” (1977), 369–85.
22 Roger Caillois, Pierres (Paris: Gallimard, 
1966). English edition: Stones, trans. 
Valentine Umansky, ed. Maja Asshaq and 
Benjamin Gaydos (Detroit: DittoDitto & 
goodgood for Flint Magazine, 2018). 
Special thanks to Maia Asshaq for 
providing the English translation. 
23 Caillois, quoted in Odile Felgine, Roger 
Caillois. Vie et Œuvre, 1913–1978, in 
Œuvres, by Roger Caillois, ed. Dominique 
Rabourdin (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 68.
24 Caillois, Stones, 23. 
25 Caillois, 30. 
26 Caillois, 36. 
27 Caillois, 88–89. 
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earthquakes, orgasms, great tectonic ordeals; and motionless matter of the 
longest quietude. Nothing prevents meditation from turning into vertigo or into 
ecstasy.”28
When Caillois thus comes to the conclusion that it is only the free play of 
imagination and with it the “entire spectrum of the poetical and the fantastical,” 
“myths, images, situations of stumbling, dreams or games, passions or cruel-
ties” that can give meaning to his life as a writer,29 in his late work this conclu-
sion is not only confirmed, but also substantiated in its contradictory nature. 
In his dreamlike explorations of the “logic of the imaginary,” he not only delves 
into the impervious nature of stones, but also finds room for such sensitive 
creatures as the octopus.30 Within the exuberant maelstrom of imagination, 
dizziness gives way to a deep understanding, the realization that all becoming 
and fading, all living and dying holds the potential for crystallization: 
Nature helps countless bubbles that pop as soon as they are formed to 
attain an uncertain, fleeting, floating existence. They are almost nothing 
but ideas, which teem and swarm, only to disappear again, washed away 
by the uninterrupted fermentation that forms them in a ballet of atoms. 
They dissolve immediately. However, some are given the chance to be-
come distinct, to attain contours. Thereby they gain a temporary, fragile 
solidity. They linger in the memory, shadows that are reflected in the 
mind and become part of it, in its first durability. […] They were evaporat-
ing foam, void turbulence. Now they carry weight, impact, productivity. 
Those that bloom become ideas, myths, beliefs, stories. Their allies are 
sensibility, intelligence, art. They have attained that impalpable, flowing 
solidity which is immanent in objects of thought, wells of emotions, fo-
cal points of fascination.31
Translated from the German by Christopher Hütmannsberger
28 Caillois, 89. 
29 Roger Caillois, “Intervention surréaliste 
(Divergences et connivences),” in Cases 
d’un échiquier, by Caillois, 212.
30 See Roger Caillois, La Pieuvre: Essai sur la 
logique de l’imaginaire (Paris: La Table 
Ronde, 1973). German edition: Der Krake: 
Versuch über die Logik des Imaginativen, 
trans. Brigitte Weidmann (Munich: Hanser 
Verlag, 1986). See also the section 
“Logique de l’imaginaire,” in Cases d’un 
échiquier, by Caillois, 21–49.
31 Caillois, Der Krake, 139–40 (English trans. 
Christopher Hütmannsberger)
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This subject, too, has no few difficulties, requires such a delicate sensi-
tivity, yet such a calm mastery of inner attention, which is not obfuscat-
ed, even during stormy movements of the senses and the mind, not car-
ried away, is also based on one’s own, natural or methodological 
development, so that it should still be taken as a happy coincidence for 
the present, if a talent of this kind comes for training.
—Jan Evangelista Purkyně
Looking Inside: Self-Observation, Self-Experimentation,  
and Subjective Empiricism
Jan Evangelista Purkyně’s contributions to the research and experimentalization 
of vertigo have played a pivotal role in this field of the history of science.  
Situated on the threshold between the Romantic-idealistic tradition of physiology 
and its modern, positivist orientation, the works by the Czech physiologist 
mark the transition to the paradigm of subjective sensory physiology.1 This is 
linked to an epistemological reconfiguration, which was characterized by an 
increased focus on empiricism and experimentation. Purkyně owes his special 
historiographical status to the methodological virtuosity and precision of his 
self-experiments, which identifies him as the founder of exact subjectivism and 
thus as one of the pioneers of the natural scientific approach in nineteenth-
century physiology.2 
This was exhibited even in the methodological outline of his practice: in one of 
his lecture manuscripts from the 1840s, Purkyně described the methodological 
approach of physiological psychology as “subjective empiricism in self-obser-
vation,” the object of which was an investigation into “the effectiveness of the mind 
under organic material conditions.”3 The liminal area between the physical 
and the psychological addressed here defined a field of research that was 
already outlined in Purkyně’s early sensory physiological works and was  
subsequently proposed as an independent discipline. As early as 1819, when 
he published his dissertation Beyträge zur Kenntnis des Sehens in subjektiver 
Hinsicht (Contributions to the knowledge of vision from a subjective perspective), 
he was centrally concerned with expanding the subject area of sensory  
1 See Karl. E. Rothschuh, Geschichte der 
Physiologie, ed. Wilhelm Trendelenburg and 
Erich Schütz (Berlin: Springer, 1953), 105. 
2 See Armin von Tschermak-Seysenegg, 
“Joh. Ev. Purkyne als ein Begründer des 
exakten Subjektivismus,” in In Memoriam 
J. Ev. Purkyne (Prague: Purkynova 
Spolecnost, 1937), 76–96; and Otto Grüsser, 
Purkyne’s Contributions to the Physiology 
of the Visual, the Vestibular and the Oculo­
motor Systems, Human Neurobiology 3 
(1984): 129.
3 Jan Evangelista Purkyně, “Vorlesungen zur 
physiologischen Psychologie,” in J. E. 
Purkyne and Psychology with a Focus on 
Unpublished Manuscripts, ed. Josef Brozek 
and Jiri Hsokovec (Prague: Academia Praha, 
1987), 77. Unless otherwise noted, all 









ence is obvious: while the latter had pursued the production of involuntary 
and possibly unknown sensory perceptions in excessive ways, including a 
marked preference for galvanic body-battery circuits,12 Purkyně linked his self-
experiment with a program of controlled production and systematic manipu-
lation of sensory experiences by active intervention (i.e., by excitation, inhibition, 
or disturbance of a specific perceptual event).13
This also indicates the direction of experimental physiology, which formed  
itself in the first three decades of the nineteenth century in opposition to  
the vitalist traditions of Romantic natural philosophy. The German physiologist  
Ignaz Döllinger formulated the decisive epistemological turn in his 1824 
speech “Von den Fortschritten, welche die Physiologie seit Haller gemacht 
hat” (On the progress physiology has made since Haller). According to him, 
involuntary and random events should no longer determine the focus of  
scientific observations. Döllinger argued that “a natural science that has to 
wait for chance to grant it the opportunity to observe can progress only  
slowly; the height to which all natural sciences have reached, therefore, is 
owed to the violent initiation of the phenomena to be observed—the ex-
physiology and thus, as he wrote, “to also gain a subjective view in addition 
to the present, merely objective sphere.”4 Inspired by Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe’s theory of color, Purkyně examined all sorts of phenomena of subjec-
tive vision—sensory phenomena that would also play a role in the first study 
on vertigo, which was published just one year later.
Purkyně was aware that in the process of analysis he was sometimes operating 
at the limits of what could be reconciled with the objective standards of  
explanation used in sensory physiology.5 The fundamental premise of his approach 
was therefore following the theoretical assumption that “every modification 
of the subjective within the sensory sphere always corresponds to one in the 
objective.”6 The qualitative or categorical difference between the two spheres 
was subordinated to a view that recognized the senses or sensory organs as 
an “interzone between the outer material world and the inner intellectual world” 
and as a transition between the subjective and objective spheres.7 If Purkyně 
understood the senses both as “the finest and most excitable instruments 
and agents of the qualities and relations of the matter belonging to them,”8 
this points to the significance of the senses in the context of this new experi-
mental configuration: unlike in previous experiments on vertigo, which primarily 
focused on the phenomenon of afterimages, and in Purkyně’s case it is the 
senses themselves that are of central epistemic interest.9 As he emphasized, 
“Every single sense [....] represents to a certain extent an individual [reality]”—
namely an ‘individual’ that had to be examined and described “through ob-
servation and experiment both in his own life and in his idiosyncratic reaction 
to the outside world.”10 By means of observation and experimentation, the  
hypostasis of the senses could be grasped in the first place, perceived in its 
own right—as a “modification of the subjective”—and, in a next step, placed 
in a causal relation with the corresponding “objective modification.” With this 
relation in mind, Purkyně spoke of “artificial conditions” that must be created 
experimentally, and at the same time he described the experimental proce-
dures of subjective empiricism as “devotion to the inner operations” of organic 
life: “We first reflect, empirically, on the active and passive processes and 
states of the subjective in our organism, and follow these observationally and 
experimentally by bringing the organs of the same into artificial conditions 
or devoting ourselves to their internal operations in order to research them 
more thoroughly. Our procedure is therefore physiological in the most real 
sense of the word, and we do not spurn any of the aids that could grant us the 
knowledge of the material organism.”11
The self-experiment was thus conducted here with the aim of undertaking a 
disciplined self-observation; both went hand in hand and conditioned each 
other mutually. However, this positioning also represents a clear distinction 
from the self-experiments of a romantic character. For although Purkyně’s ex-
periments on vertigo emerged from this tradition, the epistemological differ-
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types in question were “those created by active and passive movements of 
the body; then vertigo by galvanism; vertigo caused by disturbance of blood 
circulation; furthermore, height vertigo and vertigo caused by narcotica,  
finally temporal vertigo.”20
 
The fact that the description and analysis of Purkyně’s rotation tests and thus 
the forms of vertigo induced by active and passive movement took up the 
greater part of the account is first and foremost the result of simple and com-
prehensible experimental arrangements. In fact, Purkyně placed a “more or 
less known experience” at the heart of his investigation—life-world experiences, 
so to speak, whose experimental realization “could be reproduced and un-
derstood in the imagination without necessitating some odious post-experi -
mentation.”21
 
Thus Purkyně’s account began by describing a variety of rotation experiments 
that, as “motion vertigo,” were categorized as a form of spatial vertigo:22 “If 
one turns around the axis of one’s own body evenly with a head held vertically 
and a eyes directed immediately forward,” according to the basic experiment, 
“the visible objects seem to move only slowly in the opposite direction of the 
turning motion, then with continued rotation move ever faster until their 
contours flow half into one another.”23 Based on this experiment, a number of 
variants were derived, including rotation with the head tilted up and down; 
rotation with the head lowered laterally onto the right and left shoulders; rota-
tion with the upper body bent forward; and rotation with the head tilted up-
ward, with each rotation being made around both the right and left body axes 
respectively. Despite their similarity to older experimental procedures, signifi-
cant differences emerged. Even after the first attempt at rotation—an ordinary 
rotation around the body axis—Purkyně observed a variety of symptoms. In 
this form of rotational vertigo, he noted, 
periment.”14 How Purkyně’s experimental practice met the methodological  
requirements of this vision of a “progressive” physiology in the sense of 
Döllinger down to the last detail, can be demonstrated by his experiments 
on the phenomenon of vertigo. 
Measuring Vertigo: “In the Beginning You Feel Light and 
Cheerful in Your Head ...”15
Only a year after the publication of his dissertation on subjective vision, which 
had brought Purkyně to the attention of experts and earned him the admira-
tion of Goethe, among others, his first study on vertigo appeared. Inspired by 
the observations and experiments on vertigo that the English natural scientist 
Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin’s grandfather, had conducted,16 Purkyně under-
took a systematic typologization of the subject matter.
 
By examining the forms of physiological vertigo, he focused exclusively on 
those types of vertigo that were “given to the control of the heautognostic  
experiment” and could be observed as “subjective illusory movements in various 
modifications in the subordinate sensory circles.”17 One decisive factor for his 
introspective, or heautognostic research was the definition of vertigo as “an 
illusory movement of sensory phenomena caused by subjective states, which is 
transferred to the objective by illusion.”18 This definition implied, on the one 
hand, that his concern was not only with the accompanying optical phenomena 
of vertigo, some of which had also been the subject of the research into sub-
jective vision; instead, Purkyně’s scientific interest focused on grasping the 
phenomena of vertigo in its sensual diversity—in the spheres of seeing, touch-
ing, hearing, and feeling19—and in observing and analyzing these phenomena 
in their specific interactions with the body. On the other hand, the psycho-
physical phenomenality of vertigo clearly emerged in this definition: for Purkyně, 
vertigo represented a subjectively conditioned sensory phenomenon, a dis-
orientation that was objectified in the process of perception, that is, perceived 
as if it was an objective phenomenon. The sensory event of vertigo thus re-
volved essentially around the illusion itself, around an as if that took effect in 
vertigo, manipulated the senses, and made them believe that the subjective 
vision was an objective phenomenon, specifically: that the objects of the external 
world had started to move, while—in most cases—it was the eyes that moved. 
In Purkyně’s work, this illusion became the central focus of attention as an ex-
planandum in itself and was linked to the methodological issue of connecting 
the subjective sensory phenomena of vertigo to their objective foundations 
and thus linking the field of psychological knowledge with that of physiology. 
The systematic approach underlying Purkyně’s self-experiments was already 
evident in the ways in which vertigo was experimentally produced, which 
were linked to a typological categorization of various “forms of vertigo.” The 
14 Ignaz Döllinger, Von den Fortschritten, 
welche die Physiologie seit Haller gemacht 
hat: Eine Rede (Munich: Lindauer, 1824), 15.
15 Jan Evangelista Purkyně, “Beiträge zur 
näheren Kenntnis des Schwindels aus 
heautognostischen Daten” (1820), in Opera 
Omnia, vol. 2 (Prague: Academiae 
Scientiarum Bohemoslovenicae, 1937), 19.
16 See the chapter “On Vertigo” in Erasmus 
Darwin, Zoonomia, or, The Laws of Organic 
Life, vol. 1 (London: J. Johnston, 1774); and 
on this point see Ladewig, Schwindel, 
Epistemologie der Orientierung (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 141–68.
17 Purkyně, “Beiträge zur näheren Kenntnis 
des Schwindels aus heautognostischen 
Daten,” 16.
18 Purkyně, 15.
19 See Purkyně, 22.
20 Purkyně, 16.
21 Purkyně, 17.
22 Drawing on Kant’s spatial forms of intuition, 
Purkyně distinguished between spatial 
and temporal vertigo, whereby the former 
was defined as “vertigo in its relation to 
the outside world,” whereas temporal 
vertigo was defined as vertigo in relation 
to “imagining purely temporal subjects.” 
See Purkyně, 15–17.
23 Purkyně, 16.
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to the seemingly gymnastic attempts at rotating—Purkyně summarized them 
as types of “curvilinear vertigo”—as well as to the subsequently discussed forms 
of “rectilinear vertigo,” which he illustrated using an example of (accelerated) 
backward movement already cited by Erasmus Darwin earlier on.27
 
But this example, in which an everyday worldly spatial experience was once 
again conceived of as an experimental situation, is not the only way in which 
Purkyně referred to Darwin; the explanatory approach cited in this context 
was also based on Darwin’s attempt to explain vertigo with the topos of physical 
movement habits. “Among the ordinary experiences of common acquaintance 
is this [vertigo],” Purkyně wrote, “which people who are weak in nerves or 
otherwise unaccustomed to such movement suffer when they are driven back-
wards or even forwards in a coach. Because we are hardened by life-long  
forward movement; however, it becomes noticeable when we are set into a 
straightforward movement, the speed of which exceeds the normal speed.”28
 
It was only later, in Ernst Mach’s more technically advanced experimental research 
from the 1870s that it became clear that the cause of the vertigo motions  
described here was not their speed, but rather their positive or negative accel-
eration.29 Unlike Mach, Purkyně still resorted to the well-known means of 
counteracting vertigo already passed down from Darwin: he discovered that 
after stopping rotation, the illusory movements associated with vertigo could 
be interrupted by placing an object close to the eyes and fixating on it.  
However, Purkyně was not primarily concerned with suppressing vertigo. Instead, 
he derived from this observation of the post-rotatory “palpable and visible 
the head is taken captive (as if it were tied with a cloth), one feels an  
unpleasant pulling in the temples, the forehead, the eye sockets, the 
crown, and the occiput, and a sensation of nausea appears in the vagus 
nerve and the nearby connections. If one now suddenly stops, and (if 
necessary) stops oneself, the visible objects always seem to move in the 
same direction; in the body an alien force seems to prevail, which still 
strives to turn it in the same direction with force, and which can only be 
resisted by muscle exertion when standing still, since the movement in 
the direction of prior motion is greatly facilitated and can be continued 
half by itself. The intoxication of the head increases for a while; the hearing 
is dimmed by a slight anaesthetic; a feeling of nausea spreads from the 
vagus into the branches of the nerves of the muscle and skin. In the region 
of the heart, fear and anxiety are felt in the thoracic cavity. There is also 
a pulsating throughout the body, above all in the head and hands, which 
are the most sensitive of all. Sweat often breaks out on the entire surface 
of the skin or on individual areas of the skin, disproportionate to previous 
movements.24
The description of the sensory experiences provided here is not just remarkable 
because of the stimulus reactions it records; what distinguishes it beyond 
that is the categorization of these reactions according to the respective physio-
logical and anatomical connections, which testifies to a profound knowledge 
of organic functions and their interactions. Purkyně thus brought a spectrum 
of sensory qualities into view whose concomitant appearance with vertigo 
had until that point remained largely unconsidered. Of particular importance 
was the observation of the actual movements or illusory movements caused 
by vertigo—those phenomena that were connected with the “alien power” pre-
vailing in the body and which Purkyně later distinguished as “true” and “illu-
sory” movements in “real” or “ideal” space. The ideal space perceived by the 
senses, as this distinction vis-à-vis the illusory perception of vertigo could  
be described, thus turned within real space—and it turned with its own regularity: 
the direction of the post-rotatory illusory movements, Purkyně derived from 
his observations, was determined by the situation and position of the head 
during rotation. “In general, the direction of vertigo is different each time,” 
he noted at the end of the series of tests, “depending on the position of the 
head during the previous rotations; also the direction of the vertigo changes 
when one puts the head in different positions after the rotation. The rule in all 
these phenomena is this: that the average of the head (as a sphere), around 
whose axis the first movement occurred, invariably determines the vertigo at 
each repeated position of the head.”25
 
Purkyně thus described vertigo as a regular phenomenon of sensual perception, 
as “disorientation,” according to Michael Hagner, “which was not chaotic, 
however, but depended on the position of the head in space.”26 This applied 
24 Purkyně, 16–17.
25 Purkyně, 18 (emphasis mine). “Purkyně’s 
law of vertigo” is derived from Vladislav 
Kruta’s biography of Purkyně. See 
Vladislav Kruta, J. E. Purkyne: Physiologist 
J. E. Purkyne: Physiol ogist (Prague: 
Academia Praha, 1969), 26.
26 Hagner, “Psychophysiologie und Selbst-
erfahrung,” 255.
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the objects seem to undulate, as he 
passes, and he frequently becomes sick 
and vertiginous […]. Any other unusual 
movement of our bodies has the same 
effect, as riding backwards in a coach, 
swinging on a rope, turning round swiftly 
on one leg, seating on the ice, and a 
thousand others.” Darwin, Zoonomia, 331.
28 Purkyně, “Beiträge zur näheren Kenntnis 
des Schwindels aus heautognostischen 
Daten,” 18.
29 See Ernst Mach, “Physikalische Versuche 
über den Gleichgewichtssinn des Men-
schen,” in Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften: Dritte 
Abteilung, Sitzung vom 6. November, vol. 68 
(1873), 124–40; and Ernst Mach, Grundlinien 
der Lehre von den Bewegungsempfin­
dungen (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1875), 25. 
See also Rebekka Ladewig, “Apparaturen 
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and involuntary muscle movements, which in the case of visual vertigo led to 
abrupt shifts in the objects of the visual field, manifested itself in tactile vertigo 
in the “involuntary unconscious tendency of the muscles to move in certain 
directions.”35
 
What makes the statements about tactile vertigo even more significant is the 
fact that Purkyně first speculated about the organic causes of vertigo in this 
context.36 Insofar as the direction of tactile vertigo was correlated with the 
respective position of the brain in space, he believed that the specific modifi-
cations of this form of vertigo could be traced back to a “peculiar affliction of 
the brain.”37 From this hypothesis, Purkyně also deduced his later explanation 
for illusory vertigo movements in “ideal space.” He identified their causes as 
lying in an irritation of the brain, or more precisely. In the effect of mechanical 
momentum on the brain mass: “The laws of momentum have an unconditional 
generality in the physical world,” he wrote in his attempt to explain it, thereby 
making Newtonian inertia the natural cause of the sensory event of vertigo.38 
Purkyně also imagined the effect of rotation on the brain in analogy to a con-
tainer filled with liquid that is set in rotation and shifts in its mass proportions 
due to the effects of shear forces. This process disrupted or irritated the im-
pressions of the brain that “in the usual positions and movements of the body” 
are always perceived as the “influence of gravity,” and that thus serve “as 
regulatory of movement and the maintenance of the body’s balance.”39 
movement of the eyeballs,” a “basic phenomenon of vertigo of motion,”30 
which at the same time provided him with an explanation for the illusory 
movements: Purkyně attributed them to a “battle of unconscious, involuntary 
muscular action and more deliberate conscious action in the opposite 
direction.”31 To illustrate, he noted with a view to eye movement: “If  [...] a 
point is fixed on with attention, and one gently presses the eye with a finger 
from any side, the image of the point moves from the place of clear vision 
and goes in the opposite direction; but since attention has not been deliberately 
turned away from the image, it is captured by indirect vision, and because 
attention follows the moving image, its movement is also noticed.”32
 
The external pressure stimulus thus caused the retinal image to shift or jump 
from the central field of vision into the peripheral field of vision, whereby  
attention was focused on the movement of the image. Purkyně thus emphasized 
that attention was an active physiological process and as such also subject  
to the physiological conditions of perception. The theoretical significance of 
attention as a manipulable factor in self-experimental practice is particularly 
evident in the lectures Purkyně later gave, in which he defined it as a “free deter-
mination of the direction of consciousness.” At the same time, the constitutive 
function of attention for the practice of self-observation becomes clear here:
The first moment of awareness of an object in its specifics through deter-
minacy of the direction of consciousness is perception. The ability of 
free directional determination of consciousness is attention. The attention 
is tensed, relaxed, collected, scattered, awakened, withdrawn, sharp-
ened, blunted, etc. All these modifications are modifications of conscious-
ness, are purely formal, the content is not relevant to them. [...] Another 
modification of consciousness is observation. A self-aware conscious 
registering of objective processes, either in the external, natural world 
as an observation of nature, or in our inner being as self-observation; it 
is a more passive state of consciousness, we give ourselves to the object 
in order to receive it as it is without wanting to make something of it.33
It is clear that this economy of attention did not arise in a theoretical vacuum, 
but was empirically grounded, that is, derived from practice and tested and 
exercised in concrete experimental situations. For example, the withdrawal of 
attention mentioned above can be illustrated in the transition from visual ver-
tigo to “tactile vertigo,” as Purkyně’s second basic phenomenon of vertigo 
was described. To obtain observations of tactile vertigo that were “purer and 
clearer,” one simply had to “keep one’s eyes closed,” as Purkyně remarked  
incidentally.34 The phenomena perceived under these conditions were organized 
in exact analogy to the phenomena associated with visual vertigo: resting 
objects also appeared to the sense of touch to have moved as a result of the 
physical rotational movement, the reflexive connection between deliberate 
30 Purkyně stated: “The vertigo is therefore 
based on an oscillation, as one can already 
notice in one’s own eye by touching it 
gently, and on another’s.” Purkyně, “Schwin-
del aus heautognostischen Daten,” 15–37.
31 Purkyně, 23.
32 Purkyně, 23.
33 Purkyně, “Vorlesungen,” 52 (emphasis in 
original). 
34 Purkyně, “Schwindel aus heautognostischen
 Daten,” 23.
35 Purkyně, 25.
36 This is not surprising inasmuch as tactile 
vertigo was considered to be “the most 
important phenomenon of all motion 
vertigo.” The phenomena observed in the 
sense of hearing, in the sense of feeling—
the most subjective of all, as Purkyně 
emphasized—and even in the sense of 
sight are indeed of importance if the 
specific manifestation of vertigo could be 
observed here in their different sensual 
qualities; but—and this particularly applies 
also to the detailed descriptions of the 
visual perceptual phenomena—all these 
senses participate substantially in the views 
of the sense of touch. Purkyně, 28.
37 See Purkyně, 25–27. In fact, the brain 
irritation described here provided a first 
explanation not only of the forms of 
motion vertigo, but also of those types of 
vertigo produced by the “suppression of 
blood circulation” or by “narcotics” or 
“other poisons.” See Purkyně, 30.
38 “Everything material that is caused by a 
constantly newly acting force of move-
ment proceeds with accelerated speed, 
and remains, when the original force has 
ceased, by dint of its passivity (inertia), 
until this is stopped by other opposing 
forces.” Purkyně, 35.
39 Purkyně, 37.
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Torturing (Oneself): Self-Experiments and  
Animal Experiments by Jan Evangelista Purkyně  
and Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens 
Purkyně maintained this explanatory approach to vertigo in his 1827 study “Ueber 
die physiologische Bedeutung des Schwindels und die Beziehung desselben 
zu den neuesten Versuchen über die Hirnfunctionen” (On the physiological 
meaning of vertigo and its relation to the most recent experiments on brain 
function); and, what’s more, he deepened it. In addition to the “effect of con-
tinuous rotational movements on the brain” addressed by the study, Purkyně 
researched the influences of linear, progressive movements,40 the influence 
of galvanism, and the “effect of one-sided accumulations and leakages  
of the blood.” Only on one point, namely, the investigation of the “effect of 
immediate injuries” of the brain, did the new experiments considerably  
differ from previous ones. 
 
In fact, the experimentally produced brain injury had nothing in common with 
an introspection in the sense of the heautognostic experiment—a “healthy 
gazing into oneself’” or a “pure act of looking into the unexplored depths,” as 
Goethe admiringly wrote about Purkyně’s self-experimental practice.41 The 
occasion for this renewed engagement with the phenomenon of vertigo was, 
specifically in view of this deviation, less Purkyně’s own experimental work  
on the sense of sight and hearing, as Czech physiologist Vladimír Haškovec 
suggested,42 but rather the experimental studies that had in the meantime 
been conducted by French neurophysiologist and anatomist Marie-Jean-Pierre 
Flourens in his book Eigenschaften und Verrichtungen des Nervensystems bei 
Thieren (Characteristics and performance of the nervous system in animals).43 
 
Indeed, Flourens’s work was important not only for Purkyně and for the physi-
ology of the sense of balance, but for the early phase of experimental physiol-
ogy as a whole. In his two-volume Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen 
(Handbook of human physiology, 1833–40), Johannes Müller referred to 
Flourens’s work, a number of times,44 and, with reference to his study published 
in 1824, underlined that Flourens was the first to emphasize the “importance  
of the cerebellum for movement and as an organ of balance.”45 In Müller’s  
depiction, the vivisectional orientation of Flourens’s experiments emerges 
particularly strong. Müller wrote that “[Flourens] found that the animals 
showed no sensations when the small brain was removed.”46 And further: 
When he took away the small brain from the birds piece by piece, a 
weakness of the muscle movements and lack of coordination of these 
manifested. After the superficial and middle positions had been re-
moved, the animals became restless without going into convulsions; 
they made violent and irregular movements, but saw and heard. When  
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the last layers were taken away, the animals lost the ability to jump, fly, 
walk, stand, to maintain their balance. When a bird in this condition 
was placed on its back, it could not stand up; it fluttered constantly and 
showed no signs of stupefaction; it saw the trick that one wanted to pull 
and wanted to avoid it. It thus still possessed will, sensation, conscious-
ness; only the strength and ability to connect the movements of the 
muscles in groups to local movements in a purposeful way was lost, and 
its efforts to maintain balance were like those of a drunk man.47
Evident at first sight, this brief description reveals the difference that separated 
Flourens’s experimental approach from that of Purkyně. It marks out Flourens 
and Purkyně as representatives of two opposing trends in the experimentation 
in the early nineteenth century: while Purkyně’s self-experimental practice 
developed from the tradition of Romantic natural philosophy, Flourens’s inves-
tigations took up Albrecht von Haller’s theories of irritability.48 This approach 
manifested itself in particular in surgical interventions performed on living animals: 
“The separation of forces through the separation of organs is in fact the  
purpose of all this work,” Flourens noted in the introduction to his study.49 
Through the layer-by-layer ablation of the cerebellum, which he performed in 
this case on pigeons and frogs,50 Flourens succeeded in distinguishing the  
irritable from the non-irritable regions, and in showing that sentience and abil-
ity to move were independent of one another. The fact that in this and in 
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Schaffens, vol. 12, ed. Karl Richter et al., 
(Munich: Hanser, 1985), 346.
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et la psychiatrie,” in Vladimir Haškovec, In 
memoriam J. Ev Purkyne (Praha, 
Purkynova Spolecnost: 1937), 15.
43 See Marie-Jean-Pierre Flourens, Versuche 
und Untersuchungen über die Eigenschaf ten 
und Verrichtungen des Nervensystems bei 
Thieren mit Rückenwirbeln, trans. G. W. 
Becker (Leipzig: Reinsche Buchhandlung, 
1824).
44 See Peter Schmidt, Zu den geistigen 
Wurzeln von Johannes Müller (1801–1858): 
Eine quantitative Analyse der im Hand­
buch der Physiologie von J. Müller (1840–
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(Münster: Universität Münster, 1972), 50, 213. 
45 See Johannes Müller, Handbuch der 
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vol. 1 (Coblenz: Hölscher, 1837), 824.
46 Müller, 849. Cf. the corresponding passages 
in Flourens, Versuche und Untersuchungen, 
34.
47 Müller, Handbuch der Physiologie, 849.
48 Albrecht von Haller’s Von den empfind li chen 
und reizbaren Teilen des menschlichen 
Körpers (1752) was of decisive importance 
for the physiology of the eighteenth century. 
Here, Haller first made the distinction 
between nerve sensitivity and muscle 
irritability.
49 Flourens, Versuche und Untersuchungen, xix.
50 Depending on his research interest, 
Flourens experimented on different 
animals, including frogs and pigeons 
(Flourens, 28), as well as dogs (12), cats 
(11), and rabbits (13). 
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Flourens’s subsequent studies the complex connections between nervous system 
and motor function were also investigated can be explained by the fact that 
the motoric disorders caused by surgery were observable and therefore easily 
objectifiable phenomena. 
It is evident that Purkyně’s interest was above all in movement disorders. The 
similarity to the familiar phenomena of spatial or tactile vertigo in Flourens 
was too clear for him to have overlooked the connection between these results 
and his own vertigo experiments. Inspired by Flourens’s study, Purkyně repeated 
the experiments described herein and concluded that the “apparently inexpe-
dient movements” that arose as a result of the local injuries to the brain were 
undoubtedly “to be addressed as vertigo, and”—Purkyně jumped here in the same 
sentence back to the level of his self-experiments “emerge from a disturbance 
of spatial perception, whereby the individual becomes confused about the 
position of his own body, and therefore loses equilibrium in it. The subse-
quent movements are nothing more than efforts to regain balance, although 
it is disturbed each time anew by the erroneous view of space.”51
The change of level that took place within this argument, the jump between the 
observation of one’s own life and the life of another—between self-experimentation 
and animal experiment—is symptomatic of this second work on vertigo, which 
was both a justification of the self-experimental method and probably also a 
reflection on its limits—limits Purkyně was nevertheless concerned with defend-
ing. “It would sound like an exaggeration,” he wrote on the first page of his 
study, “that five years ago a lone observer subjected a live brain, and even his 
own brain, albeit not directly wounding it, to related mechanical and dynamic 
influences, which resulted in similar, albeit not as violent, phenomena in the 
systems of movement as the recent experiments of Flourens, with the incom-
parable advantage that he could at the same time account for the changes of 
the inner sense; this, I say, would sound like an exaggeration, and yet it is so.”52
 
Purkyně was obviously aware of the scope of his claims, but also that of his 
self-experiments. He contrasted Flourens’s characterization of the motor-
functional “signs of paralysis” of his experimental animals with the qualitative 
descriptions of the vertigo experience—the “changes in the inner sense“ that 
his self-experiment, unlike Flourens’s animal experiments, allowed him to  
establish. What Flouren’s surgical point of view did not grasp, and could not 
grasp, was the psychophysical unity of vertigo, which Purkyně understood 
with reference to the causal connection between movement disorder and spatial 
disorientation. Thus, with a view to the reluctant tendencies of movement during 
rotational vertigo (the feeling that the body was seeking to move in one di-
rection and the reflex-like balancing movements of the muscle system in the 
opposite direction), he wrote, in clear contrast to Flourens, that it was not 
“merely quantitative affliction of one side and the other [...] as if a paralysis-like 
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51 Purkyně, “Schwindel und neueste 
Versuche über die Hirnfunktionen,” 300. 
52 Purkyně, 285. 
53 Purkyně, 289.
54 In fact, Flourens spoke of “paralysis.” He 
also found a symmetrical correlation 
between the brain injuries and the result ing 
paralysis on the opposite side of the body. 
See Flourens, Versuche und Untersu­
chungen, 37.
55 Purkyně, “Schwindel und neueste 
Versuche über die Hirnfunktionen,” 306. 
56 Purkyně, 309. 
57 Purkyně, 307.
affliction had occurred here and there,” but “on both sides, it is a positive  
expression, only in different directions, whose original determination is to be 
sought out in the centris of the movement organs themselves.”53 To put it an-
other way, while Flourens would have spoken of a “left-sided paralysis” after an 
intervention in the right hemisphere of the cerebellum,54 Purkyně would rec-
ognized a right-rotating vertigo in this observation. Nevertheless, he was anxious 
to present his self-observations as objective scientific knowledge, and he did 
so in connection with the results provided by Flourens. “Finally, the effect of the 
immediate wounding of the brain led us to a complete knowledge of the 
physiological significance of vertigo,”55 Purkyně stated, and if he had already 
anticipated the brain as the central organ of vertigo in 1820, this assumption 
was now confirmed and further specified. The cerebellum was now conceived 
of as operating as a double switching point that, on the one hand, regulated 
the relationships with the muscle system—the observable bodily activities man-
ifested as deliberate motoric movement—and, on the other hand, in its basic, 
organic relationship to the cerebrum through the combination of sensations 
and perceptions produced the views of space.56 Purkyně’s focus on the psy-
chophysical unity thus apparently remained effective at the level of organic 
functional relationships. Having experienced these connections in his own 
body was for him at the same time the essential prerequisite for obtaining a 
“complete knowledge” of vertigo. That Flourens had not thought of recognizing 
the phenomenon of vertigo in the tumbling movements of his experimental 
animals may therefore also be due to the fact that it was not his own senses 
that registered these sensations. Purkyně underlined the importance of self-
experimentation when he wrote: 
The formula by which [Flourens] conceives of the phenomena by attributing 
the ordering activity of movements to the cerebellum is very apt, but too 
general. The fact that he sometimes speaks of an intoxicating state is 
not yet specific enough. His way of removing the cerebellum in layers 
has probably given rise to this indeterminacy by irritating both the middle 
and the two side parts at the same time, thus confusing the determina-
tions for movement left and right and backwards; a composite vertigo 
develops, which, if one has not learned of it earlier from similar experi-
ments as ours, is hardly ever recognized as such by anyone from the irreg-
ular movements of the animal.57
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Although Purkyně had to admit the lasting influence of the operative method, 
sensual personal experience remained decisive for interpreting his observations. 
As Emil Starkenstein emphasized with regard to Purkyně’s self-experiments, 
their “special value [...] was less in the objective assessment of the visible than in 
the subjective perception, especially as far as it refers to the sensory sphere.”58 
In this sense, self-experimentation represents a complement to vivisectional 
animal testing. Starkenstein’s account also shows that Purkyně did not consider 
himself to be a suitable subject for experimentation from the very beginning; 
rather, he made himself “suitable in accordance with the demands that arose, 
through repeated practice.”59 The body was not inherently receptive to recording 
sensory phenomena. It only became so through ongoing practice and the disci-
plining of attention. The extent to which Purkyně knew how to instrumentalize 
his own body for the purpose of self-observation is quite exceptional. While 
many of his self-experimenting contemporaries commonly developed nervous 
or physiological symptoms as consequences of their own bodily experiments,60 
Purkyně brought to his experiments a congenital visual impairment, which he 
cultivated in the course of his optical self-experiments. Thus, as Armin von Tschermak-
Seysenegg pointed out, his left eye “had almost a central blindness,” which 
Purkyně “later used to methodically compare his far-sighted, unaccomodative 
left eye, and his extremely short-sighted, accommodative right eye.”61
 
Goethe’s (if only temporary) enthusiasm for Purkyně’s experimental talent was 
mainly due to this special ability. He immediately recognized the “unheard  
effort and sacrifice” underlying Purkyně’s self-experiments and therefore de-
scribed him as a heauton timorumenos (self-tormentor).62 But Goethe was not 
referring to the excessive quality that characterized the self-experiments of 
the Romantic kind against which Purkyně also distinguished himself at times,63 
but to the form of experimental discipline that he saw at work in Purkyně’s 
case. Goethe thus emphasized the very aspect that Ignaz Döllinger had called 
the methodological imperative of the new “progressive physiology:” the vio-
lent creation of the objects to be observed and their experimental manipulation. 
The program of physiology aimed to examine the body itself and its perfor-
mances, to make it speak, to transform it into a “living dossier.”64
Instrumentalizing Rotation: Swing and Rotating Chairs in 
the Physiological Experimental Setup
“In order to decide these questions, devices are required with which one can 
control the acceleration of locomotion, which can be graduated and calculated, 
and whose movements are gentle and noiseless. [...] One of the most comfort-
able devices is the swing. There are no bumps, no noise; acceleration, which 
can be made appreciably large, and which can be calculated for each mo-
ment according to the formulas for the pendulum.”65
58 Emil Starkenstein, “Die pharma kolo gi schen 
Selbstversuche Purkynes und ihre Beur tei-
lung nach dem heutigen Stande der Wissen-
schaft,” in In Memoriam J. Ev. Purkyne, 57.
59 Starkenstein, 57.
60 These still persisted from the tradition of 
Romantic natural philosophy into the 
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the 1820s. Johannes Müller, one of the 
founding figures of scientific physiology, 
suffered from the subsequent effects of 
his self-experiments. 
61 Von Tschermak-Seysenegg, “Exakter Sub-
jektivismus,” 77–78.
62 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Tag- und 
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Saxony I. Abt.: Goethes Werke, vol. 36 
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um 1820,” in Wechselwirkungen Kunst und 
Wissenschaft in Berlin und Weimar im 
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(Bern: Lang, 2002), 193–209.
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and exaggerated imagination of the 
inexperienced makes of it; on the contrary, 
a multiplicity of specific stimuli, not used 
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smoothens the nervous system and 
simultaneously increases its indepen dence 
and strength with prudent sensitivity.” 
Purkyně, quoted in Starkenstein, “Pharma-
kologische Selbstversuche,” 57. 
64 See Philipp Sarasin and Jakob Tanner, 
eds., “Ein leitung,” in Physiologie und 
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Verwissenschaftlichung des Körpers im 
19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 19.
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66 Delage, 83.
The questions that the French embryologist Yves Delage had in mind in the 
1880s and intended to research using adjustable swinging and rotating appa-
ratuses revolved around the dizzying connection between head position and 
sensory illusion. He stated: “Whether greater accelerations or accelerations 
observed under special conditions can be perceived, to what sensations they 
could give rise, and what illusions the abnormal positions of the head 
produce.”66 
However, in Delage’s remarks, one of the most striking features is the possibility 
not only to precisely regulate, but also to calculate these movements or  
accelerations by means of instrument-based techniques. The historical-
epistemological context in which such exact measurability became possible 
only opened up in the last third of the nineteenth century—at a time when  
the connection between vertigo and balance had been experimentally re-
searched and had given rise to a largely exact physiological explanation with 
the theories of equilibrium presented by Ernst Mach, Josef Breuer, and  
Alexander Crum Brown. An explanation must be added here, which was 
based, among other things, on the use of mechanical turning devices.
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For apart from Breuer, who had derived his explanatory approach from rota-
tional experiments that were limited to the active rotational movement of the 
body, both Crum Brown and Mach integrated self-constructed apparatuses 
into their experimental setups that released the body from its own movement.67 
As indicated above, Mach based his experiments with rotating chairs on 
what Purkyně had described some fifty years earlier as the result of his self-
observations. Mach apparently only took note of Purkyně’s investigations into 
vertigo after he had already fully developed his own theory of balance and 
the sensations of movement. In this respect, he stated: “The experiments have 
already been carried out in part by Purkyně and, if I had known Purkyně’s 
treatise at the very beginning of my work, I could have spared myself some 
effort. But I probably wouldn’t have started many new experiments.”68
 
In fact, the technical-instrumental configuration of vertigo that Mach’s experi-
ments were based and that Delage also planned were already in place in 
Purkyně’s time. References to this remarkably early experimental use of tech-
nical and mechanical arrangements can already be found in Purkyně’s first 
study on vertigo from 1820, in which he cited popular vertigo setups of his time: 
he began his discussion of the forms of “movements in a large circle” by stat-
ing: “I have conducted several modified, often repeated experiments with 
pre cise self-experimentation on the carousel.”69 Here, the carousel became  
an integral part of the experimental design, the object of which was self- 
experimental research into rotational vertigo. As Purkyně observed, the effects 
of horizontal rotation of the body (with the position of the head in the center 
of rotation) were particularly turbulent. “In the beginning one feels light and 
cheerful in the head,” he reported in this context, “then follows cold and pallor 
in the face, and a slight feeling of fainting; the breath is eased, the pulse rate 
becomes slower, soon the feeling of nausea arises in the stomach.”70
Among the mechanical devices that Purkyně was able to operationalize for 
self-experimental purposes was also the “ordinary swing, as it is commonly used 
for popular amusement.”71 The experiments carried out by means of these  
ordinary swings are important, firstly, because Purkyně used the effects of the 
rocking movement to establish a connection to seasickness—and thus to one 
of the initial scenes of the scientific description of vertigo. Moreover, they shed 
light on the physiological cause of vertigo: the effect that the rocking movements 
exerted on the brain. “When swinging, the brain is pushed a little against the 
back part of the skull wall as it moves forward,” Purkyně explained. He continued: 
“When moving backward it is pushed against the front wall, when moving 
side ways against one side or the other, and on each occasion, it suffers a slight 
pressure that may determine the motion force of the brain on one side or the other. 
Seasickness, also, is one of these forms of vertigo, since it is caused by rocking 
movements, only that they are much more intense, and since rocking usually 
is very irregular and persistent, much more confused and persistent.”72
As in the case of circular movements, Purkyně observed a slow transition 
from a consistently positive, pleasurable to an increasingly unpleasant spec-
trum of sensations: at the beginning he felt “cheerfulness of the senses”  
and “eased breathing,” a “pleasant feeling in the middle flesh and in the un-
derbelly.” However, as the movement continued, “the feeling rose out of the 
underbelly toward the stomach and turns into nausea,” and “gradually the 
head is also taken over by the same feeling that accompanies the nausea in 
general.”73 The following passage shows how unpleasant the child’s initial joy 
of swinging can become in an experimental context: “When I stopped swinging, 
I couldn’t perceive any visual vertigo, but the nausea increased. I wanted 
to keep on rocking until the feeling of nausea turned into vomiting; but I had 
no disposition, and it did not materialize, even after an hour and a half of 
rocking, although the nausea and the head affliction became more and more 
unbearable.”74 
This experimental scene obviously has nothing to do with flights of fancy of 
the senses and pleasure anymore. Instead, Purkyně draws a clear picture of 
the “unheard-of effort and sacrifice” described above, which Goethe saw at 
work in these self-experiments and which may have induced him to describe 
the self-experimenter whom he so admired as a “self-tormenter.”
67 Mach’s rotating chair is particularly well 
known in this context. See Mach, 
Grundlinien, 24; and Nicholas Wade and 
Benjamin W. Tatler, The Moving Tablet of 
the Eye: The Origins of Modern Eye 
Movement Research (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 102.
68 Mach, 24.




72 Purkyně, “Schwindel und neueste Versuche 
über Hirnfunctionen,” 292.
73 Purkyně, 292.
74 Purkyně, “Schwindel aus heautognostischen
Daten,” 20.
Fig. 48 
Georg Emanuel Opitz, Swings 
in the Viennese Prater, 1805
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A scenario that can literally be described as torture from today’s perspective 
also provides a perspective on another field that Purkyně opened up a few 
years later in the course of his self-experimental practice. Evidence of this can 
be found exclusively in a short bulletin from 1925, which Hermann Aubert  
included and reprinted in his 1888 study “Physiologische Studien zur Orientierung” 
(Physiological studies on orientation).75 Regarding the connection between 
eye movements and the illusory movement of external objects it is said:
2) If the eye is moved quickly over the mass so that the consciousness 
cannot follow the movement, the compensation balance between sub-
jective movement and the location-determining activity of the sense of 
space cannot take place completely, and the illusory movement is then 
transferred into the objective. 3) This happens even more when the  
eye ends in a deliberate movement, as for example in vertigo, where the 
whole muscle system and with it also the muscular apparatus of the  
eye is engaged in abnormal activity. [Purkyně] has not only become con-
vinced through self-observation, but also through the madmen who  
have been turned in a rotating chair, that the eyes are taken by the fastest 
convulsive movement. Here, too, the general rule applies that the un-
conscious subjective movement transfers to the object, which is the reason 
for the illusory movement.76
This passage from the Mitteilungen is remarkable in two respects. First, it 
shows that Purkyně tried to explain the question of the distinction between his 
own body and the surrounding space as early as 1825 on the basis of an inde-
pendent sense organ, namely, the “sense of space” postulated here. What is 
decisive, however, is the remark mentioned under point three in which Purkyně 
states that he did not come to this explanatory approach solely on the basis 
of self-experimentation, but also made his observation in a psychiatric con-
text, so to speak with a “test person.” When the anonymous author of the Mit-
teilungen here speaks of a “mad man” who was apparently treated in a rotating 
chair, he was referring to a psychiatric “treatment method” that was quite 
common in the early 1820s. Purkyně had convinced himself of their effective-
ness at the Charité in Berlin, a university hospital, after taking note of the  
report by the psychiatrist Ernst Horn, who propagated the rotating chair method 
as part of his reform of psychiatric approaches.77 
The rotating chair and the revolving bed, which Michel Foucault also mentions 
in his History of Madness (1961) and whose earliest form can be traced back 
to the construction drawing of a so-called rotative couch in the Zoonomia 
(1794) by Erasmus Darwin,78 were recommended by Horn as “indirect psycho-
logical remedies” for a whole series of “mental ailments:” seizures of raving 
madness would be limited or shortened by it; periodically recurring manias 
would be successfully interrupted; those who were seriously depressed, stub-
born, or disobedient would be drilled to order and obedience; “suicidal luna-
tics” would be “positively shaken up and persuaded,” while the quiet and pas-
sive sick would be awoken.79
75 See Purkyně, “Mittheilungen über Schein-
bewegungen und über den Schwindel aus 
den Bulletins der Schlesischen Gesell schaft 
von 1825 und 1826” (Viertes Bulletin der 
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für vaterländischen Kultur im Jahre 1925),” 
in Aubert, Physiologische Studien über  
die Orientierung, 118–22.
76 Purkyně, in Aubert, 116–17.
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work, Vladislav Kruta cited the same 
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resschrift (1818): 219–31. See also Kruta,  
J. E. Purkyne: Physiologist, 42. 
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Gesellschaft: Eine Geschichte des Wahns 
im Zeitalter der Vernunft (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 325. Foucault 
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Joseph M. Cox. See Joseph M. Cox, Practical 
Observations on Insanity (London: 1804), 
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“Cox’s Chair: ‘A Moral and Medical Mean in 
the Treatment of Madness’,” History of 
Psychology 16, no. 1 (2005): 73–88; and 
Ladewig, “Epistemo logie der Orientierung,” 
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see Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or, The 
Laws of Organic Life, 3rd ed. (London: J. 
Johnson, 1801), 437. Darwin proposed the 
“movable rotative couch,” which he had 
illustrated with a design drawing of his 
friend James Watt, for the treatment of 
fever. See Ladewig, “Apparaturen des 
Schwindels,” 265.
79 Ernst Horn, “Beschreibung der in der Irren-
an stalt des Königlichen Chariték ran ken hau-
ses zu Berlin gebräuchlichen Dreh maschinen, 
ihrer Wirkung und Anwendung bei Geistes-
kranken,” Zeitschrift für psychi sche Aerzte, 
2. Vierteljahresheft, Leipzig (1818): 223–24.
Figs. 49–50 
Rotational bed and rotational chair,  
in use at Charité Berlin, 1818
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Purkyně also experienced and tested the violent effect of the psychiatric ro-
tating chair on his own body, as the Mitteilung revealed:
The vertigo once present in the spatial perception can thus assume a 
variable direction if the head is quickly moved into different positions 
during the horizontal rotations of the body. One can easily convince 
oneself of this, albeit in a somewhat horrible way, if one turns around in 
a rotating chair, as is used to tame the mad, without the head and neck 
being fixed in their vertical position. At first, the head holds itself upright 
and horizontal vertigo sets in; however, gradually, by the force of the 
machine, with reduced contemplation, a funnel-shaped swaying occurs, 
so that the head alternately falls backward and downward against one 
and the other shoulder. It is not described what confusion comes into 
view in this way, in that the entire outer space seems to take on a different 
direction of movement at any moment.80
In place of the carousel and swing, which were integral parts of popular 
amusement around 1800 and were used by Purkyně to induce vertigo, the 
emergence of the psychiatric rotating chair gave experimenters an apparatus 
whose rotational forces exerted an incomparably stronger effect on the sen-
sory and motor system. 
 
If this experimental scene primarily confirmed the previously postulated 
physiological regularity of vertigo with regard to the visual process of percep-
tion or its complete dissolution into aperspectivity, it also provided informa-
tion about the effect of rotation on the constitution of the brain. Purkyně noted 
that: 
a soft, delicate, coherent mass [such as the brain] if it is moved continu-
ously outwards in one direction, or in circles, or around its diameter in dif-
ferent circles (progressive or rotational movements), according to the laws 
of gravity and inertia, partly in its inner substance, partly in the distortions 
in its connecting parts, and through the walls of the vessel surrounding it, to 
which it is pressed by movements, must suffer unilateral pressures. [...] 
There can be no doubt that it must suffer due to violent or straight 
twisting movements, inner, however inconspicuous distortions, which 
can be thought to be increased to the highest degree, which in such a 
living substance will not be without influence on all life phenomena, and 
in general must be similar to those reactions which otherwise have me-
chanical effects on the brain.81
Purkyně’s description from the field of physiological experimental practice 
can thus also be read as a contribution to understanding the effects and side 
effects of rotating chair treatments, the discussion of which constituted a 
blind spot in psychiatric practice. The latter, on the other hand, provided the 
technical equipment with which the phenomena of rotational vertigo could 
be studied and precisely tested in their full spectrum and under ideal conditions. 
Against this backdrop, which brings together vertigo arrangements from the 
field of bourgeois amusement, the carousels and ship swings of the funfairs, 
as well as the rotating chairs and beds used in psychiatric practice as integral 
components of physiological experimental culture around 1820, it can be 
stated with a view to the apparatuses designed by Delage in 1888 that these 
do not “merely come out of the blue; are not suddenly invented,” as Sven Dierig 
emphasized in his study “Physiologie und Psychologie im Kontext: Labor, Stadt, 
Technik” (Physiology in context: Laboratory, city, technology).82 Instead, the 
80 Purkyně, “Schwindel und neueste 
Versuche über die Hirnfunktionen,” 292.
81 Purkyně, 288.
82 Sven Dierig, “Physiologie und Psychologie 
im Kontext: Labor, Stadt, Technik,” MPI 
Preprint 120 (1999): 25. 
Fig. 51 
James Watt, Movable Rotative Couch, 
construction drawing, 1801
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experimental arrangements used to generate knowledge represent the “result 
of a constructive process of adaptation, imitation, reassembly, and repurpos-
ing of objects and practices from other areas of knowledge.”83 The mechanical 
devices used in the psychiatric and bourgeois-popular practices of vertigo 
were particularly suitable for these translations and migrations into the physio-
logical experimental setups of the early nineteenth century. They thus became 
an integral part of an experimental design that—in line with the research in-
terest—had refined, modified, and reconfigured research on the sensory 
physiology of the sense of balance by the end of the century.
83 Dierig, “Physiologie im Kontext,” 25.
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Creativity researcher Mathias Benedek is a senior scientist at the Institute of 
Psychology at Karl-Franzens-University, Graz. He investigates the cognitive 
and neural basis of creative thought and explores predispositions that are 
fundamental for creativity.
For the project “Dizziness—A Resource,” Ruth Anderwald and Leonhard Grond 
discussed with Mathias Benedek and his team, Emanuel Jauk, and Kevin  
Kerschenbaumer the notion of Taumel (dizziness) in relation to creativity. In 
2015 the artists and scientists designed a survey, which was tied to an art 
competition, and the winning artwork would be included in the exhibition on 
Taumel at Kunsthaus Graz. The goal of the study was to learn more about  
the specifics of the artistic work process, to identify indicators of dizziness that 
occur during the creation of art, and to examine the relevance of dizziness 
for the creative process. In 2017 the findings of this transdisciplinary endeavor 
were presented in an article published in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, 
and the Arts, and were discussed in the wider context of the artistic research 
project in an article published in Emotion, Space and Society. In the following 
conversation, the creativity researcher and the artists reflect on their trans-
disciplinary cooperation, as such cocreation situates the inquirers in an ecology 
of ideas, languages, and open questions.
Resources and Circumstances of Creativity
Ruth Anderwald and Leonhard Grond (RA + LG): Creativity is an umbrella term 
describing creative behavior and creative thinking and its patterns, as well 
as the outcome, the creative work. In your work you are searching for the 
neurophysiological development of the new idea, the new thought. The creation 
of the new is associated with creative ability. In a recent study, you were 
able to depict and describe the differences in ideation by comparing the 
networking process of a highly creative person’s brain with that of a person who 
is less creative. What is creativity from your point of view? How is creativity 
defined in the context of your research field? 
 
Mathias Benedek (MB): Creativity has many meanings in everyday language. 
In the context of psychological research, an idea or product is consid-
ered creative when it is both novel/original and meaningful/effective.1 
Creative ability refers to the potential or predisposition to come up  
with creative ideas, whereas creative achievement refers to accomplished 
Dizziness, 
Creativity, and 
the Artist at Work
Ruth Anderwald, Mathias Benedek, and Leonhard Grond
1 See Mark A. Runco and Garrett J. Jaeger, 
“The Standard Definition of Creativity,” 
Creativity Research Journal 24 (2012): 
92–96.
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practices, we recognize that creativity needs resources, at least energy and 
a “room of one’s own and money,” as Virginia Woolf so famously put it.6  
Researcher of giftedness James Webb speaks of “gifted behavior” to describe 
a potential for giftedness that can only be realized in an enabling environ-
ment.7 Does this translate to creativity? From your point of view, can we always 
be creative, no matter what the circumstances and resources?
MB: The creative process is highly unpredictable in the short term. We 
cannot know in advance, what the outcome will be, or when exactly (or 
whether at all) it will bear fruits. It is more like a stochastic process that 
can be predicted on average, but not in the single case.8 This unpredict-
ability represents a risk and challenge not only to the investors in art, 
but especially to the artists themselves. Who is willing and able to endure 
the unpredictability of the creative process, particularly when it is paired 
with substantial structural imponderables such as income insecurity?9  
In the realm of science, I could not image scientists working effectively 
without proper remuneration that is independent of the outcome of their 
research. And similar to artists, many scientists often do not require 
much more than a room and money, which are typically provided by the 
universities.
 
A recent large-scale survey explored the life and working conditions  
of the roughly fifty thousand professional artists in Australia. Eighty-one 
percent of artists work as freelance or self-employed workers in their 
principal artistic occupation, a rate that has continuously increased over 
time. Asked for the single most important factor restricting artists’  
professional development throughout their careers and the most common 
reasons are the lack of financial return from creative practice (29 percent) 
and lack of time to do creative work due to other pressures or responsi-
bilities, such as the necessity to take on other paid work (19 percent). 
creative work. Creativity research differentiates between little-c, Pro-c, 
and Big-C creativity.2 Little-c creativity denotes everyday creative behaviors 
that people engage in their leisure time. Pro-c creativity reflects creative 
accomplishments by professionals who draw on extensive domain-specific 
training or experience. Finally, Big-C creativity denotes the realm of  
eminent creative genius. These basic definitions already illustrate the 
very different possible perspectives on creativity.
While research has historically been very interested in biographical analyses 
of eminent genius, recent empirical research mainly focuses on the  
investigation of little-c and Pro-c creativity. For example, in our research 
we explore the attentional and memory processes involved in the genera-
tion of creative ideas. Moreover, we study the brain processes during 
creative idea generation by means of electroencephalography (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). These investigations help 
us to understand the neural basis of creative thought and to gain a better 
understanding of the brain in general. The findings of recent research 
challenge basic myths of creativity, such as the belief that creativity resides 
in the right hemisphere or that creative accomplishments are the sole 
result of either ingenuity or serendipity. It is also implausible to localize 
a single brain region responsible for creative thought. Rather, research 
suggests that creativity is related to characteristic patterns of brain con-
nectivity, that is, increased coupling between regions in the default 
mode network and executive control networks.3 Moreover, the generation 
of a creative idea is associated with states of internally directed attention, 
which is reflected in EEG alpha activity and assumed to shield imaginative 
processes from sensory distraction.4
RA + LG: Today the word “creative” seems omnipresent, and we even see the 
notion of creativity being promoted as the panacea to all ills and problems, 
political, societal, financial, or other. In our art education in the late ’90s, the 
word “creative” was rarely used and to some extent pejorative, as it was  
understood to be more akin with mastering skills of arts and crafts in contrast 
to the more intellectual or intuitional process of making fine art that was  
associated with questioning, learning, and transforming knowledge into an 
artwork. It seemed that ideas of creativity and giftedness had been removed 
from the identity of the artist and the artistic work process, as pertaining to 
the somewhat outdated version of the “lone genius artist.” Moreover, the 
idea of giftedness seemingly resounded with the Nazi ideology of the superior 
race, from which artists clearly wanted to distance themselves.5 Today the 
term “creative” has become increasingly popular as it is seen as a desirable 
personality trait, and not only in German-speaking countries. Even more, 
creativity is associated with an almost alchemistic potential—the possibility 
of making a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. However, in our daily artistic  
2 See James C. Kaufman and Ronald A. 
Beghetto, “Beyond Big and Little: The Four 
C Model of Creativity,” Review of General 
Psychology 13 (2009): 1–12.
3 R. E. Beaty et al., “Creative Cognition and 
Brain Network Dynamics,” Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 20 (2016): 87–95.
4 Mathias Benedek, “Internally Directed 
Attention in Creative Cognition,” in The 
Cambridge Handbook of the Neuroscience 
of Creativity, ed. Rex E. Jung and Oshin 
Vartanian (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 180–94.
5 The National Socialist race policies 
in cluded attempts to breed giftedness. 
Due to this instrumentalization, the word 
“giftedness” has a negative connotation in 
Austria and Germany until today, contrary 
to creativity.
6 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own 
(London: Penguin Books, 2004), 128.
7 James T. Webb, A Parent’s Guide to Gifted 
Children (Tucson: Great Potential Press, 
2007), 120.
8 D. K. Simonton, “Creativity and Discovery 
as Blind Variation: Campbell’s (1960) BVSR 
Model after the Half-Century Mark,” Review 
of General Psychology 15 (2011): 158–74.
9 See Frank Berzbach, Kreativität aushalten. 
Psychologie für Designer (Mainz: Verlag 
Hermann Schmidt, 2010).
178 179
answer. Divergent thinking tasks are often used as test of creative cognitive 
potential, whereas convergent thinking tasks are typically found in intelligence 
tests. For an artistic work there obviously is no single correct solution or 
possibility, and thus the working process crucially relies on divergent 
thinking. Dual process models of creativity, however, acknowledge that 
in complex creative work, divergent thinking will alternate with phases of 
convergent thinking. The latter is needed to screen out less relevant at-
tempts to find a solution and focuses on more promising options before 
reengaging in divergent production.14
RA + LG: The survey “Living in a Dizzying World” comprises many questions 
related to different interests. As mentioned before, we tested divergent-
thinking abilities, but also personality traits, and we asked the participants 
to disclose their emotions when creating their artworks. In a second step,  
the jury,15 which ranked the artworks and chose one work for the inclusion to 
On the other hand, the factors perceived as most important to advance 
artists’ professional development were hard work and persistence  
(23 percent), and passion (21 percent).10 Similar findings were obtained 
in a survey on the social situation of artists in Austria, which showed 
that and artist’s quality of life is most strongly affected by worries about 
social security and income.11 Again, these problems seem closely related 
to the precarious job situation, which is equally prevalent in the Austrian 
arts sector.12 Together, these findings highlight that creativity not only 
depends on having creative ideas, but also faces critical external barriers 
such as economic and time constraints. 
Taumel and Creativity
RA + LG: When we started to design our project “Dizziness—A Resource,” we 
understood that we needed to learn more about the creative process. However 
in comparison to scientific research, artistic work is mostly connoted with  
intuition and spontaneity, which both occur in many artists’ work processes. 
But we realized in our own working process that an optimal artistic outcome 
was more affective when intuition was combined with a deliberative, rational 
mode of working. With this experience, the need to exchange and cooperate 
with creativity research became apparent, to reach a better understanding of 
creativity, its resources, and the needs of the artistic working process. We 
specifically initiated our cooperation to inquire about possible positive or 
productive sides of Taumel (dizziness, uncertainty) that we associate with 
our own creative practice. In psychology, dizzy and uncertain states are hardly 
seen as positive, as these are states of mind one would rather like to avoid. 
However, this moving into uncertainty demands the invention of a mode of 
thinking and behaving that may be novel or unknown to the individual. From 
this perspective, Taumel enables and embraces creativity in the sense of 
creative behavior. Therefore, in the process of finding a common understand-
ing we identified Taumel with divergent thinking and later included divergent-
thinking tests into our survey, “Living in a Dizzying World.” 
Could you explain in a few words what divergent thinking is and how it relates 
to artistic work process?
MB: The concept of divergent thinking goes back to J. P. Guilford, who 
aimed to map all human cognitive capacities in his structure-of-intellect 
model. His model includes the operation of divergent thinking in which 
we think “in different directions, sometimes searching, sometimes seeking 
variety.”13 Divergent thinking is required for problems that have no single 
solution, but rather many different ones that vary in quality. It is in opposition 
to convergent thinking, which leads to a recognizable best or conventional 
10 David Throsby and Katya Petetskaya, 
“Making Art Work: An Economic Study of 
Professional Artists in Australia,” Australia 
Council for the Arts, November 12, 2017, 
http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au 
/research/making-art-work/.
11 Susanne Schelepa, Petra Wetzel, and Gerhard 
Wohlfahrt, Zur sozialen Lage der Künstler 
und Künstlerinnen in Österreich (Vienna: 




12 Clemens Christl and Markus Griesser, Unselb­
stständig: Selbstständig: Erwerblos (Vienna: 
Kulturrat Österreich, 2017), http://kulturrat 
.at/agenda/sozialerechte/studie2017. 
13 J. P. Guilford, “Three Faces of Intellect,” 
American Psychologist 14 (1959): 469–79.
14 Mathias Benedek and Emanuel Jauk, 
“Spontaneous and Controlled Processes 
in Creative Cognition,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Spontaneous Thought: Mind­
Wandering, Creativity, Dreaming, and 
Clinical Conditions, ed. Kalina Christoff 
and Kieran C. R. Fox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018): 3, doi: 10.1093 
/oxfordhb/9780190464745.013.22.
15 Members of the jury were Katrin Bucher 
Trantow, chief curator at Kunsthaus Graz 
and cocurator of “Dizziness. Navigating 
the Unknown,” artist Anna Jermolaewa, 
and Sergio Edelsztein, director of the 
Center for Contemporary Art, Tel Aviv.
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the exhibition, was asked to disclose its decision-making process so we 
could learn more about the factors that may predict the success of an artwork. 
Could you summarize the settings of our study on artistic work processes, 
and the specific challenges it entailed from your side?
MB: In this study, we set out to analyze the creative process when making 
artistic work with a focus on the role of dizziness. A first challenge  
represented the definition and operationalization of dizziness in the context 
of psychology. We concluded that dizziness is conceived as creating 
feelings of uncertainty that might be characterized by marked variability 
of subjective progress over time. Another major challenge was to devise  
a valid examination of the creative process that meets the requirements 
of empirical research. Empirical research aims for controlled observation 
conditions in order to be able to discover general mechanisms that apply 
independent of contextual factors. However, we could not simply ask 
artists to perform a predefined task in our lab, as this would have little to 
do with their actual artistic practice. Therefore, together we decided to 
launch an open international art competition at the Kunsthaus Graz, invit-
ing artists to create a time-based visual artwork of less than ten minutes 
on the topic “living in a dizzying world.” During the two-week working period, 
the artists answered twenty brief questions each day on their process 
via online assessment (e.g., experience sampling software installed on 
their mobile phone). As you mentioned, artists also completed an online 
survey consisting of established tests of personality structure and creative 
potential. This procedure allows for an observation of the creative process 
in a largely standardized setting, while keeping interference with individual 
work to a minimum. The resulting study was one of a kind because it  
examined the creative process in a large Pro-c sample with sound empir-
ical methods. The study was made possible by the joining of forces  
between artists and psychologists and because of the support from rele-
vant art and science institutions.
RA + LG: Philosophers like Maurice Merleau-Ponty or Gilles Deleuze have ob-
served and theorized the artistic work process from a phenomenological  
and philosophical points of view.16 However, the understanding of the specifics 
of the artistic work process is incomplete. Our survey was an attempt to 
come to a more profound and holistic understanding of dizziness with regard 
to the artistic process. Moreover, as artists we intended to gain a better  
understanding of the process artists undergo: the emotions, needs, and condi-
tions that come with it, and what kind of support is relevant and helpful. 
The expectation was that the outcome of the study would place emphasis on 
the potential of building a better environment for the needs of the artistic 
community. One of the participants noted that she felt “comforted by the 
idea that other artists were reflecting on their process at the same time […]. 
16 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and 
Non­sense (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964); and Gilles Deleuze, 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2003).
17 Quoted in Mathias Benedek et al., “Creating 
Art: An Experience Sampling Study in the 
Domain of Moving Image Art,” Psychology 
of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts 11 





18 Mason Currey, Daily Rituals: How Artists 
Work (New York: Random House, 2013).
19 Ut Na Sio and Thomas C. Ormerod, “Does 
Incubation Enhance Problem Solving? A 
Meta-analytic Review,” Psychological 
Bulletin 135 (2009): 94–120.
20 G. J. Feist, “A Meta-analysis of Personality 
in Scientific and Artistic Creativity,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 2 
(1998): 290–309.
21 M. G. Grohman et al., “The Role of Passion 
and Persistence in Creativity,” Psychology 
of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts 11 
(2017): 376–85.
22 Matthijs Baas, Carsten K. W. De Dreu, and 
Bernard A. Nijstad, “A Meta-analysis of 25 
Years of Mood-Creativity Research: Hedonic 
Tone, Activation, or Regulatory Focus?,” 
Psychological Bulletin 134 (2008): 779-806.
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It made [her] realize that the challenge of art making is not unique—it is difficult 
for all [artists] and can lead to different emotional states, etc.”17 She felt 
supported because she became increasingly conscious of not being the only 
one undergoing this process. As part of our study, “Living in Dizzying World,” 
we inquired about work-related behaviors and feelings in relation to the artistic 
work processes. What behavior or emotion can be a resource for creativity? 
And do artists differ from nonprofessionals?
 
MB: Creativity can be a very idiosyncratic process. Yet, research has re-
vealed a number of behaviors and traits that appear to represent influential 
resources for creativity. First of all, complex creative work seems to 
benefit from the interplay between goal-directed and spontaneous pro-
cesses. Evidence of this is seen in the daily rituals of eminent creative 
figures, who ensured that their days included focused work but also 
work breaks.18 This notion is further supported by empirical research 
showing that breaks can serve as incubation periods that mitigate men-
tal fixation effects and give room to unconscious problem solving.19 At 
the personality level, creativity is consistently related to people who are 
open to new experiences.20 The individual disposition to regularly step 
out of one’s comfort zone can foster mental flexibility and provide a source 
of inspiration. Another relevant trait is perseverance, which is the ability 
to stick to one’s goals despite setbacks.21 This characteristic that is likely 
relevant to achievements in all domains but may particularly discriminate 
between artists and nonprofessionals. Finally, research links creativity 
to positive affective states.22 Many studies in nonprofessionals and  
professionals find that creativity is higher on active and happy days. To 
be sure, there are two possible routes of causality: positive emotions 
may drive creativity, and creativity can also drive positive emotions. Yet, 
these findings clearly challenge the popular belief that real creativity 
needs to be born from states of torment.
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RA + LG: Personality traits of high openness, and the connection of positive 
emotions to the creative process may also challenge the idea that dizziness, 
here defined as uncertainty, is a solely negative experience in the creative 
process. Going toward an uncertain outcome may be frightening as much as 
exciting and invigorating, depending on a person’s perspective and person-
ality. In relation to personality, the divergent-thinking test in our study was not 
that well received because some artists refused to complete it. In our article, 
we stated: “It is interesting to note that divergent thinking ability (creativity 
and fluency) was also negatively correlated with jury evaluation of artworks. 
The negative correlation between divergent thinking fluency and creative 
top achievement may indicate that highly achieved artists cared less to respond 
and hence did not score well in this task.”23 However, research implies that 
“improvisation performance is related to divergent thinking ability and working 
memory capacity.”24 Given the possibility to do another survey, would it be 
important to gain insight into the divergent thinking ability of (visual) artists 
and what could be learned from it? 
MB: Divergent thinking tasks are a highly common approach in the psy-
chometric assessment of creative cognitive potential in little-c populations 
(i.e., nonprofessionals). In the so-called alternate uses task, participants 
are asked to find creative uses of everyday objects, such as a car tire. All 
ideas given within three minutes are scored for fluency (i.e., the number 
of ideas) and creativity (i.e., the rated creative quality of ideas). These tasks 
are largely domain-general, that is, they do not rely on domain-specific 
expertise and are known to predict creative accomplishments to a mod-
erate extent in little-c populations. Therefore, we were curious whether 
divergent-thinking ability is also relevant creative professionals (i.e., Pro-c 
populations). However, the employed divergent-thinking tasks in our 
study were not well received by professional visual artists: especially, 
more accomplished artists provided very few responses, which precluded 
a proper scoring. We are aware that artists often oppose the idea that 
creativity can or should be measured. Moreover, if the artists got the im-
pression that divergent-thinking tasks aimed to assess their artistic creativity, 
they could easily get offended by the simplistic nature of the tasks, and 
with very good reason. As mentioned before, divergent-thinking tasks do 
not attempt to measure artistic creativity in any way but to measure, rather, 
a basic predisposition of mental flexibility. We presumed that visual artists 
would generally score high on these tasks compared to the general pop-
ulation; low mental flexibility may not be helpful in artistic work, while, to 
be sure, high mental flexibility does necessarily make a good artist. To date, 
we cannot tell whether divergent-thinking tasks are useful measures in the 
context professional creativity. Maybe professionals approach these tasks 
in completely different ways, which impede straightforward comparison 
of task performance across different levels of creative achievement.
RA + LG: The study focused on the individual’s creative process. Surprising 
to us was to learn that an artwork’s quality (indicted by the jury’s evaluation 
of the work) was decided on by the artist’s former achievements and the 
personality trait of lower agreeableness. On the one hand, it seems that per-
sonality traits play a germane part in the creative process; on the other, 
previous high achievements may predict future accomplishments. From our 
own experience as artists, when one starts to work on a new piece of work, 
he or she is confronted with the metaphorical white page, a blank sheet that 
“evokes a zero degree of the creative imagination.”25 To describe the ensuing 
feelings of uncertainty and ambiguity involved in a creative process and in 
categorizing its (uncertain) outcome the English poet John Keats coined the 
term “negative capability.”26 How does creativity research relate to the un-
certainty of the creative process? Here, we refer to previous studies that “found 
that artworks, which are ultimately judged higher in quality, showed a more 
jagged gradient of quality over time. This suggests that more creative work 
evolves in a less linear, predictive way because it may involve more radical 
and risky revisions rather than small incremental changes.”27 
MB: Creating art can be considered an uncertain and risky process. Kozbelt 
and colleagues examined the quality of emerging artworks over time.28 
In one study, nonartists and art students judged the twenty-two in-progress 
states of Henri Matisse’s great 1935 painting Large Reclining Nude.29  
The different stages varied considerably in their appeal to the beholders. 
Interestingly, “non-artists judged the painting as getting generally worse 
over time, consistent with the increasing abstraction of the image. In 
contrast, art students’ judgments showed a jagged trajectory with several 
peaks (including the finished version), suggesting an interactive hypothesis-
testing process that gradually transformed the image.” These temporal 
dynamics appear to reflect a nonlinear form of progress rather than a 
linear advancement toward a clear goal. 
23 Benedek et al., “Creating Art,” 330.
24 Beaty et al., “Role of Domain-General 
Cognitive and Creative Abilities in Jazz 
Improvisation,” 262.
25 Davide Deriu, “Carte Blanche,” in Forty 
Ways to Think about Architecture: 
Architectural History and Theory Today, 
ed. Iain Borden, Murray Fraser, Barbara 
Penner (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
2014), 78.
26 Horace Elisha Scudder, ed., The Complete 
Poetical Works of John Keats (Boston: 
Riverside Press, 1899).
27 Benedek et al., “Creating Art.” See also 
Aaron Kozbelt, “Dynamic Evaluation of 
Matisse’s 1935 ‘Large Reclining Nude,’” 
Empirical Studies of the Arts 24 (2006): 
119–37.
28 Aaron Kozbelt and Joanna Serafin, 
“Dynamic Evaluation of High- and Low 
Creativity Drawings by Artist and Non-
artist Raters,” Creativity Research Journal 
21 (2009): 349–60.
29 Kozbelt, “Dynamic Evaluation of Matisse’s 
1935 ‘Large Reclining Nude,’” 119.
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In our study, we made similar observations when looking at the development 
of the artwork from the perspective of the artist. While artworks generally 
advanced over time, each process took a different and often nonlinear 
course. It requires substantial self-confidence, independence, and perse-
verance to believe that the journey will come to a fruitful end within reason-
able time.30
Go Together, Go Far?
RA + LG: Having focused on the creative process of the individual, it is note-
worthy that the winning artwork of the competition was created by an artist 
duo. We also have been working as a duo since 1999. Nowadays, we can see an 
increase of artists working in duos, groups, and of temporal co-operations of 
otherwise individually working artists (e.g., Jonathan Monk and Ariel Schlesinger, 
who contributed to the exhibitions on dizziness in Graz and Warsaw). Could 
you provide an overview on how cocreation work processes are different 
from individual processes? What resources does a prolific co-creative work 
process need, and what risks are involved?
MB: There is not much empirical research on the role of cocreation in 
art. From research on creative group processes, we know that they in-
volve process gains and losses.31 On a cognitive level, the direct ex-
change of ideas can be stimulating and engaging, but listening to others 
can also induce cognitive interference, making it hard to follow one’s 
own train of thought. On a social/motivational level, interaction typically 
results in social facilitation processes that increase motivation and per-
sistence, but it may also induce evaluation apprehension and pressure 
for conformity. Studies suggest that process losses are attenuated when 
interaction occurs in asynchronous ways rather than face-to-face. More-
over, cocreation may benefit from heterogeneous, complementary part-
ners. Finally, for practical reasons, cocreation may work better in some 
art domains compared to others (e.g., music versus literature). Taken to-
gether, it will clearly depend on the specific constellation of individuals 
to what extent they achieve to harness process gains at little costs of 
process losses.
RA + LG: To conclude, our cooperation revealed that dizziness may be a fac-
tor in artistic work processes, but the experience of dizziness in the creative 
process is tied to personal experience and personality traits.32 Sharing dizzi-
ness, as much as sharing creativity is an even more complex and yet under-
researched topic. 
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Identity would seem to be the garment with which one covers the naked-
ness of the self, in which case, it is best that the garment be loose, a little 
like the robes of the desert, through which one’s nakedness can always 
be felt, and, sometimes, discerned. This trust in one’s nakedness is all that 






Autumn. Japan. Naoshima Island. Chichu Art Museum. I approach a hall, hidden 
behind a cold cement wall. Before arriving at the entrance, I am greeted by a 
young lady, who is so gentle she is almost transparent, dressed in gray, against 
a colds cement background. She hands me a leaflet with written instructions 
and explains the process to follow: go in, keep quiet and follow instructions. 
My mind tries to calculate what to expect. 
My body starts feeling the cold temperature of the room. 
She asks me to remove my shoes. 
I follow. 
She instructs me to go into the adjacent room and receive further 
instructions. 
I make five steps inside. 
The temperature is even lower now, the room is filled with ambient light and 
all I see is another instructor, a podium with seven black stairs connected to 
a white wall, and a blue square on a wall extending above the stairs. The  
instructor signals to me that I should approach her. Reluctantly and with little 
understanding of what all the fuss is about, I approach her. She asks if I have 
read the instructions that I must listen carefully to her instructions. I nod. 
“Please go up,” she says. I place my foot on a step and try to understand why I 
need to approach a wall via stairs when I can see it perfectly well from where 
I am—it must be a perspective thing—I try to rationalize. 
“Please continue,” she repeats. 
I go two steps further. 
I still see the same wall. 
“Please continue,” she urges me now in an assertive tone. 
Puzzled, I look back at her. 
The Many Facets 
of Creative
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an almost limitless creation of new possibilities, of erasing boundaries and 
erecting new ones. 
Create. Dream.
To truly create is to dream.4 To dream of the unknown, unexplored, to challenge 
oneself and challenge those that govern the known. Those that dream, those 
that dare to act on their dreams are those that create new ways of looking at 
things, and new ways of exploring emotions and of being.
It is often said that creative ideas comprise three components: they should 
represent something different or new; are of high quality; and be relevant to 
the domain of practice.5
This is a rather formal and cold definition. Creation is filled with emotions.  
A creation has a message. Like an oracle, giving an answer to the question buried 
deep inside you that was not even posed. The motivation behind the creation, 
behind the dream, is a motivation to change something in reality for self or the 
other, be it for one person, for a community, or for the whole world. 
Creation is often described by creators as “a meditative state” with moments 
that overtake the mind and the body and allow a spirit to play out the dream. 
If you speak to a creator, any creator, about the moment she came up with an 
idea, she will always say that there is this “disconnection with the reality,” the 
body or mind of the self are no longer in the driver’s seat, “a spirit takes over,” 
music is played in the mind, new colors are seen, new smells are discovered, 
numbers and words just come out dancing, and the creation is finally laid down 
There was no place for discussion. I surrender. I ascend the next steps and 
see the white wall with the blue square close up. “Go in,” she says. “Go in 
where? It’s a wall,” I say, disregarding the instructions to be quiet. “Please 
proceed!” she urges me, with a sense of agitation in her tone. Curious, 
scared, heart rushing, muscles stoned, I decide to risk it and trust her. 
I feel cold air on my face. 
I put my foot forward and realize there is no wall. 
My heart almost stops. 
I curiously enter a space, no sign of boundaries, no sign of walls, and very 
cautiously I walk in, my body is covered in goose bumps. I hear her voice. 
“Continue.” 
I am torn between my curiosity, my rational, my emotions. 
I continue into the space. 
Silence. Tears start flowing, heating the cold white floor. I have no control over 
my emotions or my body. I stand in the space sobbing. Looking back, I do  
not see an exit. I get lightheaded and dizzy. All I see is an orange square at the 
space where I positioned the entrance. Overtaken by my emotions, I want  
to run out scared by this magic and at the same time stay there forever to  
explore the physics of the creation. For few seconds, I am lost. 
I am so h a p p y.
This sensory experience, the breaking of a script, and the raising of the stakes 
for me as a participant of the creation is what made this moment so powerful.1  
I was experiencing the magnificent “Open Field” of James Turrell, as I was be-
coming part of the creation.2
Creation is a process and a product.3 For me, the truly creative outcome is 
one that allows you to experience the process of creation as well as the 
product. You may hate it or love it, but you feel it. The process takes you in 
and embeds you in to the creation, even if for a split second. You experience 
a facet of the creators self-experience. You become one. In turn, as a creator, 
one is always influenced by experiences she has, it inevitably affects what she 
does, how she thinks and her creative process. The great creation, one that 
resonates with your body and mind, breaks a boundary between you and the 
creator and allows you to explore yourself through her process and benefit 
from her experience. 
It is inevitable that when you try to create within a certain existing domain that 
you will find yourself recreating a feeling that accompanies the creations in 
that field. What is being discussed in the following is a different type of creation, 
Maya M. Shmailov
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In the world of science, for example, the interpretations that surround scientists 
and science with special believability often become cartographic. Science, 
and in fact each of its distinct branches, becomes a space on maps of culture, 
separated from other territories, labeled with landmarks that show the traveler 
how and why it is different from other regions. But these maps are episodic rather 
than transcendent or timeless, and every so often a branch of science is  
expanded, forming new branches as boundaries are redefined and extended.
It is not a trivial matter, especially in science. Edward O. Wilson, a biologist, 
asserts that the acid test for a scientist is “I discovered …”—a discovery that 
must be a certifiable scientific discovery. It needs to be judged and certified by 
peers who abide by the same rules in the same and nearby “silos.” “Real scientists 
seek above all the acceptances and esteem of their peers,” putting public  
acceptance for example as secondary.11 Thus, to break a norm, to bring some-
thing new to the domain of knowledge, inevitably results in taking a risk.
Typically, characterization of the scientist—a creator—almost always emphasizes 
the objectivity of the work and describes the scientist’s cold, detached obser-
vation without any emotional feeling, without discussing his or her process of 
discovery. The scientist is typically portrayed as recognizing a problem and 
searching for its solution. But there is more to it. Because all great movements 
are ultimately human-powered, to understand one’s creation is to explore and 
understand one’s personality and motivation, which are closely tied together. 
A short visit to the nonfiction books section will prove a rising interest in the 
human side of scientists, artists, and creators in general. This is all with the 
goal of telling a story to gain understanding of the incredible process of dis-
covery and creation. 
But what characterizes these people who defy established norms, who disregard 
conventional boundaries, institutionalized rules, and accepted reward and 
evaluation systems—people who, in fact, not only view conventional boundaries 
as ridiculous, but do not see boundaries to start with? 
The personality of the “creative” in this work is that of a boundary crosser, often 
an outsider who establishes a new train of thought. Such a personality inevitably 
has many faces. When discussing with behavioral psychologist professor  
with little understanding how it came to be. This is not surprising as recent 
research shows that creative people have a condition called synesthesia, which 
leads to crossing of sensory functions, resulting in seeing colors when reading, 
seeing smells or tasting colors.6
Attempts to capture the process of creativity, to define it, to analyze it, are 
abundant.7 Contrary to common belief, it is in fact of no difference if we observe 
the world of science or the world of humanities. After all, as entomologist 
Edward O. Wilson writes, “Science and the humanities share the same origin 
and brain processes of creativity.”8 In past years, with the attention on unveiling 
the secret of innovation and the advantages of breaking the conventional set 
of rules, the body of knowledge we have on creativity is exponentially growing. 
But still, there is no winning formula that will assure creativity. 
It has been long held that creativity often comes to be when established 
boundaries, norms, and expectations are crossed, erased, and reconstructed 
anew. It is thus not surprising to read behavior scientist Donald Norman and 
others writing that a creative project should be constraint free and boundary-
less.9 To add to this, consider Professor Andrew Jarosz of Mississippi State 
University mixing cosmopolitan cocktails to remove inhibition in his study 
subjects and to prove that drunk people are better at creative problem solving.10 
Creation is hindered when filters are added. And yet, creating or breaking a 
boundary is never as simple as taking a drink.
Who Are You?
In Tom Sawyer Abroad (1894), Mark Twain narrates a beautiful conversation that 
takes place between Tom and Huck while they are traveling in a fantastical hot-air 
balloon. During their trip, Huck decides that their geography professor is a liar. 
The reason the professor is perceived as such is because Huck deduced that accord-
ing to how fast and in what direction they were floating, they should have passed 
Illinois and arrived at Indiana. When Tom confronts him on this point, Huck explains 
that the professor’s map showed that Illinois is green and Indiana is pink, there-
fore they are still in Illinois as the scenery is completely green with no pink in sight.
I find this story intriguing because most people are realists like Huck, and 
learn about gender, science, culture, religion, and art from pre-charted maps. 
For Huck, maps teach you facts, they teach you the extent of a boundary.  
Reality should be in line with this, because facts do not tell lies. For Tom, this 
was not the case. He understood that the map is a tool and not a mirror of 
reality.
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They also like resolvable disorder. Having a high tolerance for ambiguity, 
they can carry through the search period, or “stay in the cloud” during 
the process of discovery without rushing toward a solution or finding the 
way from A to B.20 
With strong egos, which allow them to regress to preconscious states 
with the certainty they will return, they are without fear of failure. They 
take high risks without worrying about failure because they have no 
doubt that they are still on the right path.
Interpersonal relations are of low intensity in their life and they are often 
perceived as asocial. They marginalize themselves into states of isolation 
and in a sense are opportunistic, with little loyalty to others. “I need it I 
take it” is the adage. One the other hand, they build a support network 
of very few people, and nurture these connections.
They are preoccupied with things and ideas more than with people.
They like to take risks and rarely depend on luck.
In my research, I also found that while boundary crossers have what could be 
considered as positive traits like self-confidence, alertness, unconventional 
thinking, and behavior, and perhaps add obsessive commitment to their work; 
these personality types also may have negative trait: self-confidence merges 
with narcissistic behavior, egotism, and self-absorption fueled by arrogance. 
They also can be master manipulators, maneuvering between self-deprecation 
and self-admiration, marketing their brands to a number of audiences.21 Their 
persona is like a faceted diamond. Their strength is in allowing the diamond 
to constantly rotate to expose one facet, showing one aspect of their personality, 
to achieve the goal at sight. Each facet is carefully chosen when presented 
to those on the outside, and often adapted to the viewers’ expectations, while 
B. J. Fogg the motivations of boundary crossers, he concluded that their per-
sonality is probably a combination of nature and nurture although I was  
hoping for a different result.12 An attempt to single out and unlock the secret 
to creativity, to find that one personality trait that gives rise to creativity  
will inevitably lead to failure.13 However, observing creative personalities and 
closely examining the motivation underlying their actions shed light not only 
on their achievements but also on the process of creativity. 
But what is personality? How do we define that? For psychologists and behavior 
scientists the term “personality” refers to a unique and constant set of behav-
iors, feelings, thoughts, and motives that build the profile of that person.14 It is 
what distinguishes us from one another, what makes us unique and contrary 
to what you might believe it is very difficult to break from your profile or change 
your personality. 
Creativity is assumed to be unique and defining trait of our species with its 
ultimate goal, self-understanding.15 Personality, as a predictor of creative achieve-
ment, trumps intelligence as a predictor of lifetime creative achievement.16 
The following list of traits are common to boundary crossers and creatives: 
norm-doubting and nonconformity, independence and desire for autonomy, a 
particular balance of extraversion-introversion, aloofness, social hostility and 
coldness, dominance with a taste of self-confidence, and arrogance.17 Some 
will note that extraversion or sociability and outgoingness are rarely a trait to 
define a creator. Extraversion, however, is a combination of assertiveness 
and sociability, and viewed as such the association is more natural as boundary 
crossers are typically highly confident, assertive, and autonomous.18 In turn, 
this self-confidence and assertiveness leads to a belief that one is capable of 
doing something or carrying out some source of action, also defined as a 
trait of self-efficacy.19 
Their motivation is often described as related to the following terms: persistent, 
driven, ambitious, focused, and impulsive. 
How Does It All Play Out in Reality?
They actively seek experience and action. Being independent and not 
subject to group standards and control, they are more observant than 
others and are highly autonomous. As they are egocentric, this makes 
accumulation of experience possible, allowing them to center on what is 
really important to them.
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vation and personality and combine it with Carl Jung’s theory of “archetypes” 
to show how they can be employed to bring meaning and profit to a brand. 
A deeper look into Mark and Carol Pearson’s work on brands and marketing, 
in combination with the fact that creators and boundary crossers, who need 
to attract audience to their creations, build an identity they market—makes 
their combination theory a suitable ground to understanding the motivation 
of our boundary crossers.
In brief, this motivational theory centers on four major human urges positioned 
along two axes: belonging versus independence, and stability versus mastery 
(that includes risk-taking). These categories of motivation link most closely with 
the stages defined by Maslow.
Basically this means that most of us want very much to be liked and to belong 
to a group. At the same time, we also want to be individuals and go our own 
way. Both of these desires are deep and profound human urges, yet they pull 
us in opposite directions. The desire to belong makes us want to please others 
and conform, at least to some degree. The desire to individuate causes us to 
spend time alone and make decisions or act in ways that those close to us may 
not understand. 
Similarly, most people have a deep need for security and stability. Such desires 
are fulfilled by routine, comfort, and staying with the tried and true. We see 
these when we buy insurance, when we religiously exercise or stay in a job for 
the pension plan. Yet, however much people want safety, there is also the 
ambition and the desire to exert mastery and to feel the exhilaration of accom-
plishment, by taking risks. 
While we all negotiate along these poles on a daily basis, these urges are in a 
struggle when in the state of crisis or in transition period in our life. This 
struggle between the poles is something most of us have experienced at least 
once at a time when we tried to find out who we are. Take the transition of 
your teenage years. When we are no longer kids, we are released, at least theo-
retically, from under control of our caregiver, we are under the illusion that 
we can be who we want to be and yet we are still tied to the definitions and 
boundaries that have been laid out to define us. We feel like the world we 
knew, which protected us, is falling apart or we take it apart, we rebel, struggling 
to find balance, and some part of us that we are yet to recognize seeks ex-
pression. We wobble, like Vanka Stanka (a roly-poly doll), between the need to 
belong and the need for independence and self-expression, between the 
need for stability and taking risks. If we are lucky, and we have the support we 
the true intention, the inner complexity, remains incomprehensible to those 
on the outside.  By being master manipulators, an identity is created to suit the 
purpose and to gain acceptance of the new idea or creation, a marketing 
strategy is put in place. But the inner drive stays constant. 
Why Do You Do What You Do?
But what kinds of things motivate the boundary crossers? What exactly drives 
them? Is it the need to know? Is it recognition or acceptance? Self-expression? 
Money? Pleasure or excitement during the process? Edward O. Wilson asserts 
in his research on the origin of creativity that the driving force is humanity’s 
love of novelty. It’s an instinct for the discovery of something new, the solving 
of old challenges, “the aesthetic surprise of unanticipated facts and theories, 
the pleasure of new faces, the thrill of new worlds.” Creativity is and should be 
judged by the magnitude of the emotional response it evokes.
I often ask research subjects “Why do you do what you do?” The answer is never 
simple and often perplexing. Common features are, for example, inner drive, 
hunger to prove something that others claimed as impossible, expressing 
connections they see that others overlook or deem as irrelevant. This is known 
as “intrinsic motivation,” and a large body of research supports this idea. 
“Extrinsic motivation,” such as financial rewards, recognition, or peer acceptance, 
has been shown to actually have a detrimental effect on creativity. They deter 
from the process, they conform the creator to accepted norms, which in turn 
prevents the process of breaking the status quo and crossing a boundary. 
The fact of the matter is, and as many studies show, creative people, people 
who redefine the world we live in, no matter which field, are very deeply and 
emotionally involved in their work, and in fact are themselves an essential 
tool in the process of creation and discovery. When exploring reality-changing 
creations, be it in the art world, science, technology, society, politics, food, 
or any other field, to truly create, means that the creation is not pointing at you, 
as the creator; rather, it points to something larger, with a bigger purpose, 
and it’s about something that goes beyond the creator. The creation has a 
message. The motivation behind the creation, behind the dream, is a motivation 
to change something in the reality, for the self or the other, be it for one person, 
for a community or for the whole world. While for most, change signals loss, for 
boundary crossers, change signals excitement. Fear is an emotion that is em-
braced in a calculated manner and taking a risk is sine qua non for these creators.
Margaret Mark and Carol Pearson have developed a system that integrates 
motivational and archetypal theory to explain how great brands become  
extraordinary.22 They build on Abraham Maslow’s 1954 seminal work on moti-
The Many Facets of Creative Maya M. Shmailov
22 Margaret Mark and Carol Pearson, The 
Hero and the Outlaw: Building Extraordinary 
Brands through the Power of Archetypes 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001).
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need, we find a balance and allow our inner core to come out and the wob-
bling diminishes (but never really ends). 
Any exploration of the self is of course a constant process of negotiation 
along these poles. However, when we try to bury who we really are or try to 
adapt to the world despite our urges, we struggle. Then comes a life crisis  
or a “midlife crisis,” when we feel again that the reality as we know it changes, 
and we are under the illusion that “time is running out” and we have this urge 
to find out or to define who we should be—we get out of balance, some buy  
a sports car, some take apart their life, wobbling from pole to pole because 
there is a part that has been suppressed for a long time and now seeks 
expression. 
This process of self-discovery at times of transition leads to rigorously jumping 
along these poles in a state of dizziness, beyond the normal. As with a roly-
poly doll, shifting from one side to the other, constantly seeking to reach its 
balance but often getting lost, sacrificing one end of one of these to continue 
to the other end. Most people seek balance, as the lack thereof leads to a 
state of crisis and loss of control, whereas for explorers, like boundary crossers, 
this unbalance is in fact what drives their works. They master this staggering 
movement, and learn to make the best of a situation. 
We often see the creators deliberately living in this negotiation until they 
reach a state of balance, through accomplishments, recognition, and a gradual 
realization of their dreams. The state of balance in turn signals stagnation, 
lack of novelty. This then leads to another go at the process through self-
marginalizing, breaking down another boundary, and fearlessly running into  
another endeavor. Through the research of personalities and motivations of 
such creators, it becomes reasonable to assume they are what psychologists 
classify as a type T personality, as first proposed by Frank Farley.23 This  
type T personality is often described as a personality dimension referring  
to individual differences in stimulation-seeking, excitement-seeking, thrill- 
seeking, arousal-seeking, and especially risk-taking. 
It seems that in the creative process, if you’re not risking failure, you’re not 
risking enough. Research on risk-taking and success shows that 30 percent of 
what leads to success is this ability to take risk and the rest is training (40 percent) 
and skill (30 percent).24
For most who tend to seek balance, the lack of it leads to a state of crisis and 
loss of control; for explorers, boundary crossers, and creative personalities, this 
is in fact what drives their works. They become “master roly-polys,” embracing 
the dizzying movement between the four basic human urges: belonging,  
independence, stability, and risk-taking. Negotiation between these urges on 
certain levels and seeking balance is common to most of us. For the boundary 
crossers, placing themselves often in these states of imbalance, drives their 
creative process. They are thus actively seeking new experiences, self-discovery, 
and enhancement to the creative voice. Each such state of imbalance, despite 
the cost in human terms, strengthens their understanding of the self, their core 
identity, which in turn leads to clarity of what the next step should be to realize 
their dream. Thus, the boundary crossers are certain that the navigation in the 
unknown, despite the miserable failures, is a process that leads to discovery 
and new creations. Being master roly-polys, they are learning to make the best 
of situations to achieve the most they can.
What is interesting to observe is that at the axis point between stability and 
risk, between the urge to belong and the urge for independence, there lies a 
core. This core, this inner voice, defines who we are, our true identity, fea-
tures of which we might have lost and buried, allows us to seek belonging or 
independence, to seek stability or taking risks. And like the roly-poly doll out 
of equilibrium, moving from one end to the other in the state of dizziness, we 
are as well until we reach the state of balance, the crossing point, a certain 
clarity of who we are. But this state of balance is not something we are born 
with or can train ourselves to achieve. It’s a process. It is a magnificent and ex-
quisite process of navigation through the unknown, an experience of miserable 
failures, of discovery, and a way to build a new world. 
A hurricane swept over last night,
And brought nothing but a sudden plight.
Oaks stood rigid and lost in the fight.
Bamboos swayed but now they stand upright.25
Following the bamboo metaphor so abundant in Zen Buddhism, one needs to 
receive enough nurture, watering, and patience of many years for the shoot 
to spring and for the bamboo to start growing meteorically. Only due to this 
patience, a root system develops, allowing the bamboo to withstand the 
harshest winds, the burning sun, or the monsoons. The flexibility, the fearlessness, 
at times conformity and flowing with the blowing winds is possible when the 
true identity, the core and the root system, is developed and clearly followed 
by the creator, even at times when sacrifice is needed to attain to the grander 
dream.
23 Frank Farley, “The Big T in Personality,”  
Psychology Today, May 1996, 44–52.
24 Michael Schwalbe, “The 40-30-30 Rule: 




25 Fortune, no. 30, Zen Buddhism proverb, 
received at Mahayana Temple, New York, 
2018.
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There are essential conditions for growth from the viewpoint of consulting  
and counseling. For instance, anarchy and dizziness can enable personal  
co-evolution in connection with others and within the wider context of organi-
zational systems. Both are essential conditions for deep transformation.1  
On the one hand, power relations are conditions that either delimit or open up 
development. On the other hand, we can become aware of these conditions 
and transform them actively through self-empowerment and cocreation.
In this paper, knowledge development is treated from a phenomenological 
perspective. Theory and practice (qualitative empirical data) inform each other. 
The cases described derive from my work as a consultant and coach. I differen-
tiate and connect three levels of awareness:2 individual, self “I” awareness; 
collaborative, interpersonal “we” awareness; and organizational, systemic 
“us” awareness. My desire is to create a complex approach to meet complex 
challenges by telling the human story about becoming aware of potentials. 
That requires the renewal of power patterns through anarchy and dizziness.
Conditions for Growing Transformation and Cocreation 
Capacities
How Anarchy Gives Space for Dizziness
Anarchy is a daring call to give away the power we are used to,3 to turn loose 
given and old patterns and make space inside our minds and our systems for 
something new. It is key to gaining ownership and becoming active instead of 
following. Providing space for anarchy means setting the stage, preparing 
conditions for something new to take place, and for future forms to emerge.4
Experiencing anarchy comes with the lack of known power patterns, well-
known leadership cultures, structural clarity, and designed processes. In this 









1 In philosophy, we call this “conditions of 
the possibilities of knowledge,” originally 
formulated by Immanuel Kant in The 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781). His book 
deals with conditions that must be fulfilled 
in order for a thing to be known by reason. 
Kant argued that only on this basis of 
rational understanding can deep transfor-
mation of human moral agency become 
possible.
2 Maria Spindler, “How Do You Embrace the 
Big Picture? The Development of Aware-
ness as a Potential of Collective Growth 
through Senior Management,” February 
2016, https://www.maria-spindler.at/how 
-do-you-embrace-the-big-picture/. 
3 Cf. Maria Spindler and Chris Stary, “SoS: 
Anarchy: Active Inner Spacing for 
Co-creating Future Outer Space,” 
Challenging Organisations and Society: 
Reflective Hybrids 6, no. 1 (2017): 1014–64.
4 See Otto Scharmer, Theory U: Leading 
from the Future as It Emerges (San 
Francisco: Berret-Koehler, 2009).
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that contains everything, all potential. Simultaneously, nobody knows what 
this potential of everything could be. As a consultant, I have experienced this 
moment as crucial, and sometimes cruel. For a moment, it takes one’s breath 
away, like diving into a new atmosphere, like changing worlds. Sometimes 
people say it out loud: “aha” or “ooh” or “wow” or “I didn’t expect this” or “It’s 
simple, but …”
In order to be able to leave well-known, deeply imprinted patterns behind, a first, 
inner seed is needed that dares to be different and nonconforming compared  
to the well known. If this inner seed can be anchored, new space will be captured 
with which the individual inner space can be newly connected. We transform 
in quality when we move from non-thought (routines and conformity) to our own 
active seeding. Anarchy is the condition for space liberation and 
self-engagement.5 
Routine – Pattern = Anarchy
How Dizziness Feeds Transformation 
Anarchy is a condition for dizziness. When dizziness kicks in, confusion, over-
reaction, too much of everything and nothing come to the surface. Not knowing 
what is right or wrong to say or do, not knowing how to fill the void, not 
knowing how big the risk is, not knowing what is behind this dizzy, foggy, misty, 
noisy nothingness. Dizziness is essential for transformation; it is needed for 
the process of destruction of old patterns. Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag 
and Leonhard Grond see dizziness as a resource for creativity. They describe 
“a conception of dizziness as movement through spatial, emotional and social 
surroundings movements,” and thus “gain new perspectives on the affects 
and effects of thought […] thinking-in-motion holds the potential to overcome 
the traditional opposites of motion and standstill, certainty and uncertainty, 
knowing and not-knowing, because there is space and movement ‘in between’ 
professed opposites, which can become productive in moving towards new 
knowledge and meaning.”6 Movement acknowledges the gray, undefined, 
unknown zone required for creativity and innovative potential.
Dizziness leads us beyond two-dimensional, linear, logical, cognitive thinking 
as it embraces all potentials and more, without judgment, without preference.  
It is a multidimensional approach, urging body recognition, body movement, 
and embodiment as processes of freeing, showing, and materializing the  
potential. Body awareness provides the next level of complexity and thus the 
next level of dealing with uncertainty. Connecting our body-mind system  
relations anew allows us to experience more complexity and thus more con-
nections within us and outside of us.
We must have the grit to destroy old patterns so that dizziness can unfold its 
potential,7 reinventing us as humans, cocreating our shared future collectively. 
Daring to experience dizziness, looking into our own unknown, into the core 
of our vulnerability lets us emerge more complex, multidimensional, and 
more integrated at the same time.8 Stepping into dizziness is risky for leaders 
and organizations, simultaneously not knowing and hoping that it could be 
the basis for new qualitative growing.
Routine – pattern = anarchy & dizziness × body awareness 
= multidimensional awareness of potentials
Two Case Studies: How to Transform and Empower 
Ourselves
Case 1: Self-Empowering from Within
This case illustrates the process of finding and conquering one’s own inner 
anarchy and finding one’s inner beauty. Edmund,9 a CEO, was fired from his 
position; he was wounded, suffered, and did not understand how this could have 
happened. He was shaken and sought professional coaching. After several 
sessions searching for explanations and looking inward, following up on the 
discomfort of his body, his stomach aches, back pains, headaches, and tensions, 
an inner image became obvious: there was a wheel spinning in his head, a rat 
race, and he did not know how to stop it. The process was not always painless 
for him. On the one hand, this wheel was the source of constant production 
of great ideas about himself, but, on the other hand, it led to negative images 
about his behavior and negative projections about his coworkers, bosses, 
employees, and environment. This caused stress, increased pressure, micro-
management, and narcissistic behavior that, in the long run, his business and 
private surroundings did not appreciate. 
5  “Anarchism […] stands for the liberation of 
the human mind from the dominion of 
religion; the liberation of the human body 
from the dominion of property; liberation 
from the shackles and restraint of govern-
ment. Anarchism stands for a social order 
based on the free grouping of individuals 
for the purpose of producing real social 
wealth; an order that will guarantee to every 
human being free access to the earth and 
full enjoyment of the necessities of life, 
according to individual desires, tastes, and 
inclinations.” Emma Goldman, Anarchism 
and Other Essays (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1969), 83.
6 Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and 
Leonhard Grond, “Dizziness—A Resource: 
Dizziness and the Compossible Space in 
Research-Creation,” Emotion, Space and 
Society 28 (2018): 129.
7 See Angela Duckworth, GRIT: Why Passion 
and Resilience Are the Secrets to Success 
(New York: Scribner, 2016).
8 See Brené Brown, Daring Greatly: How the 
Courage to Be Vulnerable Transforms the 
Way We Live, Love, Parent and Lead (New 
York: Gotham Books, 2012)
9 All names in this article have been changed.
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At this point, I asked his permission to take a deeper step, following the deeper 
flow of his inner nature. He agreed to go into more unknown territory. The 
process started with breathing consciously, relaxing, looking inward, connect-
ing to his body. The wheel’s spinning decreased slowly, and it felt to him as  
if the wheel was melting down his neck, back, and chest. This process took 
approximately fifteen minutes; his conscious mind shifted into the background 
and his attention opened up an inner place. I asked him to let his good future 
arise from the inside. He poured out the words: “My positive way of life.” Now 
something new emerged: a green meadow with fragrant flowers became clearer 
and bigger and outgrew his skin. He was lying in the meadow, at the same time 
overgrown by it, looking into the sky. A new positive inner space was born.
I witnessed his face and body relaxing, changing, and the smiling mask dropped 
into a serious, soft expression. He talked slowly, was able to relax, lying there 
in the grass among the flowers and smelling them intensely, feeling the soft 
warm wind on his skin, looking into blue eternity. It was an experience he had 
never had in his life before, becoming aware of his senses and body in a soft 
and self-loving way. Several times during this process he felt a loss of control. 
He wanted to fade out, had to overcome some inner obstacles, as there was 
something happening that was not steered by his cognition. The final image 
was a green meadow with a white fence that was at his disposal as a gift from 
himself.
He left my office very happy, dancing into his life. The next day he called, 
slightly shaken, talking about his uncertainties, asking if he was still a normal 
human being and man. He said that he had looked at old pictures from his 
childhood and that he had tears in his eyes looking at himself and seeing and 
feeling this tiny vulnerable boy. He recognized a shift that felt painful but  
simultaneously was a relief. The first inner seed was sown, and it grew a meadow 
and thus changed his rat race to a life-affirming pace. 
Edmund had experienced in the outer world a massive breakdown of his rou-
tines, his well-known patterns. Anarchy grew step by step. First, he lost his 
job, without seeing this coming or knowing why. He was so shaken up that he 
sought the help of a coach, focusing on himself as the cause. Secondly, the 
more consequential and deeper transformed the unconscious rat-race thinking 
routine and opened up a new space, a complex world as conscious body- 
awareness.
Dizziness had taken over as the rat race started slowing down, melting, and 
moving into the background. This process of decomposition has its inner narrative, 
which one cannot speed up. One loses one’s sense of time; the mask one 
wears for the outer world disappears,10 and the inner face surfaces. When 
everything decomposes, the inner, multidimensional world can slowly expand 
and something new can emerge; the positive intention appears as an image, 
in this case a meadow with its smells and positive feelings. This inner journey 
was not superimposed by two-dimensional, fast-paced, centralizing mind control 
(the rat race). The multidimensional awareness is the process of freeing his 
deeper, more complex narrative.
For the process, it was important that as his coach I kept the inner space open 
for the narrative to perform its necessary ritual. I opened the session with 
breathing, relaxing, and connecting exercises. I kept it open the entire seventy 
minutes by accompanying him through the process, slowing him down when 
he became tense, following his bodily awareness, telling him he was doing 
fine and that everything was welcome, that this was his own process, and he 
had all the time needed. It is important that a coach does not judge and 
trusts the client’s narrative: the rat race, the melting down, the growing—even 
higher grass and fragrant flowers. Edmund’s growing into this new, colorful 
inner space simultaneously increased uncertainty and hope. Looking at his 
family pictures the next day showed that he was open to wider and deeper 
integrated multidimensional awareness making its way into his daily life.  
Edmund’s case shows there is a decision for each of us to make when it comes 
to power: Do I want to follow patterns through unquestioned acceptance, or 
do I want to step up, question patterns, and act in self-awareness?
Routine – pattern = anarchy and dizziness × Body awareness 
= multidimensional awareness of potentials 
& intention & overcoming obstacles 
& opening unknown potentials × integration 
= self-empowerment (individual transformation capability)
Interpretation and Consequences of Case 1
Power over relations alter their “objects,”11 be they individuals, groups,  
organizations, or nations. Dominance and coercion are used. Power over rela-
tions focus on polarity, opposite views, and differences in power that attract 
each other from a position of distrust. One side vies for power over the other; 
this can be influencing the other to concede its position but also using  
brute force to get its way. Max Weber defines power as the probability that 
one actor in the social relationship is positioned to carry out his will despite 
10 In The Transparency Society (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), Byung-
Chul Han analyzes loss of inner life, inner 
connection, and trust for others that 
result from the focus on being transparent 
and recognized in a certain way by the 
outer world. Edmund’s mask and rat race 
were the perfect solution for this transparency 
society. With the mask and rat race, 
Edmund blocked his inner beauty.
11 Mary Parker Follett, Prophet of Management: 
A Celebration of Writings from the 1920s, 
ed. by Pauline Graham (Washington, DC: 
Beard Books, 2013).
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resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.12 Power over 
works with fear: fear that one will be worse off than one already is, will be 
punished, will lose status, one’s job, or one’s good and comfortable life, or will 
experience even more conflicts. Unquestioned dominance-organized relation 
patterns disintegrate. Power under occurs when we give up our own power. 
When complex interconnections and the need for equal cooperation and a 
person’s own dignity come into play, an active move and responsibility shift 
of everyone is required. 
Power with requires from everyone a “stepping up,” taking responsibility, and 
not following blindly, shutting down, or stepping back. It is self-empowerment 
from within. Power with is a form of collaboration and participation that we 
today call stakeholder engagement, multi-sector approaches, and cocreation.13 
Mary Parker Follett argues in her “power with” concept that reciprocal influ-
ence could lead to creative synthesis. This includes concepts like:
Collaboration on an equal level as system with all differences (diversity, 
inclusion, etc.), negotiation, dialogue, and shared decision-making.
Self-empowerment of individuals, active participation, motivation, and 
responsibility for self-learning as a condition for stepping up and being 
able to collaborate on an equal level. 
These cocreative processes bring groups of people together for closer and 
better equal relations. This can happen in a government, an enterprise, or an 
NGO. It also means constant integration and differentiation, overcoming and 
involving what seems strange or frightens.
Arendt defined practical wisdom as a certain orientation and perspective in 
connection with the world.14 The highest and most important relation is an 
active life that embraces the potential of human freedom. Each mutual action 
finds its meaning in recognizing the action as part of a larger movement. In 
Arendt’s concept, power can be realized when we actively cocreate our reality. 
This approach defines power as a shared interest and intention for a potential 
that can emerge among us. An active social life (practical wisdom) is a condition 
of power and vice versa. Through acting together, we gain power potential, 
which corresponds to the condition of plurality in relating to each other. For 
the same reason, power can be divided without decreasing it. And living  
this cocreation is a condition for and result of individual freedom and dignity 
within organizations and thus in society. Arendt argued that freedom does 
not preexist in the organized community but is constructed there, as seen in 
the common space in which people bring their own uniqueness and create 
something of lasting value, such as an organization or a state. 
In fact, Arendt sees this power as the element that gives us a reason to cocreate 
our future.15 It is the reason we build organizations. Whenever I experience 
“power for,” I feel the potential it carries within itself. I interpret Arendt’s defi-
nition as connecting us anew with our human dignity, our individuality, and 
responsibility for our collectives beyond repeating old, shared power patterns.16 
The term “power for our shared future” is here understood to mean creating 
new realities, as a lively nexus between the world and energy for life creation. 
This gives leadership systems and organizations a different sense in our com-
plex society. The possibility for “power for” must be given and taken and if 
necessary defended; the space for it must be guaranteed and fostered. 
Case 2: Cocreating from the Inside Out and the Outside In
This case shows how complexity awareness for cocreation and systems 
grows through anarchy, dizziness and transformation.17 The case follows the 
growth from unawareness to two-dimensional system logic to multidimen-
sional, integrative awareness. It addresses the transformation of the top leader, 
the management system, the development team, and the whole system, this 
means of all members, functions, and connections of the entire organization.
It is “a turnaround organization,” the entire process took eight years and is 
still ongoing. It also shows the conditions needed for deep transformation in 
order to experience power as future potential, rather than a threat. 
Everything that constitutes and builds top management can become a capac-
ity. Rita has a desire for development. She is intelligent, warm-hearted, witty, 
generous, challenging, and knows that her responsibilities are “leadership, 
organization, and future.”
Phase 1: Top Management as Complexity Opener
Rita started taking coaching sessions on her own in order to get an idea what 
her best leadership function could be in this system, and how she could help 
herself, the management system, and the organization grow. Her intention 
was to develop the entire organization from unawareness to shared develop-
ment where coworking and developing the entire system into future strategy 
12 Max Weber, Society and Economy: An 
Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 
13 Follett, Prophet of Management.
14 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 




17 Starting with approximately 250 employees 
and headquarters in Vienna, the size of 
the organization and the number of staff 
members and clients grew 7 percent in 
these eight years. Due to client-consultant 
privilege, I am not permitted to give more 
information about the nature of the business. 
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would show through daily practice. She decided for a long-term process so 
that no one would have to be fired, and that each person’s dignity and motivation 
would grow.
Phase 2: From Mechanical Leadership to a Logical Leadership System
We decided to take small steps, installing teams along the hierarchical structure. 
The first two-day workshop was to set up the leadership team around the di-
rector. The following workshops, with top and middle management, stabilized 
line-oriented organization: moving from an unconscious mechanic power  
relation to clearly defined responsibilities for tasks and systems, logical processes. 
The management team gained enough overview to provide orientation for 
their middle-management teams to do their jobs without fear of making mistakes.
The director developed and showed multiple power awareness and actions:
Power with: when to share power and invite ideas, initiatives, cocreation.
Power for shared future: inviting the leadership system to grow, pull strings 
of developments together, and focus.
Power over and power against when needed to protect developments and 
topics against negativity and a culture of blaming.
Individual fear and negative, destructive loops (e.g., downgrading or hinder-
ing other people and projects) slowly lost their magic, and it was possible  
to take on more complex responsibilities and collaborations within the leader-
ship system. This second phase created a foundation on which the multi-
dimensional complexity could be built.
Phase 3: From Two- to Multidimensional Awareness as Whole System
The organizational narrative, the deep flow of the system and its individuals 
connected so that shared future could arrive through the power of self- 
organization and collaboration. It started with the director’s quest for the 
company to become a more innovative, future-oriented organization. She  
called the initiative “Our Future 2025.” She introduced a new vessel: “the develop-
ment team” and handpicked fourteen people: they were good networkers, 
highly respected experts, or lower managers, and cared about the organization. 
I focus here on the most crucial moments of four events that show the pro-
cess of increasing transformational capabilities. The director, the management 
team, and I prepared the three-day workshop set up to institutionalize this 
development team. 
Development Team Workshop 1
Participants of the workshop were the handpicked fourteen plus Rita, with the 
management team and the middle management, making twenty-six people 
altogether. The first day was for orientation (individual, team, whole system) 
and to discuss the following questions: What is the idea for this team? Who  
is here? Why and in what capacity? What are the individual intentions for the 
future of the entire organization? What could be the shared intention, and 
how is it connected to the rest of the people of the organization? On the second 
day, I introduced a tailor-made method for self-organization in the style of open 
space,18 which creates anarchy by expanding space and time. One cannot 
predict specific outcomes: only the framework “Our Future 2025” was set in 
this case.
I introduced the method and invited the participants to introduce topics they 
would like to work on. They took responsibility for naming the issue and posting 
it on a pin board, which simultaneously served as the space in which to meet. 
The hosts introduced the topics and kicked off the conversation, taking notes, 
which were placed on the pin board, and presenting the topic to the plenary.
And off we went. For a moment they were stunned: three hours of self-organization; 
everyone was supposed to follow her or his energy and interest; if someone 
had no interest/energy, he or she could take a break, chat with others, or develop 
new topics. And after this moment and energy outburst came an explosion.  
I had the impression that the walls of our seminar room were bending outward. 
The room was filled with words, movements, laughter, material collecting, 
chatting, plotting. It was a wild, slow-motion dance, secret romantic talks, child’s 
play, serious talk, and more. 
After three hours, eleven topics had emerged and some of the participants had 
already started working on initiatives: strategy development, leadership  
concept, architecture, social environment concept, core competences, hand-
book for trainees, culture from negative loop to positive loop, landscape 
gardening for the courtyard. Some of the topics were already merged during 
this process. People were stunned by their own outcomes. The management 
was more than satisfied seeing the commitment. A multidimensional flow had 
opened, and we had to bring it into different streams in order to build bridges 
into the next steps of development for the entire system.
18 Harrison Owen, originator of the term and 
the approach open-space technology in 
1984, says open-space works because it 
harnesses and acknowledges the power of 
self-organization, which he suggests is 
substantially aligned with the deepest 
process of life itself, as described by 
leading-edge complexity science as well 
as ancient spiritual teachings. See 
Harrison Owen, Open Space Technology: 
A User’s Guide (San Francisco: Barrett-
Koehler, 2008).
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The Whole System Event 1 (one day, four months later) was the most impor-
tant vessel that brought those initiatives into an even more complex environment. 
The team and management were doubtful that the open space could also 
work with 250 people, that they would follow their passion and contribute in 
whatever way they felt was right. This large-scale event required a lot of 
preparation, such as which auditorium to use, how to arrange the room, how 
to proceed step-by-step, how to secure results, and how to engage the  
people. It was a mix of excitement and fear; tension was high.
The members of the development group presented their topics at the whole 
system event with the entire crew of 250. We replicated the core part of the 
tailor-made development-team workshop. Some people were lost; the other 
two facilitators and I accompanied them from time to time so they would not 
become lost in their own fear. It was a huge success for the system and the 
people: anarchy and dizziness opened further, and the whole system develop-
ment became more complex and deeply rooted.
To connect those two events so closely meant having to build bridges between 
the members of the development team, the management, and the entire 
system, the motto “Future 2025,” the topics, and the actors. After three hours 
in the “open space,” one could feel that the dizziness and fear were slowly  
being replaced by a growing awareness and acceptance of the task’s complexity. 
More positive collaboration and laughter arose, and new opportunities sur-
faced. Fewer people were lost in space. They dared to say what was important 
to them. As fear was replaced by joy in collaboration, the power over/under 
was overwritten by the power for shared future.
The final presentation of fourteen initiatives made the people proud; they 
clapped, whistled, and sang songs, surprised by the range of topics and con-
nections among them across the entire organization. The loop was positive; 
even unpleasant issues could be addressed without being judgmental. The 
flow into the future became deeper and wider and opportunities materialized: 
each topic had one or two responsible people from the development team. 
They had been working in self-organized project groups with members 
throughout the entire organization over the entire year.
Development Team Workshop 2 (2 Days): One Year Later
All team members maintained their commitment over the year. The projects 
performed more strongly than expected. Some projects for the entire organi-
zation had already successfully ended. The members of the development 
group had taken on responsibilities throughout the year and had been sup-
ported by Rita and the management team. The presentations at the beginning 
of the workshop were already an emotional highlight; one member hung a 
huge banner over each project pin board with comments like “successfully 
ended” or “work in progress” or “already implemented.”
I suggested going one layer deeper and asked them to build three groups 
that would plan a ritual for overcoming obstacles to reach “Our Future 2025.” 
They had enough space and time until the next morning to prepare the rituals 
to allow for dizziness to happen. The three rituals followed a narrative of a 
three-part ceremony: from past to present to future. They were performed in 
following order:
Ritual 1: Transforming old habits into growing new plants out of the ashes 
and earth.
Ritual 2: Three arrangements building sculptures based on the three letters 
in the organization’s acronym.
Ritual 3: Connecting the words (represented by people) of the strategy 
for “Our Future 2025,” and connecting the institution with society and 
the intention. It was a ritual process of developing the strategy one step 
further.
Rituals mark transitions for people and systems. They interweave individuals 
with the system in its depths. Through rituals, individual meanings and a shared 
collective sense are connected. Barriers and obstacles become zones of death, 
of transformation, of hope for something new. Rituals are narrative processes; 
they develop their own rhythms and drumbeats. The transitions in this case 
were:
Letting go of old patterns, freeing ourselves from past restrictions to let 
new life grow.
From standing alone to standing together in the sculpture of the whole 
system of the letters and the future value sentence.
Cocreating and embodying the future together and bringing it into the 
here and now among ourselves. Shared intentions are the internal com-
pass of a system.
The people were changed, simultaneously connected to each other and able 
to stand alone. Their togetherness had a new quality of trust. They decided to 
facilitate the next large system event themselves. I was hired to prepare the 
event with them and wished them well. The event took place in February 2018, 
and according to Rita it was a huge success. This eight-year process shows 
how important passion and perseverance are, especially from top management, 
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to increase joy, to give purpose, and to have success together throughout the 
entire system.
Routine – pattern = anarchy & dizziness × body awareness 
= multidimensional awareness × Intention & overcoming obstacles & 
opening unknown potentials × integration 
= self-empowerment × whole system × shared intention & 
cocreation × resilience/endurance/perseverance 
= new power for a shared sustainable future 
(collective transformation capabilities)
Conclusion 
Power and its patterns are not inherited or given by a higher being but are a 
choice. We put ourselves into a position where we can gain a perspective on 
power by coming together as individuals and through organizations with action, 
reflection, and decision-making. We generate establishments in the here and 
now for shared future opportunities. The two cases showed different movements, 
emerging from unconscious habits, growing into two-dimensional logical 
awareness, decomposing again, and growing into multidimensional, integra-
tive awareness.
For the individual, it requires decentralization from centralized mind control; 
multidimensional body awareness allows for individual “I” awareness.
For the collaboration, it requires a cocreation of the future in order to 
experience trust and the deep connectedness of “we” awareness.
For the system, it requires embracing the whole and daring to lose our-
selves in it, which allows us to grow individually through and with it: I am 
part of it, and I can cocreate it.
Anarchy and dizziness are two sides of the same coin: an inner state of humans 
and social systems, a capability and a resource that transform from reaction 
to action, from a mechanical knowing (the rat race pursuit) to not-knowing to 
growing life awareness. Thus, anarchy and dizziness invite us from the inside 
to transform the awareness of power relations in order to create more anarchy 
and dizziness and thus more growing. Awareness of one’s own inner place is 
essential for growing one’s own anarchy and dizziness. And it is the place from 
which we create and bring the foundations for future leadership possibilities 
into reality. The development of awareness requires conscious perception of 
one’s own thinking, feeling, and acting in relation to oneself, other human 
beings, and the world. Allowing oneself to be touched by inner anarchy and 
dizziness is in accordance with one’s awareness of patterns, such as conven-
tions, rules, structures, processes, principles, cultures, values, and norms, and 
of individuals and social systems (teams, organizations, and society). To in-
crease transformational capabilities and to support other people and systems 
growing these capabilities, I suggest to:
Be deviant and let go of well-known patterns, even if others cannot  
understand your approach and interventions. 
Walk into the unknown. Be a role model and show how to deal with inse-
curity and failure. In this way, the two-dimensional approach can be 
overcome.
Give away rigid, expected power. This is a situation in which the narrative 
process and dynamics can organize themselves. It is an invitation to you 
and others to expand their capabilities, moving between individual intention 
and system intention as well as between stability and flow. 
Disappoint expectations, to be rejected with your inner and outer space. 
When you as leader, coach, or consultant can be comfortable with being 
different, there is more space for dizziness, discomfort, the unknown, and 
bewilderment.
Believe in the whole and its future potentials, provide and hold the space, 
even when there is the uncomfortable feeling of nothing, of emptiness. 
Put a lot of work into providing and holding anarchy and hold it open so 
dizziness can pave the way for decomposition.
Slow down, let go of time and grasp anarchy and dizziness in order to 
succeed and be sustainable in the long run. 
The way we lead and organize ourselves is what our organizations have become 
in relation to us as individuals in relation to our society. “Power for” focuses 
on awareness in cooperation, responsibility, and emancipation, mutual actions 
that expand the freedom and activity of others in any form of collective social 
construction, in teams, departments, corporations, networks, states, and society. 
Everybody can grow transformational capacities. There are two interwoven 
paths: from the inside out and from the outside in. Empower yourself, dare to 
decompose and grow new clarity through transformation and cocreation in  
a way that roots in and embraces power with multi-perspective awareness for 
a shared human future.
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Alice Pechriggl is Professor of Philosophy at the Alpe-Adria-Universität in  
Klagenfurt. In cooperation with Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and Leonhard 
Grond, the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, and Nora Leitgeb from the Kunstraum 
Lakeside, she organized the workshop “Navigating in the Unknown” at the 
Department of Philosophy in Klagenfurt in May 2015. On the first of the two-day 
workshop, a HASENHERZ with the film Failed States (2008) by American film-
maker Henry Hills took place in the Kunstraum Lakeside.1 A music performance 
by the Swiss artist Charlotte Hug concluded the first day. On the second day, 
the workshop was moved into the university, where a number of lectures and 
podium discussions delved deeper into the topic of navigating in the unknown.
Karoline Feyertag (KF): I would like to combine two topics in our con-
versation: on the one hand, the topic of dizziness and vertigo, of losing 
one’s sense of orientation and balance, and, on the other, your project 
concerning the development of a theory of action, especially with regard 
to withstanding dizziness. Considering that uncertainty is one of the 
most important aspects of dizziness, I suggest that action is the other 
major issue. In the conception of the exhibition “Dizziness. Navigating 
the Unknown” at the Kunsthaus Graz, the idea of falling into dizziness, 
going through it, but also coming out of it, was very important. The 
chief curator, Katrin Bucher Trantow, realized that the visitors also had 
to be accompanied out of the exhibition, so they were not left alone, 
lost in dizziness. For our research project we use the Keat’s term “negative 
capability,” which is similar to the term “containment,” coined by the 
psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion.
Alice Pechriggl (AP): Maybe this would be a good point for me to cut in, or 
otherwise this discussion might be too long.
KF: Yes, I was thinking we would start the conversation with the individ-
ual, because this was also the starting point of our research project. 
During the project, we came to realize that the individual itself is not 
enough but that he or she can be understood as a starting point for the 
experience of dizziness. With regard to the term “experience,” I would 
like to quote your announcement text for the workshop “Navigating the 
Unknown” that we held together in Klagenfurt in 2015: “What are we 
doing when we try to rethink the concept of action including uncon­
scious action? That is the initial question that needs to be answered not 
Navigating in the 
Unknown 
Karoline Feyertag and Alice Pechriggl
1 HASENHERZ is the screening and discussion 
format developed by Anderwald and 
Grond, which appropriates ideas of Arnold 
Schönberg’s Society for Private Musical 
Performances for film and video works. 
HASENHERZ shows a film and discusses it 
with the artist and public, then screens 
the work a second time, after the 
conversation.
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It was also of great interest to me to take a close look at the mise-en-scène:  
I therefore began with three phases of execution and worked with it for two 
years. The mise-en-scène accounts for the imaginary, thus the imaginary insti-
tution of our society, and I have dealt with the social imaginary according to 
Cornelius Castoriadis for a long time. If you were to ask me about experience, 
empeiria, I would say that I went to Paris to experience the imaginary with 
Castoriadis;5 and later I turned toward dealing with questions concerning the 
body. You then wrote your dissertation, which I had the honor of supervizing;  
I also found the experience of working together to be wonderful, and am happy 
that we think of each other again, years later. This matrix of people that we 
enjoy working with is very important to me, to my individuality—it is something 
I consider to be very real, because I was recently very sick, and I became 
highly aware of my own mortality.
Coming back to the three phases of execution, at that point they seemed 
complete to me. But then I had a major skiing accident, in which I fell so badly 
that I got a slight tear in my aorta. I could not remember anything—I had ret-
rograde amnesia, forgot everything, and said the same thing again and again 
every few minutes, which everyone found rather disturbing. After eight hours, 
these symptoms disappeared and even my concussion was not that bad. After-
ward, I had to take things very slowly, and was on sick leave for three weeks, 
yet I constantly thought about my book Agieren und Handeln and about the 
three-phase model. I thought to myself that something was missing. Well, and 
then I realized that the fall was missing: How to come out of the act of falling? 
Why do you fall so far that you almost die? These questions became so important 
to me that I added mise en abîme as the fourth phase of execution.
That is how I came even closer to your research project on dizziness than I had 
already with the concepts of action, the unconscious, the chaotic within  
action, the uncontrollable, and the undefinable that evades the control mech-
anisms of the conscious and of deliberation. By introducing the mise en abîme, 
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only in a theoretical manner, but also through an empirical approach. 
We intend to shed light upon the term ‘empirical,’ and to realize it in a 
philosophical manner based on the term empeiria, experience […]; in 
the framework of an artistic analysis of the world, that is by means of 
improvised as well as planned action, and attentive, as well as thought-
ful follow ups concerning lived experiences.”2
Your approach of artistically analyzing the world is comparable to that 
of Ruth Anderwald and Leonhard Grond, regarding their approach to-
ward dizziness, inasmuch they combine experience with reflection. It 
seems that both approaches use as their starting point the term empei-
ria, or bodily experience. How much self-observation and also self-
forgetfulness can be found in your philosophical-empirical approach? 
Where do you see moments of dizziness in your work process?
AP: This question really moved me—right away I had to think of the four phases 
of execution that I developed within my emergence ontology, as I wanted to 
distance myself from the Aristotelian teleology that is found within any theory 
of action. To this day, the philosophical-teleological model of dynamis (possi-
bility), energeia (potentiality and actuality), eidos (cause of form), telos (cause 
of purpose), and entelechia (completion or goal-orientated realization) stands 
in the foreground in all sciences that deal with the concept of action. There-
fore, I developed a four-phase model comprised of mise-en-scène (creativity in 
actu), mise en sens (logos and deliberate action),3 mise en acte (potential 
and its actualization), and mise en abîme (chaos as negativity, the potential of 
collapse). However, the order in which these four phases occur is irrelevant. 
What is important is how the single phases are combined. These combinations 
do not intend to replace Aristotle, but rather expand on his theory.
The mise en sens accounts for the action, the act of giving meaning, the thought 
devoted to what we do, the reflective moment within deliberation or boulêsis4—
while the mise en acte is always at work. The latter corresponds to energeia 
according to Aristotle. It means that you are always doing something, either 
alone or with others, when thinking, speaking, but also physically—you are always 
active, even when sleeping. The mise en acte is actually the most natural; 
the mise en sens is what we finally produce when we think about what we have 
done. It is our mental and dianoetic contributions that have the power to 
transform our acting out into deliberate action. However, it is important I 
mention that also within acting out in the psychoanalytical sense of the term 
that there is a thought process present: it is subliminal, thus unconscious. 
Resembling latent thought within dreams, thought is at work within the uncon-
scious, yet in a very different manner.
2 Alice Pechriggl, quoted in Taumel, no. 2 
(2015), http://on-dizziness.com 
/booklet-2/. Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations by Christopher 
Hütmannsberger. 
3 This refers to action that relies on 
deliberation, that is, on discussion by a 
group and on reason-guided reflection.
4 “Boulêsis is not only deliberatio and 
deliberate will, but also establishes a 
positive freedom as something with which 
people decide upon their world; in the 
history of institutions it established a 
democratic government (boulê) as a 
collective act of giving the matter 
thought, thus the self-governing polis.” 
Alice Pechriggl, Agieren und Handeln: 
Studien zu einer philosophisch­
psychoanalytischen Handlungstheorie 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2018), 25.
5 The concept of the social-historical 
imaginary was established by Cornelius 
Castoriadis in his seminal book The Imagi­
nary Institution of Society (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1998). Alice Pechriggl earned 
her habilitation degree with a thesis on 
Castoriadis’s philosophy. It was published 
in French under the title Corps transfigurés: 
Stratifications de l’imaginaire des sexes/
genres (Paris: Harmattan, 2001).
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I was also able to establish a connection between the chaos that emerges 
from excessive control and the ordering mechanisms that emerge through 
unconscious, planned action. This kind of connection represents a Chiasma.6 
As the mise en abîme—entirely in line with Hegelian dialectics—offers both 
the possibility of a new start, as well as the possibility of utter destruction, of 
death, of the end of form, of a figure—whether this is good or bad, pleasant 
or unpleasant does not matter in this case. In that respect, it is a central 
phase, and I was surprised that I had not thought about it before; however, 
had it not been for that accident, I would not have come to the realization. 
My book would have been missing an important part, and maybe I would not 
have even finished writing it. These “life events” have given me a lot of 
strength, with regard to the book, but also to my life in general; also my sick-
ness—that I do not want to describe here—became an important phase of my 
life because it affected the joy of life with my friends, my work, and philoso-
phizing together.
KF: Could you please expand on the terms “emergence” and “emergence 
ontology”? Is emergent to be understood as something connected to 
acting out and as something that simply comes to the surface of conscious-
ness? Is the term “emergence” to be set in contrast to “teleology”  
and does emergence then mean an (unforeseen) event? What arises through 
emergence? Or is it a term that points to experience as empeiria?
AP: Anything can arise. Something that emerges, that arises, can come up in 
all walks of life—in experiences, in interpersonal action, no matter if this is in 
reference to a form of thinking, of imagining, of symbols, ways of acting,  
or of things that we come up with. What interests me is giving space to the 
developments of the term, and not always knowing and controlling what 
should come out at the end: this forceful “I know what I want, and that is what 
is going to happen, and you all have to adhere to me.” I have worked with  
various committees at the university and have always suffered from the teleo-
logical-techno-bureaucratic train of thought and how rigidly it defines all 
forms of action. At that point, deliberate action ceases to be action and be-
comes mere functioning: people must function in the way that the new 
planned economy demands, and their creativity is supposed to be part of 
that. Those are absolutely absurd thoughts, and even I could not say for  
certain that they exist as conscious thoughts. Managers have their programs 
and the auditors check—and it is those checks that are becoming increasingly 
scary for the top floors at university. It is a regime of fear and terror, but the 
people do not see it as such. 
However, there are those, especially within the arts and humanities, who severely 
suffer under such a regime—and from the dumbing-down process that comes 
with it. That is what made me sick, but that is also what made me so productive, 
since I was interested in how to account for the new forms we are constantly 
creating; not only in a positive sense, we all also come up with monstrosities—
that is also emergence. And emergence emphasizes the spontaneous char-
acter of what arises, rather than the teleologically planned form. The latter is 
important to me as well, because we have to be able to imagine what we are 
doing when we do it. But that is not everything. And coming from my experi-
ence with group psychoanalysis, I wanted to get to the bottom of this: how it is 
connected, how one can transport the other, and how shedding light on this 
connection can also help us in our action. I see a certain improvisation in 
acting out—and that is where art, and the collaboration with artists helps me 
a lot, as improvisation, as well as acting out, is so important to many artists—
like it is for me as philosopher; I like just sitting and thinking, and waiting to 
see what happens in my thought resonance space,7 in my body, in my mind, 
or in my psyche. Or simply: What did I dream? I am very happy about dreams, 
also the strange ones, which is why I love watching films, but I do not want to 
deal with films on a scientific level, because that could take away the experi-
ence to some extent.
KF: There are two points I would like to consider more precisely: on the 
one hand on improvisation, on the other on togetherness. During our 
workshop in 2015 in Klagenfurt, there was a musical performance by the 
Swiss artist Charlotte Hug in the Kunstraum Lakeside, where improvisa-
tion played a large part; furthermore, we realized throughout our research 
on dizziness that the individual itself cannot deal with dizziness on 
their own and must rely on the assistance of others, and if possible a safe 
and sheltering space that surrounds them, or rather in which they are 
included.
6 Derived from χίασμα, Chíasma “crossing” 
after the Greek letter X. See Alice Pechriggl, 
Chiasmen: Antike Philosophie von Platon 
zu Sappho – von Sappho zu uns (Bielefeld: 
transcript, 2006). Also see the last para-
graph of this text.
7 “The thought resonance space is no longer 
solely a scheme that is created through 
radical imagination of images and concepts, 
but also a bodily and psychic medium in 
which passivity and activity should be 
considered to be entangled on a medial 
level; it is a nonplace over and in which 
the body moves imagining and thinking 
about itself without ever leaving it entirely, 
yet also acting in a disassociating and 
seceding manner. This thought resonance 
space is characterized by many voices on 
a linguistic level, but also as a space of the 
ever socialized individual; it is a space in 
which there are many, a group space in a 
figurative, but also in a literal sense in that 
the various carriers of the voices, and 
authors of the thoughts seem to be present 
within us.” Alice Pechriggl, “Versuch einer 
gedanklichen Visualisierung vielstimmig 
sich gebärdenden Denkens,” in Korporale 
Performanz: Zur bedeutungsgenerierenden 
Dimension des Leibes, ed. Arno Böhler, 
Christian Herzog, and Alice Pechriggl 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2003), 178.
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Regarding improvisation: Hug’s performance had a strong influence on 
the theory workshops the next day at the university, and she also took 
part and spoke about improvisation and about her experiences in music, 
in which improvisation plays such a large part. In her talk, she addressed 
the problem of breaking down the habit of falling into patterns, something 
that was also mentioned by the artist duo Anderwald and Grond. Every-
one tends to fall into patterns when improvising, and so it is important 
to be able to interrupt yourself, or to throw yourself off track, as these 
patterns tend to emerge very quickly. This is very understandable espe-
cially in music, but also in thought and action, maybe also in acting out. 
That would be the question to you: How do you deal with improvisation, 
without quickly falling into a pattern that repeats something and finally 
does not provide a space, which bears the possibility of something 
new, or a change in the status quo?
AP: “Pattern” is a good term, which I hardly use and practically never in my 
book. It is a very important concept in psychoanalysis. Maybe I will tell a short 
story from my childhood: My father was a jazz musician and he still played 
when I was a child. That meant that I was always surrounded by the sound of 
jazz. Improvisation was also always a topic. I very much appreciated Hug’s 
performance, and her description of improvising, but also her description of the 
ensemble in London, with which she only improvises.8 It is not like in classical 
jazz, where you have a standard that you always come back to after improvising, 
so that you have order again that you then deviate from—these people meet 
only to improvise. I liked that very much.
If we now turn to psychoanalysis—be that for an individual or a group—it is 
often about free association. Groups make more sense to me, especially for 
serious pathologies, but often people are so individualistically habituated 
that they refuse a group. I believe there to be many connections between im-
provising in art, in jazz—especially in music—but also in other fields, such  
as performance art and with free association in psychoanalysis. It is difficult 
because we are always trapped in patterns of ordered speech, and from a 
young age onward we are told to sit still, and to speak and write properly—of 
course it is important in a culture that is very much based on writing and 
comprehensibility. But that is something that has been set against us and is a 
constant battle within us. I once heard my colleague Sophie Klimis say at a 
lecture series in the context of our research project “Generating Bodies” that 
she had learned to play classical music, but then wanted to play jazz, and that 
that was impossible for her because she simply could not unlearn the pat-
terns of music virtuosity that were drilled into her. It took her a very long time 
to loosen the hold of those patterns, which are very similar to those of the 
university regime. She was certain it would have been easier for her to learn 
free improvisation had she not had such a strict musical education. Of 
course it is a good thing if you know what you are doing and have attained 
such virtuosity.
That is what I believe to be important when it comes to creating terms. That is 
why I speak of emergence ontology. I liked the emergence theory by Francisco 
Varela, and others, that opens a window into biology and allows for spontaneous 
developments. That means that it is not the survival of the fittest, but maybe 
also, allow me to speak biblically, that the last will be the first; the smallest, the 
worst adapted life-forms could appear to be the fittest based on some circum-
stance or another, because maybe their constitution fits best after a catastrophe. 
If it had been up to the evolutionary plan, they might have disappeared. It is 
something that I also see politically: an insurgency of the weak; they gather 
and produce something against all expectations. That is something I very 
much appreciate about free association: something arises that was suppressed. 
That is why I love psychoanalysis, and why I find it especially wonderful to 
experience in a group. When something arises from within the group, everyone 
can enjoy it together. Or when someone frees him or herself from anxiety, it 
is incredibly touching. In a situation like that you experience empathy and pity 
at the same time, almost like in a Greek tragedy—he or she might start to cry 
within the group, but also frees him or herself, and the others are happy and 
sad at the same time. That is true compassion. That also holds true in larger 
groups that are often not as intimate, but in smaller groups you often hear very 
personal stories and through this catharsis—very much in the sense of Aristotle’s 
Poetics—everyone participates in this liberation from anxiety or from the sup-
pression of emotions that would have only represented a danger if you were 
to open Pandora’s box by yourself. In that respect, a group does help a lot to 
contain, to catch, to endure. A group can have a very comforting effect, and 
you can see how kind people can be to each other, but of course also how mean.
KF: Yes, I was just about to ask what the other side looks like. My fear of 
such a group analysis is essentially the fear of the other people.
AP: Yes, but you are sheltered by the setting. That is why such a group is min-
imally led by a psychoanalyst.
KF: Is there a relation between dizziness and queerness from your per-
spective as a queer-feminist philosopher, perhaps for instance between 
the experiences of dizziness and coming out? In the context of the  
research project I have treated this question under the title “Queering 
Dizziness,” displaying the semantic proximity of (gender) trouble and 
8 This refers to the London Improvisers  
Or chestra: http://www.londonimprovisers 
orchestra.co.uk/.
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dizziness, for example analyzing feelings of insecurity, which are provoked 
by bearded women in a heteronormative society.9
AP: There is a connection between queerness and dizziness for sure and I would 
like to answer your question this way: Nearly every society institutes two 
gender classes that are more or less strictly separated; not all individuals would 
fit smoothly within one of these classes, be it in a psychic, somatic, or psycho-
somatic way. In this case, we speak of intersex, transgender, or genderqueer 
persons. Feeling situated between the two classes, which are inseparable from 
the power relations they institute, is confusing. The confusion not only  
concerns the libidinal economy of these persons or their socially conditioned 
identification process but also implies dizziness as a kind of permanent 
questioning of something that seems natural for the majority, namely, unam-
biguous gender difference and exclusive heterosexual orientation derived 
from it, even if its taken-for-grantedness is illusory. One could say that people 
who are marked by this questioning have integrated dizziness more than 
others. They lack a certainty that others and the normative society believe 
they have. Yet, it seems to me that this certainty begins to crumble for the 
“normal people” too.
*
At this point in the conversation, the recording device broke down unexpect-
edly. However, I luckily made notes that allows us to gain more insight into 
the connection between dizziness, the abyss (abîme), deliberate action, and 
acting out with regard to the collective and the group.
A major advantage that group analysis has over an individual session concerns 
the transfer situation that Pechriggl emphasizes in the interview. In such a case, 
the group acts as the subject and the various projections can be split up 
among multiple people, and the patterns that are usually transferred onto a 
single person, the analyst, can be broken down in an easier manner. Pechriggl 
also points out that within a group, problems that are caused by a group 
(family, society, etc.) can be better analyzed and solved. In her experience, the 
personal drives, personal stories, and experiences cause afflictions, but even 
more so, problems are caused by social declassification and socioeconomic 
pressure. Another moment of dizziness within a group situation is that of silence. 
It becomes menacing, but at the same time it represents a place of collecting, 
collection, and reassurance. To endure the silence in a group can often be very 
difficult.
With reference to the workshop “Navigating the Unknown,” Pechriggl saw the 
technique of navigating to be much like the principle of triangulation in sailing, 
in which you must have a third bearing in order to avoid “losing one’s bear-
ings.” To apply this to psychoanalysis, the third bearing would be society and 
language, very much in the sense of Jacques Lacan’s topology of the imagi-
nary. Pechriggl reminds us of the Möbius strip that represents disorientation, 
the uncanny, and fear, as a geometrical shape for Lacan. On a Möbius strip, 
the top side is simultaneously the bottom, the right simultaneously the left. 
This makes it impossible to spatially orientate yourself, pulling the rug from 
under the feet of the Euclidean space, and we fall into dizziness. This reversal 
is also achieved by another figure, the Chiasma, which is shaped less by 
mathematics and more by linguistics and rhetoric: the key component in tropes 
or figures of speech is created by the Chiasma in a crossover space, which  
is simultaneously a thought resonance space. Through the crossover of an X 
(chi) connections are created between what previously seemed to be uncon-
nected: applying this to Pechriggl’s critical continuation of action theory in 
reference to emergence ontology, the figure of the Chiasma could represent 
a combination of freedom and acting out, as well as between deliberate  
action and obligation. To act freely in the sense of free association within psycho-
analysis and artistic improvisation, Pechriggl talks about a potential for libera-
tion that has the potential of noticeably tipping the scales. Instead of asking 
about freedom of action we must now also ask about the obligation of action, 
or of forced action—and now we have returned to the regime of fear and terror 
by the new planned economy.10
The end of the conversation was shaped by the question of whether or not 
it is possible to learn to fall, and if that would help in cases where people lose 
their proprioception. In those cases, Pechriggl says we can practice falling.
Translated from the German by Christopher Hütmannsberger
9 The continued thought meets the seman tic 
relation and possibly chiasmic structure 
of dizziness/resource and navigating/
unknown. New possible combinations of 
the chiasma mentioned above that disturb, 
or expand the usual contrasting pairs, 
could be: navigating in dizziness or dizzying 
navigation, and the unknown as a resource. 
What seems more familiar to us is: 
navigating as a resource, and dizziness as 
the unknown.
10 For example, American artist Zoe 
Leonard’s photography from a series of 
five silver gelatin prints, “Preserved Head 
of a Bearded Woman,” Musée Orfila, 1991 
(Collection of Centre Pompidou, Paris) 
reflects the medical and heteronormative 
gaze in the anatomical museum as well as 
the practice of exhibiting the “abnormal” 
and the very fact of taking pictures. See 
also Karoline Feyertag’s essay “Queering 
Dizziness,” http://on-dizziness.com 
/queering_dizziness/.
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Perhaps we can change the world without taking power. Perhaps we 
cannot. The starting point—for all of us, I think—is uncertainty, not 
knowing, a common search for a way forward. Because it becomes 
more and more clear that capitalism is a catastrophe for humanity. A 
radical change in the organisation of society, that is, revolution, is more 
urgent than ever. 
—John Holloway
A fundamental interest in democratic coexistence and how to live together 
better are at the core of Oliver Ressler’s work. How we identify and how we 
communicate with each other are questions that logically emerge from there. 
His artistic practice generally serves as a political statement and a call for  
resistance within a globally connected world. For almost twenty-five years, 
Ressler’s work has become exemplary for pinpointing and actively forming 
concepts of resistance and reaction; an activism that works in the art field and 
beyond. Ressler finds his fields of interest and resistance all over the econom-
ically, politically, and ecologically linked world. His research analyzes economic 
conditions and political forms of organization, focusing primarily, for example, 
on forms of resistance found in the so-called anti-globalization movement or 
in the climate-justice movement. Characteristic of his work is the representation 
of alternatives to the existing, conveyed in films, photographs and installations 
as role models for action. He often works in collaboration with other artists, 
scientists and activist groups. This text is based on a public talk between the 
artist and the author at the U-jazdowski Castle, Warsaw, on December 2, 2017,1 
and aims at unraveling Ressler’s strategies of fundamentally questioning  
social inequality as a threat to democracy. His work often consistently focuses 
on finding just solutions for an equitable community: a community beyond 
capitalist profit maximization, power relations, and hierarchies. His aim is to 
find uncommon ways out of seemingly blocked or antagonistic situations, 
while the power of the collective and its collective decision-making processes 
serve as his models for individual action. At the conference, Ressler stated 
that in his practice he follows interests in different models of self-organization: 
“I follow the questions of economy, democracy and ecology—while looking 
for forms of alternatives. And then I am interested in spreading the work.” 
Ressler was born in Austria in 1970 and lives in Vienna. Originally educated in 
painting, he eventually moved on to the analysis of image and text, of their 
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1 The talk took place during the conference 
“Balancing Togetherness,” which was held 
on December 2–3 at the Centre of Contem-
porary Art, U-jazdowski, during the show 
“Dizziness. Navigating the Unknown,” 
curated by Ruth Anderwald, Katrin Bucher 
Trantow, and Leonard Grond. See “Balancing 
Togetherness—The Conference 02/12/2017,” 
YouTube video, 4:34:38, posted by 
“Centrum Sztuki Współczesnej Zamek 
U-jazdowski,” March 5, 2018, https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=4prduCdKiDw.
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conditions. Production budgets for exhibitions, festivals, and catalogues help 
to reach out for grants in visual arts and film, while the institution regularly 
represents a safe space—in the sense of Foucault—from where the decon-
structed message can spread from within to without.  
For the exhibition “Dizziness. Navigating the Unknown,” we chose, together 
with our cocurators Ruth Anderwald and Leonard Grond, Ressler’s three-
channel video installation Occupy, Resist, Produce (2014/15–ongoing) to tackle 
the concept of finding creative solutions. The ongoing film project documents 
different cases of worker’s self-organization, and is done in collaboration with 
the political scientist, sociologist, and documentary filmmaker Dario Azzellini. 
Ressler has worked with Azzellini previously, for example, during the Bolivarian 
Process when they documented worker-controlled factories, which served  
as a model and a basis for the filmmakers’ interest in workers self-empowerment. 
They also documented the takeovers in Venezuela in 2005 during the legally 
benevolent situation of the stately approved process under the presidency of 
Hugo Chavez.4 
education. Since the mid-’90s, video-based installations and text and image 
montages became central elements of his practice. Ressler was first known 
shortly after his studies when his works appeared in the public space. As a 
reaction to the overwhelming success and the rise of the FPÖ (the so-called 
Freedom Party of Austria, a right-wing populist party), under the leadership of 
the infamous Jörg Haider, Ressler—together with Martin Krenn—started bill-
board projects like Institutional Racism (1997) that focused on detention centers 
for undocumented migrants as an example of state-regulated (institutional) 
racism. In contrast to critical NGOs and liberal media, the project did not call 
for a reform, for the improvement of the poor conditions in these institutions, 
but was fighting for an end to the existence of these facilities.
In Gelernte Heimat (Learned homeland, 1996), one of their first poster projects, 
Ressler and Krenn tackle the issue of hidden political interests and political 
residue in Austrian educational textbooks. They used the books customarily 
employed at state schools for their research, extracting images and quotes. 
Transferred onto two massive poster collages, they chose images and texts 
dealing with the concept of homeland, nation, and belonging. Installing the 
posters in the main square in the city of Graz as well as at the Neue Galerie 
where they were shown together with interviews from the public square, they 
consciously used the “art institutions to explore a content more deeply […] 
and use the field of art in order to go beyond the field of art.”2 Krenn and Ressler 
contextualized the material and exposed it as highly contaminated by political 
right-wing vocabulary and imagery. The conception of homeland itself became 
evident as a construction and a concept of the Austrian nationalist state in 
search of segregation, rather than identification.  
Tools of Criticality and Self-Empowerment
In the case of Gelernte Heimat, the discussions provoked immediate results: 
after a report on national radio FM4 by Susanna Niedermayr, the radio station 
started a campaign where pupils were asked to collect racist texts from their 
school books and many schools took part.3 
Producing artworks that serve as a starting point and as a instrument for pub-
lic discussions remains one of the main aims of Ressler’s practice up until to-
day. Another core concern lies in a critical attitude toward the institutional, 
which also includes the art institution itself. Ressler has learned to use the in-
stitutional setting of the art gallery as a tool for his profound analysis of dem-
ocratic systems and their approaches to communication: he makes use of the 
art institutions set up supporting scientific research and aesthetic analysis. 
Economically the art field has offered Ressler possibilities to network between 
different scientific fields and to create criticality, even if under precarious 
2 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=4prduCdKiDw. 
3 Markus Wailand, “Willkommen Österreich,” 
Falter 42, no. 97, http://www.ressler.at 
/institutional_racism/falter.html.
4 “With the Bolivarian government seeking 
to develop ‘21st century socialism,’ it 
offered financial support to workers willing 
to organize into cooperatives. Recognizing 
that restarting idle factories could generate 
new jobs and add to national output, in 
July 2005, Hugo Chávez announced in his 
weekly television program, Aló Presidente, 
that 136 closed factories were to be evaluated 
for possible expropriation.” Sharat G. Lin, 
“Can the Bolivarian Process Achieve 
So cialism? 5 Worker-Controlled Factories in 
Venezuela,” Venezuela Analysis, Sep tem ber 5, 
2006, http://www.venezualanalysis.com.
Figs. 55–56
Martin Krenn and Oliver Ressler, 
Gelernte Heimat (Learned homeland),1996
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the others prove certain theories that allow one to apply to reality what we 
have seen on screen.”7 
I believe that is the case in many levels: curatorially, the work of Ressler con-
sequently served as an instrument to give an image to the idea of finding a 
way to move on. Starting with the claim that the experience of dizziness often 
accompanies creative processes that are defined by the three stages of 
moving in, through, and out, the exhibition was shaped accordingly in three 
overlapping zones. These three conditions connected to the three states of 
falling, colliding, and swerving, which are found in Lucretius’s first-century BC 
didactic poem ”De rerum natura” and describe three kinds of movement toward 
the emergence of the new or extraordinary. As curators we used this struc-
ture to recreate the process of creative thinking through the experience and 
analysis of artistic works in the space and in creating the meandering path 
through the works in the exhibition space. Motion turned out to be highly im-
portant as a solution to physically step forward and empirically point out  
possible ways to go out of the show, to leave dizziness and find stability by moving 
on. In the context of the exhibition, the three-channel video installation thus 
allowed us to understand the implications and workings of dissent as much as 
a feeling of dizziness productively. The work actively demonstrated a way 
out of a crisis. On the one hand, through its physical presence as an actively 
engaging installation inviting the public to sit down on a set of bleachers 
reminiscent of wide stairs in a public square while also hinting at the function 
of pedestals honoring a partaking public. On the other hand, by means of 
the successful combination of art and activism, demonstrated in film through 
several existing examples seen in parallel; all of them displaying democratic 
decision-making growing into common action. The installation as a whole served 
thereby to finalize a processual experience throughout the exhibition reaching 
from powerless and dizzying dependency toward self-empowerment: Azzellini 
and Ressler’s work showed a way to leave dizziness through the experience 
of collectivity and solidarity. 
On another practical level, Azzellini and Ressler used the film as an instrument 
to research the process of collaboration and the process of common decisions 
concretely: “There are several decision-making bodies that we analysed. [In all 
three factories alike]. [We recorded] two different meetings. For the one, it is 
The multilayered construction of Occupy, Resist, Produce comes together in 
an exemplary way to articulate a strong plea for resistance and self-organization. 
The work deals with a dark side of speculations in a globalized and impersonal 
free-market economy, when after the global economic crises of 2007/8 workers 
suddenly became unemployed; where functioning factories were abruptly 
left and their financial assets were often taken along by their legal representa-
tives and owners. 
It’s important to state that in the occupations of factories [in Occupy, 
Resist, Produce] in Milan, Rome and Thessaloniki [RiMAflow, Officine 
Zero and Vio.Me] emerged out of fraudulent situations where in all cases 
the workers have been defrauded by the legal owners of the factories. 
In all cases the workers struggle radicalized once they realized that they 
wouldn’t get the wages that were owed to them. [...] After months of 
struggling these workers collectively decided that the only possibility to 
continue working in the factory would be to take over all the responsibil-
ities in the factory and produce and manage without their legal bosses. [...] 
Usually the group of workers not only had to establish a new form of colla-
boration, but also to develop a new form of production. For different reasons: 
In one example [RiMAflow] the workers occupied a more or less empty 
factory where the machinery had been sold by the legal owner. [...] In 
the Vio.Me factory in Thessaloniki the machinery park was very old [and 
needed restoration]. But there is no way to get a loan for an occupied factory 
from the bank of course, as its no legal entity entitled to receive a loan. [...] 
In this case the workers decided to start an organic soap production and 
raised the necessary small investment through private loans from people 
who fought in solidarity with them.5
Ressler and Azzellini’s concentration on situations of self-organization and 
solidarity with others ties in with social movements and critical thinking today 
as described in John Holloway’s publication Change the World without Taking 
Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today (2002) that searches alternatives to 
the politics of a central power as in capitalism.6 Holloway suggests to form 
councils as teams, to build “cracks” in the existing neoliberal system. His idea 
is that collective movements can form a logic differently from that of profit: 
the logic of cracking capitalism. That is, to create, within the very society that 
is being rejected, spaces, moments, or areas of activity in which a different 
world is imagined and—just as in Ressler and Azzellini’s work—revolutionary 
alternatives are prefigured. 
Marco Scotini calls Ressler’s films “manuals of dissenting techniques” and refers 
to Jean-Luc Godard’s plea in 1970 that there “are two kind of militant films, 
those we call blackboard film and those known as international films. The latter 
are the equivalent of chanting L’Internationale during a demonstration, while 
5 Oliver Ressler, (lecture, Centre of Contem-
porary Art, U-jazdowski, December 2, 
2017); see https://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=4prduCdKiDw.
6 John Halloway, Change the World without 
Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution 
Today (London: Pluto Press, 2002); 
https://libcom.org/files/John Holloway 
-Change the world without taking power 
.pdf.
7 Jean-Luc Godard, quoted in Marco Scotini 
and Oliver Ressler, ‘“Blackboard” Cinema 
and the Capitalistic Regime of Enunciation,” 
in Oliver Ressler, Cartographies of Protest, 
trans. Otmar Binder (Nuremberg: Verlag 
für Moderne Kunst, 2014). 19.
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they also create a certain reality—they are tools to be used in different 
contexts.”9 As was the case in the exhibition “Dizziness” the work is presented 
in museums. However, it can appear also in film festivals, etc., and can be 
seen and understood by a differently interested public. Furthermore, users of 
the films can be political organizations, the portrayed workers themselves or 
other workers in similar situations also struggling with existence and production. 
Workers can use the films as way to understand better these processes and 
to make the struggle understood by a public, or by political decision makers. 
Thes film as such grow into being a far-reaching testimonial and representa-
tion to put up resistance. 
“Alternatives Need to Be Expressed through Language”10
Occupy, Resist, Produce works as the descriptive title of a three-channel video 
installation, but it is also a manifesto and could just as well be the refrain of  
a protest song. It is also a slogan used in different languages coming from the 
struggles for workers control. Language in Ressler’s case is a critical tool for  
a new form of speculative imagination of alternatives. He uses language in his 
works in different ways: in his installations and films we find text lines or slogans 
as songs, chants but also as visual citations like demonstration banners or 
posters. Text also appears as an ongoing line of subtitles for a precise under-
standing of what people say. As in the early poster projects, language can 
also appear in form of text-image-montages. When Ressler states that realities 
first have to be imagined and tested in language, he points out to the fact 
that language together with the image is the medium to reflect on and decon-
struct prefabricated beliefs. Ressler’s work therefore is showing us how to 
demonstrate in multiple ways.
When in his non-documentary work Emergency Turned Upside-Down (2016) 
Ressler comments on the so-called summer of migration in 2015, he confronts 
the cynical and inhuman discourse about the flight of refugees. This repeatedly 
called refugees’ presence in Europe an “emergency” when that word should 
be applied to the war, terror, and economic strangulation that forced people 
to leave their home. Other than in most of his works, Ressler underlies the 
film consisting of drawn animations in black and white with a narrator’s voice. 
Overlapping lines form an abstract pattern that together with the dropping words 
evoke borderlines, migration routes, and outlines of states, lifelines, and human 
heart rates. The film—atypical in a way—is a consistent and even bitter comment 
the existing workers assembly, so their most important decision-making body. 
We created a second situation, in each case a gathering of about six people. […] 
We asked the workers to engage in a discussion with each other how they 
read the past struggle, how they saw their factory’s development up the 
present and how they were seeing and imagining the factory’s future, and future 
pro duc tions.”8
Since the year 2000, his videos have aimed at a public not only inside, but 
also outside the immediate field of art. Moving between art and political activ-
ism, these works pick up themes and practices of resistance from a non- 
institutionalized left. “These films document a certain aspect of reality—but 
8 Oliver Ressler during the talk held on 
December 2 at the Centre of Con-





Occupy, Resist, Produce, installation view at 
U-jazdowskie Castle, 2017
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at the Lusatia lignite coal fields (near Berlin). Last year Ressler finished the 
film on the ZAD, an impressive struggle against the building of an unwanted 
airport on farmland and woods near Nantes. Here the resistance of 2012 is 
documented by the camera apparently grows viral and brings together all dif-
ferent sorts of people fighting against state decisions and real estate specula-
tion. Forty thousand people were involved in a five-week-long struggle, in 
which treetop protests took place and temporary constructions were built to 
resist the attempted evictions. Finally, the state gave up, as opposition grew 
too strong. The film brings forward the actual voices of “disobedient” activists 
and shows them as practically and theoretically skilled persons fighting for a 
collective existence. We hear dialogues, no voice from the offset, no explanations 
of the context besides what the activists tell us or what can be read on the 
protest slogans or a few text inserts in “Everything’s coming together while 
everything’s falling apart: The ZAD.” The voices, like the languages are multiple. 
Through clever cuts, close-ups on seemingly incidental happenings cinemati-
cally used aesthetic functions in different settings and works toward a maximum 
of identification. In the art context, the tractors digging blindly through the 
grounds of the woods might remind us of Robert Smithson’s famous comparison 
between the unthinking building machines and the prehistoric animal world, 
whereas most football fans, demonstrators, or sociologists might see the 
chanting as a necessary act of identification. The protesters themselves are 
on the misuse of language and images of personal fates for systematization, 
categorization, and evaluation. Consequently, the film elaborates on words like 
“border” and “migration” as inventions and possibilities for division and  
“zoning”—for marking out of different types of people—regardless of interna-
tional human and civil rights.
With a view to the speakers of documentary works, Ressler on the other hand 
wants his work “be given back to the people […]. Referring to “Everything‘s 
coming together while everything‘s falling apart: The ZAD (Zone a Défendre)” 
from 2017, Ressler says: “Those people have so much knowledge which generally 
is hardly heard. I tend to bring people together in front of the camera in small 
groups. I hardly film any single people as its mainly collective discussions that 
I want to present in my films.” Consequently, the work, which again is part of a 
continuous film project documenting an ongoing resistance process, focuses 
on a collective struggle against global warming. Three key moments of civil 
disobedience link situations and contexts of the people’s struggle against a 
capitalist system and its dependence on fossil fuels. Starting with mass pro-
tests of activists and a massive presence of police forces during the UN Climate 
Change Conference in Paris in 2015, it continues with the episode Ende Gelände 
(End of the road) from 2016 documenting the massive civil disobedience action 
Figs. 58–59 
Dario Azzellini and Oliver 
Ressler, Occupy, Resist, 
Produce, 2014–15
Fig. 60 
Oliver Ressler, Emergency Turned Upside-Down, 2016
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Toward the end of our talk at the U-jazdowski in December 2017, Ressler refers 
to Rebecca Solnit’s A Paradise Built in Hell (2009) and summarizes that col-
laboration evokes empathy, a side of human nature easily forgotten. Solnit “shows 
that in the very beginning of catastrophes such as the Hurricane Katrina for 
example, people help and support each other. In all the cases that Solnit de-
scribes, it is after a certain time the state and the police forces intervene and 
make the direct and personal support of people impossible. The state will 
rather support already privileged people and forget the others. […] However, 
it shows that we are able to collaborate. For decades, the state has been trying 
to prove that the logic of the [capitalist] system lies in the fact that we cannot 
do things on our own. That we need owners to lead factories to generate profit. 
We should try to forget all of this and—cooperate!”12
clever to use popular iconography and phrases like “Resistance in the land  
of Asterix” that refers to the fact that the police dared to label their police 
operation “Operation César” in the land of Asterix. No wonder then that while 
watching the films the slogans catch us and infect us and before we know it, 
we might become infected with the virus of wanting to become part of it. 
Ressler uses humor as much as other cinematic instruments for identification 
when he, for instance, shows the beauty of resistance in the thoughtful face of 
the true protester who invests her time and energy for a shared cause. He 
skillfully reintroduces an experience of collective euphoria, fear and power of 
the mass that inevitably reminds us of the euphoria experienced in the early 
days of the internet or at music festivals. When asked if he consciously chooses 
positive or happy endings for his films, he said, “I am not sure if ‘happy  
ending’ is the right term. I travel around and focus primarily on these rare ex-
amples of positive aspects of organizing, which are important to highlight to 
strengthen the movement. The only way to seriously fight global warming is 
to engage in civil resistance. We cannot believe that those people, who claim 
to be our representatives in the parliament, will do the job for us. For twenty-
three years nations have been negotiating a reduction of carbon emissions 
[under the framework of the United Nations] and they do not succeed at all: it 
requires that we get involved.”11
Fig. 61 
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By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder (thaumazo) when I think of all 
these things. It sometimes makes me quite dizzy.
—Theaetetus to Socrates
Any reflection on dizziness is very much induced by personal experiences of 
feeling dizzy, lost, disorientated, overwhelmed, trapped, depressed, paralyzed, 
or fearful. Alternatively, moments of getting lost might also be a free and inspir-
ing experience, in which dizziness is a means to take some time off from our 
daily routines and work, or as a resource for reorientation.1 In the following,  
I will try to give an account of what Janus-faced dizziness means in a philosophical 
and political setting, specifically addressing the question: Can dizziness be 
transformed into a method, and if so, to what extent and for what or whose 
purpose?2
This question alludes to the paradox that underlies any reflection on dizziness. 
On the one hand, dizziness is aporetic. This means dizziness is a very bodily 
experience from which there is no escape through rational reflection. It rather 
hinders any kind of rational thinking or even epoché.3 On the other hand, 
dizziness might also become this means or resource by which to escape such 
an aporetic situation because dizziness, causing disequilibrium, sets our or-
ganism into motion.
I will begin with three moments that circumscribe different experiences of dizziness. 
Many scholars, also in this volume, begin with a very personal experience  
as a starting point to reflect on dizziness. These following moments refer to this 
necessity to confront dizziness also personally on an affective level that is 
mediated through language(s) and images.
Art
Henry Hills’s experimental film Failed States (2008) testifies to the basic as-
sumption of ”Dizziness—A Resource,” namely, that dizziness might be trans-
formed into a resource under certain conditions. By editing spinning motions, 





1 See Rebecca Solnit, A Field Guide to Getting 
Lost (New York: Viking Books, 2005).
2 Preliminary work on dizziness as a method 
has been written by Karoline Feyertag. 
See her essay “Le vertige comme méthode,” 
artpress 2, no. 46 (August–September 2017): 
58–62.
3 Epoché refers here to the phenomenological 
method established by Edmund Husserl, 
which is also called “phenomenological 
reduction” through the “bracketing” of 
conscious knowledge (ideas) about the 
external world. This method aims at the 
temporal suspension of rational judgement, 
following the ancient Greek skeptical 
tradition and focusing exclusively on the 
analysis of experience. But if this experience 
is so dazzling that it paralyses the subject 
totally, then the suspension of judgement 
becomes lasting and dangerous.
Fig. 62 
Zoe Leonard, 
Niagara Falls No. 4, 
1986/1991
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lishes a poros to basic philosophical ambiguity and to the ancient Greek chaos. 
It affects us as human beings on an individual and a collective level.
Vertiginous Heights
Furthermore, an aporetic situation might affect everybody, the individual as 
well as the collective, because it is a bodily experience and not only a theo-
retical concept: “Aporia is an experience that affects us on many levels at 
once: we feel discomfort, we doubt ourselves. We may ask, ‘What do I do?’ 
‘What do I say?’ ‘What’s wrong with me?’ An aporia is a crisis of choice, of  
action and identity, and not only of belief. When I have too many choices, or 
no choices, I don’t have a choice; I’m stuck. I don’t know how to go on.”9 
Transformation through dizziness is linked to chaos, which stands for the  
beginning of all existence. Afterward, once the transformation has come to 
an end, the problem is solved, the crisis overcome, and the threshold tres-
passed, the individual has become someone different, and the whole world 
looks changed, debunked. Out of chaos emerged order (cosmos)—in contrast 
to chaos, which is the unordered and limitless (apeiron). To navigate this un-
known space, these unfamiliar or even uncanny experiences, the significance 
of the limit and the threshold needs to be considered.
Both notions, limit and threshold, seem crucial when thinking of the catalysts 
for dizziness and for defining the parameters, which transform dizziness either 
into motion or standstill. Reaching one’s own limit makes one dizzy. Crossing  
a threshold, which is understood as a symbol for ending something and beginning 
something new, could start within dizziness but also could end in lucidity. 
Madeleine Schechter defines the limit as follows: 
In Western tradition, limit appears very early on in Greek philosophy, 
where peras is connected to the problem of the continuum, with the 
general sense that limit marks the end of a region in space, also indicating 
the suppression of all separations. Thus, in the literal sense, as men-
tioned above, limit has a purely physical connotation, being the place 
lates the dizziness he experienced in the aporetic situation of a creative cul-de-sac 
into moving images. Dragging us into the movement of his filmic images, Hills 
also pulls us into our own experience of the unknown by confronting us with 
our own dizziness. As Anderwald and Grond have already stated: “Hills literally 
used dizziness as his resource. […] Not only had the vertiginous perception of 
the world matched his uncertainties about his work, but his becoming dizzy 
also stimulated new sensations and brought back a childhood memory—
spinning and falling into the grass while watching the world turning around 
him.”4 Hills’s reenactment of spinning like a child helped the filmmaker to 
overcome his severe crisis and to realize new ideas.
Throughout the artistic research project ”Dizziness—A Resource,” we’ve discussed 
the notion of “resource,” especially with French philosopher François Jullien. 
In my interview with Jullien, he referred to an initial “common ground or source” 
out of which the understanding of our common world originates and unfolds.5 
Jullien generally speaks of le fonds/fond, la source, and la souche, meaning 
foundation, fount, source, and soil all together.6 This notion of source or 
ground that Jullien adopts is not essentialist but refers in a wider sense to the 
perplexity Aristotle mentions in relation to aporia. “Aporia,” writes Aristotle, 
“is an equality between contrary reasonings [that] would seem to be a cause 
of perplexity; for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find 
everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which 
of the two we are to do.”7
When we feel trapped in between two equally true propositions or possibilities, 
it becomes very hard to decide which side to choose, which direction to  
follow, which path to take. As individuals, we have a range of parameters helping 
us with that decision, keeping us from falling into aporia. But this range of 
parameters, determining what to do, what to think, is always threatened to 
become deranged, confused. Out of fear of chaos, we cling to these parameters 
as if they were cast in stone. Yet, it is only a specific society’s apparatus  
(Michel Foucault’s dispositif), the sociohistorical imaginary (Cornelius Castoriadis) 
instituting those parameters that ought to help us with undecidable questions. 
As Jullien states: “Your theme of dizziness—and that’s what I find interesting—
is that dizziness makes one flourish again, pulling us back to this non- 
differentiated ground of confusion […]. Maybe the interest of the kind of vertigo, 
of dizziness as you use it, is to bring us back to this ground of seeming confu-
sions, but which is actually a ground of ambiguity, non-separation and communi-
cation of opposites among each other.”8 Dizziness is understood as a “re-source” 
in a literal way. The term “resource” comes from the Latin resurgere, meaning 
to rise up again. Dizziness as resource reopens a way toward chaos and lets 
us draw upon this disorder, our existential source, once again. Dizziness 
clears the way to the “foundation-fount” of humankind in Jullien’s sense, estab-
Karoline FeyertagDizziness: From Aporia to Method?
4 Ruth Anderwald, Karoline Feyertag, and 
Leonhard Grond  “Dizziness—A Resource: 
Dizziness and the Compossible Space in 
Research-Creation,” Emotion, Space and 
Society 28 (August 2017), http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2017.07.001.
5 See the conversation with Jullien in this 
volume, 54–64.
6 See Jane Marie Todd, “Translator’s note,” 
In Jullien 2009, xii.
7 Aristotle, “Topics,” in Complete Works, 
vol. I, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984): 245 
(Book 8, 145b).
8 François Jullien, in conversation with the 
author, May 2015.
9 Nicholas C. Burbules, “Aporias, Webs, and 
Passages: Doubt as an Opportunity to 
Learn,” Curriculum Inquiry 30, no. 2 
(2000): 173, https://doi.org/10.1111/0362 
-6784.00161.
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where a certain reality, i.e. thing or territory, ends. However, the term has 
also had from the beginning a complex meaning, since limit can exist 
only in connection with a ‘before’ and a ‘beyond.’ As such, interest in the 
limits of the categories and consequently in their transition or transgres-
sion is the hallmark of a certain epistemological shift, whose focus is not 
on limit as border, but on limit as threshold (which both connects and 
separates), creating a ‘third space’ (in Homi Bhabha’s formulation), and 
as such can be described as in-betweenness (in Victor Turner’s terms).10
The limit as threshold opens up a specific space-time and can be compared 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s “zone of indiscernibility,” to Bhabha’s “third space,” 
and to Foucault’s “heterotopia,” as well as to Jullien’s use of the term “compos-
sibility,” which Ruth Anderwald, Leonhard Grond, and I have developed further 
to the notion of the “compossible space.”11 The apeiron literally means “without 
limit” and designates the proper “space” dizziness creates when there is no 
way out and no end in sight—when orientation is completely lost because of 
no peras (limit or landmark). When we enter the state of dizziness, we not 
only enter unknown territory but also often fall into aporia.
At the edge of an abyss, be it real or virtual, natural or urban, we might  
reach such a limit, and looking down, we might become dizzy.12 Architectural 
historian Davide Deriu speaks about the urban phenomenon of the “vertical 
city.” He suggests there is a political and economic purpose behind this sort of 
Babylonian architecture, constructing ever-higher buildings and skyscrapers, 
for example, in a downtown area. “In recent years, the growth of vertical cities 
around the world has been increasingly associated with the pursuit of dizzying 
experiences that reflect, and respond to, different states of suspension.  
Examples abound in contemporary high-rise architecture: the observation 
Fig. 63 
Ruth Anderwald + Leonhard Grond, 
Human Flight Experiments Nr. 34, 2003
10 Madeleine Schechter, “Liminal and Hybrid 
Aspects of Intersemiotics,” Internet­
Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften 16 
(August 2006), http://www.inst.at/trans 
/16Nr/01_2/schechter16.htm.
11 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizo phrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(London: Athlone, 1988); Homi K. Bhabha, 
The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 
1994); Michel Foucault, Le corps utopique, 
les heterotopies (1966; repr. Paris: Nouvelles 
Éditions Lignes, 2009); and Anderwald, 
Feyertag, and Grond, “Dizziness and the 
Compossible Space in Research-Creation.”
12 See Davide Deriu, “‘Don’t Look Down!’ A 
Short History of Rooftopping Photography,” 
Journal of Architecture 21, no. 7 (2016): 
1033–61. 
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decks of American skyscrapers such as Chicago’s Hancock Centre and the 
Willis (Sears) Tower, for example, have been retrofitted with overhanging 
ledges that invite an immersive experience of the urban abyss.”13 This archi-
tecture as well as the practices of its human appropriation, for example, 
through illicit rooftopping, skywalking, and funambulism,14 and their visual 
modes of (self-)representation via social media end up making people used 
to vertiginous heights. Deriu tentatively suggests that political and economic 
purposes underlie this “high-rise architecture,” deliberately inducing dizziness 
in order to accustom citizens not only to vertiginous sensations, but also to 
dizzying ups and downs of the financial speculation or precarious working 
conditions.15 It is such purposes that transform dizziness into a method, making 
people insensitive to the abysmal, to general disorientation, growing social 
inequalities, and the shared condition of an exaggerated imperative to optimize 
the individual human being according to the demands of the market in our 
accelerated societies.16 However, we only seem able to critically reflect on 
dizziness as a phenomenon on the basis of personal experiences.
Literally, Dizziness
Yet, another example for vertiginous heights and the existential, but ambiguous 
implications of dizziness and falling into aporia is found in Jorge Luis Borges’s 
short story “The Library of Babel” (1941). Borges uses the library and its specific 
Babylonian architecture, hexagonal galleries that are superposed endlessly, 
as a dizzying metaphor for the universe. To share this literary experience, I quote 
the entire paragraph:
The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite, 
perhaps infinite number of hexagonal galleries. In the center of each 
gallery is a ventilation shaft, bounded by a low railing. From any hexagon 
one can see the floors above and below—one after another, endlessly. 
The arrangement of the galleries is always the same: Twenty bookshelves, 
five to each side, line four of the hexagon’s six sides; the height of the 
bookshelves, floor to ceiling, is hardly greater than the height of a normal 
librarian. One of the hexagon’s free sides opens onto a narrow sort of 
vestibule, which in turn opens onto another gallery, identical to the first—
identical in fact to all. To the left and right of the vestibule are two tiny 
compartments. One is for sleeping, upright; the other, for satisfying one’s 
physical necessities. Through this space, too, there passes a spiral stair-
case, which winds upward and downward into the remotest distance. […] 
Like all the men of the Library, in my younger days I travelled; I have 
journeyed in quest of a book, perhaps the catalog of catalogs. Now that 
my eyes can hardly make out what I myself have written, I am preparing 
to die, a few leagues from the hexagon where I was born. When I am 
dead, compassionate hands will throw me over the railing; my tomb will 
be the unfathomable air, my body will sink for ages, and will decay and 
dissolve in the wind engendered by my fall, which shall be infinite.17
But not only would this unimaginable infinite space of the library—its vertigi-
nous architecture—make us feel dizzy, the story’s end touches on an existential 
kind of dizziness: when there is no longer any hold, falling becomes the  
human condition par excellence and not only our sense of balance, but the 
sense of human life itself collapses:
Methodical composition distracts me from the present condition of  
humanity. The certainty that everything has already been written annuls 
us, or renders us phantasmal. […] I am perhaps misled by old age and 
fear, but I suspect that the human species—the only species—teeters at 
the verge of extinction, yet that the Library—enlightened, solitary, infinite, 
13 Davide Deriu, “Architecture and Vertigo: 
States of Suspension in the Vertical City,” 
in Vertigo in the City (London: University 
of Westminster, 2015), 10.
14 See Deriu’s discussion of Philippe Petit’s 
high-wire walking between New York City’s 
Twin Towers in 1974 in this volume, 118–36.
15 Davide Deriu: “Vertigo in the City” (paper 
presented at the symposium “Agents of 
Confusion!,” Kunsthaus Graz, February 10, 
2017).
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around such questions and concluding the discussion with an unambiguous 
truth, Plato often releases his interlocutors with yet another aporia—as if we 
as humans were to stumble from one impasse to another time and again.
There are many philosophical texts, such as René Descartes’s Meditations on 
First Philosophy (1641), where feeling dizzy, doubtful, troubled, and uncertain 
is closely linked to the act of philosophizing in the sense of resolving an 
aporia. The original Greek word aporia means the negation of poros and can 
be separated into its two morphemes: a- and poros (“without passage”). For 
understanding dizziness in a philosophical and political setting, it is indis-
pensable to understand both notions, aporia and poros. To be sure, poros has 
a wide range of meanings, including passageway, resourcefulness, and expe-
diency. Poros designates potentiality because it is inventiveness. The situation 
or better, the space, in which poros becomes necessary, is the typical space-
time of aporia, the moment when we reach a limit or an impasse and when this 
liminal experience propels us into limitless chaos and dizzying perplexity. 
Though poros cannot offer the same security as hodos, which is essential to 
any scientific method.23 French philosopher Sarah Kofman gives a multifaceted 
account of aporia in her book Comment s’en sortir? (1983), where she links 
philosophical deconstruction of Greek texts to the autobiographical nightmare 
of a Jewish child being persecuted by the Nazis during World War II.
Poros is not to be confused with odos, a general term designating a path 
or a road of any kind. Poros refers only to a sea-route or a route down a 
perfectly unmoving, armed with precious volumes, pointless, incorrupt-
ible, and secret—will endure. […] If an eternal traveller should journey in 
any direction, he would find after untold centuries that the same volumes 
are repeated in the same disorder—which, repeated, becomes order: 
the Order. My solitude is cheered by that elegant hope.18
It was in 1941 that Jorge Luis Borges wrote this tale in Buenos Aires. A lot has 
been written about it since then, especially with today’s focus on digitization, 
data storage, and artificial intelligence. How can we imagine this space, chaotic 
and ordered at the same time? It is hard to visualize such a complex and infi-
nite system of architecture suspended in the void. As readers we lose orientation. 
A space filled with all books that could ever be written, all possible and even 
the impossible books; the immoveable Library, which will endure and survive 
humankind. As already mentioned, the specific liminal space-time of aporia 
can be compared with the compossible space. Borges’s Library is a metaphor 
for such a space. Yet, it is not utopian but heterotopian in Michel Foucault’s 
sense. It is a completely different, yet perfectly real space; an-other space 
compared to our common and shared social spaces. A heterotopia is the “con-
testation of all other spaces,” a “counter-site.”19 Besides the colonies of the 
seventeenth century in the Americas, the fairgrounds, vacation villages, prisons, 
and asylum houses, museums and libraries form part of yet another type of 
heterotopia: not only are the latter two spaces outside our common spaces of 
daily business, but they are also “heterochronies” of a special kind, “indefi-
nitely accumulating time,” like cemeteries. Will this “idea of accumulating 
everything, of establishing a sort of general archive,”20 make humankind redun-
dant in the long run and contribute to the loss of the human sense of balance 
and orientation?
Besides the dizzying or vertiginous heights of architectural and literary con-
struction and against this backdrop of heterotopian compossible spaces, I 
want to take a closer look on the existential moment of dizziness to which the 
last paragraph of the Borges tale refers: the human species teetering on the 
verge of extinction. This moment of dizziness is a proper aporia, leading to 
chaos and disorder. The fear of extinction and death is what makes looking 
down the abyss so dreadful. Before this fear of death comes the fear of falling. 
But what if we even don’t realize that we are falling because there is no 
ground?21
Existential Dizziness
One could claim that Greek philosophy as such arose out of aporia. For instance, 
the Platonic dialogue uses aporia as rhetorical device to point out the questions 
humankind is unable to resolve.22 Instead of closing a dialogue that revolves 
17 Borges, “Library of Babel,” 112. 
18 Borges, 118.
19 Michel Foucault, Le corps utopique, les 
hétérotopies (1966; repr. Paris: Nouvelles 
Éditions Lignes, 2009), 34 and 24. Unless 
otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
20 Foucault, 30. 
21 Steyerl, “In Free Fall,” 2011.
22 Aporia as rhetorical device is understood 
here in the sense of “deliberating with 
oneself as though in doubt over some matter; 
asking oneself (or rhetorically asking one’s 
hearers) what is the best or appropriate 
way to approach something” (see “aporia,” 
http://rhetoric.byu.edu/). But aporia can 
also be understood in the way Sarah 
Kofman metaphorically describes it as an 
escapeless situation where we lose the 
ground beneath our feet and start falling: 
“Like the sophists, Socrates draws his 
interlocutors into a situation from which 
there is no escape, makes them fall into a 
directionless space where they become 
disoriented and dizzy. The aporetic state 
always arises as one moves from a familiar 
environment or space to a space to which 
one is unaccustomed, during a transition 
from below to above or from above to 
below, from darkness to light or from light 
to darkness. In both cases, falling into an 
aporia is like falling into a well of perplexity 
and becoming a laughing stock for 
bystanders.” Sarah Kofman, “Beyond Aporia?,” 
trans. David Macey, in Post­Structuralist 
Classics, ed. Andrew Benjamin (New York: 
Routledge, 1988), 19–20 (emphasis in 
original). The English translation is only an 
incomplete translation of Kofman’s book 
Comment s’en sortir? (Paris: Galilee, 1983).
23 From Greek methodos “scientific inquiry, 
method of inquiry, investigation,” originally 
“pursuit, a following after,” from meta “in 
pursuit or quest of,” and hodos “a method, 
system; a way or manner” (of doing, saying, 
etc.), also “a traveling, journey,” literally “a 
path, track, road” (https://www.etymonline 
.com/word/method). 
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De-coincidence
Like poros, the way through heterotopia or the compossible space is not traced 
in advance by a method, following an hodos, which remains always the most 
appropriate and fittest. Jullien recently started to speak about human existence 
and evolution as a way of “ex-aptation,” and “decoincidence.” His thesis reads 
that human beings only come into existence by the very fact that they fall out 
of existence, understood as unconsciously and unreflectingly succumbing  
to life instincts. It is only because humans are not adequate to their environment, 
because they fail to become adequate or adapted to the world that they ex-
perience a gap between themselves and the world. Jullien stresses the importance 
of divergence, écart, and non-adequation and makes it the proper element of 
human “ex-istence.” It is only humans that can exist in the sense of not coinciding 
with themselves and the world. Jullien parts from a theory of modern art 
when life of the artwork only begins once the adequation with an object or sub-
ject fails. It is only when art does not equal the object or subject, when art 
does not coincide with nature, that the autonomy of art equals the autonomy 
and freedom of humans, or as Deleuze and Guattari formulate: “The artist 
creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of creation is that the 
compound must stand up on its own.”25 The human ability to deviate from  
the given, from the norm, and from the so-called natural, and to withstand this 
marginalization and ex-istence in the sense of “standing apart,” makes up human 
freedom.26
Yet the human species, writes Borges in his short story, is teetering at the edge 
of extinction.27 But human existence or evolution might also be conceived  
as always having to redefine its ground or source. Will humankind disappear 
by falling into the abyss or will it adapt itself to new environments, as for  
instance to the vertical cities Davide Deriu writes about? Will we be able to 
deviate from the given, from the familiar, and from the norm and might  
dizziness play a role for this “disadaptation”?28 Extinction, the absolute disso-
lution of humankind and of “the Order,” terrifies and inspires the readers of 
Borges’s story. If we try to train our ability to endure dizziness and to invent 
poroi, ways out of terrifying or overwhelming experiences, maybe the human 
species will be able to transform itself instead of perishing. Adapting—or  
ex-apting—to transition processes is key when it comes to find exit strategies 
river, to a passage opened up across a chaotic expanse which it trans-
forms into an ordered, qualified space by introducing differentiated 
routes, making visible the various directions of space, by giving direc-
tion to an expanse which was initially devoid of all contours, of all land-
marks. To say that a poros is a way to be found across an expanse of liq-
uid is to stress that a poros is never traced in advance, that it can always 
be obliterated, that it must always be traced anew, in unprecedented 
fashion. […] The watery depths [l’abîme marin in the original version], the 
pontos, is the ultimate apeiron [c’est l’aporie même], aporon because 
apeiron: the sea is the endless realm of pure movement, the most mo-
bile, changeable and polymorphous of all spaces […]; it is analogous 
with Hesiod’s Tartarus, with the image of chaos itself; Tartarus is a realm 
of wild swirling squalls where there are no directions, no left and no 
right, no up and no down, where there are no fixed directions, where 
one can find no landmarks, no bearings to travel by.24
In Kofman’s sense, poros is characterized by the impossibility to reiterate a 
route on water, which does not leave any traces to follow and cannot be 
shared. Nevertheless, poros has the potential of “giving direction, contour, 
and landmarks” within the “most mobile, changeable and polymorphous of all 
spaces.” It is this potential that dizziness shares with poros: the ability to set 
into motion and reorientate a lost movement in the limbo of space and time. 
Yet, dizziness cannot become a method in the traditional sense—a meta- 
hodos—because a method always implies a grounded way, going straight for-
ward; it implies a hodos that can be repeated or followed endlessly. Hodos is 
the basis of modern experimental science. But what happens when scientific 
laws are challenged, for instance, the laws of gravitation formulated by Isaac 
Newton and called into question by Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity? If 
scientific evolution appears to have dizzying effects on its own scientific 
methodology, poros in the end seems more appropriate than hodos to reveal 
new and creative approaches to the unknown.
Groundlessness, disorder, movement, or chaos seems to be the basis of the 
universe and human existence or—in Borges’s language—of the library. We 
cannot know whether we fall downward or upward because we don’t know if 
there is an end or a “ground” to the universe. All this contributes to our confu-
sion, our feeling of being lost and disorientated. “Chaos” is the ancient Greek 
word for disorder, and in Hesiod’s cosmogony it signals the beginning of our 
world or the cosmos, that is, of order. Dizziness understood as resource, 
which is another translation of poros, leads us back into this initial chaos.
24 Kofman, “Beyond Aporia?,” 10, 19 (emphasis 
in original).
25 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and 
Hugh Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), 164.
26 See François Jullien, La dé­coincidence: 
D’où viennent l’art et l’existence (Paris: 
Grasset, 2017).
27 Borges, “Library of Babel,” 118.
28 Jullien urges a reconfiguration of the paleo-
anthropological concept of “ex-aptation”, 
which is not the adaptation of the human 
being, but a “disadaptation”. In his sense, 
exaptation means leaving behind a precedent 
adaptation and putting to the test new 
potentialities. See Jullien La dé­coincidence.
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in a dizzying world. Therefore, core questions concerning the navigation of 
dizziness remain for the future:
Is there a way out of dizziness? Is it poros or hodos?
Is there any helping or compassionate hand to be expected?
Do we need to overcome dizziness together  
or is an exaptation also possible for each of us alone?
Might we share experiences of dizziness?
Might we share the resources that help navigate dizziness on unknown territory?
In her essay “In Free Fall: A Thought Experiment on Vertical Perspective” (2011), 
Hito Steyerl discusses the painting The Slave Ship (1840) by J. W. M. Turner to 
illustrate the shift from the linear central perspective, due to a stable horizon, 
to the dizzying perspective of a horizon in motion:
The scene in the painting represents a real incident: when the captain of 
a slave ship discovered that his insurance only covered slaves lost at sea, 
and not those dying or ill on board, he ordered all dying and sick slaves to 
be thrown overboard. Turner’s painting captures the moment where the 
slaves are beginning to go under. In this painting, the horizon line, if dis-
tinguishable at all, is tilted, curved, and troubled. The observer has lost 
his stable position. […] At the sight of the effects of colonialism and slavery, 
linear perspective—the central viewpoint, the position of mastery, con-
trol, and subjecthood—is abandoned and starts tumbling and tilting, taking 
with it the idea of space and time as systematic constructions. The idea 
of a calculable and predictable future shows a murderous side through 
an insurance that prevents economic loss by inspiring cold-blooded 
murder. Space dissolves into mayhem on the unstable and treacherous 
surface of an unpredictable sea.29
“Being thrown overboard”—this formulation echoes “The Library of Babel”: 
“When I am dead, compassionate hands will throw me over the railing; my 
tomb will be the unfathomable air, my body will sink for ages, and will decay 
and dissolve in the wind engendered by my fall, which shall be infinite.”30 
With one difference: Borges’s hands, which shall deliver the dead librarian, 
are compassionate and helping, whereas the hands that throw the slaves 
overboard are acting on instruction from a captain of a slave ship on the 
make for profit.31 Turner paired his painting, which was exhibited for the first 
time in 1840 at the Royal Academy during a meeting of the Anti-slavery Society 
Convention in London, with his unfinished and unpublished poem “Fallacies 
of Hope” (1812):
Aloft all hands, strike the top-masts and belay; 
Yon angry setting sun and fierce-edged clouds 
Declare the Typhon’s coming. 
Before it sweeps your decks, throw overboard 
The dead and dying—ne’er heed their chains 
Hope, Hope, fallacious Hope! 
Where is thy market now?32
According to Jullien, decoinciding is understood as the only way for humans 
to become human and to resist dehumanization. It even might seem like a 
strategy to disclose paths of divergence regarding “the market”: decoincidence 
could be read as resistance to not becoming used to or accustomed to the 
vertiginous heights of the vertical city or to the demands of accelerated per-
fectionism in our capitalist societies. One of these paths might be opened 
up by Austrian artist Oliver Ressler, whose documentary films portray individuals 
in collective settings of radical social and political change, especially with 
regard to today’s working conditions.33 The metaphor of falling is particularly 
of interest when considering how to find a (new) way, make a (new) move, 
create a (new) concept. This is especially true when we link the problem of 
falling to the physical question of gravity, the question arises: What is falling 
and how does gravity participate in the creation of existence?
29 Hito Steyerl, “In Free Fall: A Thought 
Experiment on Vertical Perspective,” 




30 Borges, “Library of Babel,” 112. 
31 On the spectrum of motives of and moti-
vations for taking action, deliberative 
action, acting out, and enacting, see Alice 
Pechriggl, Agieren und Handeln: Studien 
zu einer philosophisch­psychoanaly ti schen 
Handlungstheorie (Bielefeld: transcript, 
2018).
32 Turner, quoted in A. J. Finberg, The Life of 
J. M. W. Turner (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), 474.
33 See the conversation between Oliver 
Ressler and Kathrin Bucher Trantow in this 
volume, 232–44.
Fig. 65 
J. M. W. Turner, The Slave 
Ship (Slavers Throwing 
Over board the Dead and 
Dying, Typhoon Coming 
On), 1840
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Falling Together Apart
Anderwald and Grond, when initiating their artistic research project “Dizziness— 
A Resource,” referred to Lucretius’s notion of the clinamen to highlight the exis-
tential dimension of dizziness as motion. The Roman philosopher and poet ob-
served that atoms, when moving straight down through the void by their own 
weight, “deflect a bit in space at a quite uncertain time and in uncertain places, just 
enough that you could say that their motion has changed. But if they were not in 
the habit of swerving, […] no collision would occur […] nature would never have 
produced anything.”34 This clinamen became also part of Jullien’s theory of deco-
incidence, because the word “de-coincidence” stems from the Latin word for 
falling in, incidere. Literally, a coincidence means the falling together of the one 
and the other in simultaneous motion. For Jullien, life itself begins with pure co-
incidence, which is only made possible by a certain deviation upstream, an incli-
nation of a straight forward movement, without which “no collision would occur.” 
In the interview on dizziness, Jullien stresses the importance of ambiguity when 
we consider the meaning of dizziness. As for his own concept of decoincidence, 
dizziness always enables both motion and standstill, and potential for radical 
change and gradual exaptation to changing environments, positive and negative 
effects, as well as bodily experience and theoretical reflection.
Instead of choosing either the one or the other, it seems to be the combination 
of limit and limitlessness, of motion and standstill, which gives ground (arche) for 
something new to emerge out of chaos or the void.35 Disorientation and dizziness 
go hand in hand with orientation and directed motion. At this liminal turning point 
of becoming, what enables transition are the peirata, the landmarks. Kofman also 
translates the Greek word peras (limit) to mean link. If there is a possibility to establish 
a relation, to link one move with another, something new appears. This is not always 
happening suddenly, but gradually. There might be some kind of before and beyond, 
but it will only be après coup, afterward, when we realize there had been a before.
Coming to an end of these reflections on dizziness and aporia, dizziness might 
not become a method in the traditional scientific sense but nevertheless takes 
part in creating poroi, helping us to navigate the unknown. Furthermore, dizziness 
as “method” of artistic research and as a means for human exaptation to existing 
ways of perception, experience, and reflection will have to be distinguished from 
kinds of dizziness that are instrumentalized for specific purposes of political, 
economic, egocentric, and ethnocentric profit.
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in The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings 
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The feelings of dizziness and vibrations are closely related. Most people 
experience vibrations at one point or another, and some even frequently. The 
unmistakable feeling of the body vibrating can be overwhelming. More often, 
though, the feeling is less distinct, and the vibrations are ignored or brushed 
aside as being caused by something else, like a truck passing, the floor rocking, 
a sudden spell of wobbliness. In dance and ritual, vibrations are made visible 
through the shaking of the performers. This shaking, as well as the vibrations 
that are sensed but unseen, can be understood as the first step in a transformation: 
a signal from phantom bodies, lost memories, and new identities trying to 
wriggle their way out.
Joachim Koester (artist)
This book gets your head spinning. While being bombarded by daily reports 
of crises (both real and fictional), while destabilization has become normal 
and feelings of disorientation, fear, and dizziness have started to prevail in 
our everyday lives, the contributors to this book reverse this perspective by 
emphasizing that dizziness is a valuable resource. Dizziness—A Resource  
is the result of the cross-disciplinary research project initiated in 2014 by 
artistic duo Ruth Anderwald and Leonhard Grond. What can we gain when 
balance is lost? How can anarchy and dizziness empower us? How can a 
cognitive vertigo fuel our cognition? Artists, scientists, philosophers, and art 
critics attempt to answer these questions and to show us how to navigate  
a world marked by unpredictable change.
Małgorzata Ludwisiak (director, Ujazdowski Castle Centre for Contemporary 
Art, Warsaw)
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Katrin Bucher Trantow, Davide Deriu, Karoline Feyertag, Leonhard Grond, 
Sarah Kolb, François Jullien, Rebekka Ladewig, Jarosław Lubiak, Alice Pechriggl, 
Oliver Ressler, Maya M. Shmailov, Maria Spindler, Marcus Steinweg 
